

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20506

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

ACTION

October 27, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PS*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Acland: October 28,
3:00 p.m.

You have agreed to meet with Ambassador Acland, who will be accompanied by Embassy Political Counselor, John Kerr. Acland has been seeking an introductory meeting for some time, but will come in tomorrow under specific instructions from Prime Minister Thatcher to convey British thoughts on Reykjavik.

In sum, the Prime Minister supports the position we took on INF, 50 percent reduction in ballistic missiles, and the SDI research program. She is concerned about the 10-year timeframe for eliminating ballistic missiles, particularly the impact this would have on the British Trident program. The new UK Trident submarines are currently scheduled to come into service in 1996. She is also deeply concerned about the impact of deep cuts in strategic forces on nuclear deterrence. All these are issues on which you are well versed.

Acland made these points to Secretary Shultz in a meeting on October 23 (see reporting message at Tab A). Acland is also under instructions to meet with Secretary Weinberger. The points Acland is making represent a preview of what Mrs. Thatcher is expected to say to the President at Camp David on November 15. That meeting is now set, but Acland may want to discuss it.

Chemical weapons have also long been high on the British agenda. You will recall that the British are pushing a watered down inspection system. Acland told the Secretary that Mrs. Thatcher agreed with us on the need to negotiate conventional reductions Alliance-to-Alliance. She is, however, concerned about how we move forward, particularly given the French position.

All of this sounds very similar to what Kohl told the President last week. You will recall that Kohl referred to his phone conversation with Mrs. Thatcher. What we are seeing is a coordinated European approach aimed at underlining those points about which they are uneasy or feel vulnerable. In the case of Mrs. Thatcher, she is clearly concerned about the impact of the Reykjavik proposals on domestic politics in Britain.

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BY KML NARA DATE 11/29/11

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You may also wish to discuss terrorism and Syria with Acland.

RECOMMENDATION

That you draw on the above in your meeting with Acland.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Report on Acland's meeting with Shultz

cc: Jack Matlock
Bob Linhard

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WHSR COMMENT: REYKJAVIK

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
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, US, UK, UR
SUBJECT: UK AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY:
- BRITISH THOUGHTS ON REYKJAVIK

1 - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR CONVEYED PRIME
MINISTER THATCHER'S CONSIDERED VIEWS ON REYKJAVIK TO
THE SECRETARY ON OCTOBER 23.



THE
SECRETARY REVIEWED FOR ACLAND THE BACKGROUND OF THE
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS AT REYKJAVIK AND THE HISTORY OF
THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITIONS ON ARMS CONTROL. HE
SAID HE ALSO BELIEVED IT NECESSARY FOR ALL CONCERNED TO
THINK ABOUT THE MATTERS RAISED AT REYKJAVIK CAREFULLY
AND THAT HE THOUGHT DISCUSSIONS IN A RESTRICTED
FRAMEWORK WOULD BE DESIRABLE. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR ACLAND CALLED ON THE SECRETARY OCTOBER
23 ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM LONDON TO PRESENT PRIME
MINISTER THATCHER'S CONSIDERED THOUGHTS ON THE ISSUES
AND PROPOSALS DISCUSSED AT REYKJAVIK. HE BEGAN BY
SAYING THAT MRS. THATCHER HAD STUDIED THE SECRETARY'S
BRIEFING AT NATO AND THE DELIBERATIONS AT GLENEAGLES
AND HAD SPOKEN WITH LORD CARRINGTON AND PRESIDENT
MITTERRAND ON THE SUBJECT. SHE LOOKED FORWARD TO
SEEING THE PRESIDENT ON NOVEMBER 15 AND THE OPPORTUNITY
TO EXPLORE THE ISSUE FURTHER.



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9. THE SECRETARY TOLD ACLAND THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE INTERESTED IN MRS. THATCHER'S VIEWS, REFLECTING PERSONALLY ON DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMS CONTROL, HE SAID THAT MANY OF THE PRESIDENT'S POSITIONS IN THIS AREA HAD BEEN CRITICIZED INITIALLY AS UNREALISTIC OR NOT SERIOUS ONLY LATER TO BE ACCEPTED AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. FOLLOWING REYKJAVIK THE U.S. POSITIONS ON INF AND BALLISTIC MISSILE REDUCTIONS HAVE TAKEN ON MORE REALITY AND PEOPLE ARE SEEING THAT THEY MAY REALLY

TAKE PLACE. HE SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL AT REYKJAVIK ON SDI WAS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM THAT DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY. THE U.S. HAD REARRANGED ITS PROPOSAL INTO THE 10-YEAR PACKAGE PRESENTED TO GORBACHEV, AND THE RUSSIANS HAD MOVED DOWN FROM 15-20 YEARS TO 15 YEARS IN THEIR PROPOSAL.

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10. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE DISCUSSION OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD BOTHERED SOME PEOPLE AND THE ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS DID NOT ACCEPT THE IDEA. THE PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, SENSED THE GROWING UNEASE ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, AND LOOKED FOR A STABLE PATTERN WITHIN WHICH TO REDUCE THEM. SINCE UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT WAS NOT TO ERABLE, THERE WAS A NEED TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS THAT THE ONLY WAY TO APPROACH THE QUESTION WAS TO NEGOTIATE. FOR THEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT UNLESS THERE WAS A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD BE CONFRONTED WITH DEPLOYMENTS.

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11. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT REYKJAVIK MAY REPRESENT THE PEAK OF THE BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AFTER THE MEETING, PEOPLE HAD BEGUN TALKING ABOUT REDUCTIONS WITH MORE CARE BECAUSE THEY REALIZED THAT SOMETHING JUST MIGHT HAPPEN. THERE WAS NOW A NEED TO TALK ABOUT ALL OF THE ISSUES WITH GREAT CARE INCLUDING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HE SAID HE HAD TALKED TO THE GERMANS DURING CHANCELLOR KOHL'S VISIT ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF A FEW PEOPLE FROM A FEW GOVERNMENTS DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES IN DETAIL AND AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC EYE. HE SAID HE HAD IN MIND THE "USUAL SUSPECTS," THE U.S., UK, FRANCE, AND THE FRG.

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12. ON THE QUESTION OF AN ALLIED POSITION ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD ALSO TALKED WITH THE GERMANS ON THE SUBJECT. HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE GOOD TO HAVE AN ALLIED POSITION BY VIENNA AND THAT BY DECEMBER WE SHOULD HAVE THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND BE ABLE TO LOOK AT PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE POINTS AT THE NAC.

13. RESPONDING TO MRS. THATCHER'S QUESTION ABOUT THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT FROM THE DISCUSSIONS AT REYKJAVIK THAT IT WAS OBVIOUS TO THE US AND THE SOVIETS THAT NEITHER WOULD REDUCE THEIR MISSILE FORCES TO ZERO UNLESS THE FRENCH, CHINESE, AND BRITISH DID LIKEWISE. THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PHASE OF AN AGREEMENT WOULD BRING ABOUT A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION. IF THAT TOOK PLACE, IT WOULD PRESENT THE OTHER COUNTRIES WITH THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH THEIR FORCES. THE CHINESE HAVE SO FAR BEEN IMPRECISE IN THEIR REACTION,

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HE SAID. THEY SAY THAT IF THE U. S. AND THE USSR GO TO
ZERO THEN THEY WILL BE HAPPY TO DO SO.

14. OTHER TOPICS COVERED BY THE SECRETARY AND
AMBASSADOR ACLAND DURING MEETING ARE REPORTED IN
SEPTELS. WHITEHEAD
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