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18

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS EAST WEST US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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
OF 131200Z OCTOBER 86

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US/SOVIET RELATIONS: TELEVISION ADDRESS BY GORBACHEV



SUMMARY

1. IN AN ADDRESS ON SOVIET TELEVISION ON 23 OCTOBER GORBACHEV REPEATED MUCH OF HIS EARLIER ANALYSIS OF REYKJAVIK. HE CITED IN PARTICULAR THE US ATTITUDE TO SDI AND THE POST-REYKJAVIK EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET PERSONNEL AS ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF DEALING WITH THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, ADJUST HIS PREVIOUS ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF REYKJAVIK AND INSISTED THAT HIS PACKAGE OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS REMAIN ON THE TABLE.

DETAIL

2. THE MAJOR PART OF GORBACHEV'S 50 MINUTE ADDRESS WAS TAKEN UP WITH A REPETITION OF THE POINTS MADE IN HIS TELEVISION ADDRESS ON 14 OCTOBER (MY TELNO 1206), WITH A MORE SUSTAINED ATTACK ON SDI. HE SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING 'WE HAVE RISEN TO A HIGHER LEVEL, NOT ONLY IN ANALYSING THE SITUATION, BUT ALSO IN DETERMINING THE OBJECTIVES AND FRAMEWORK OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT..... IT IS THE COMMON VIEW THAT THE MEETING HAS RAISED BOTH THE US/SOVIET DIALOGUE AND THE EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AS A WHOLE TO A NEW LEVEL'. HE ADDED: 'THE ROUTE TOWARDS A SOLUTION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS WAS OUTLINED THERE. BUT THE PERIOD SINCE REYKJAVIK HAS DEMONSTRATED SOMETHING DIFFERENT'.

3. ON SDI, HE REFERRED TO THE AMERICAN ARGUMENTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS AFRAID OF IT, THAT IT HAD BROUGHT THE RUSSIANS TO NEGOTIATE, THAT IT WOULD SAVE AMERICA FROM THE SOVIET THREAT AND THAT IT WOULD GIVE THE US A GREAT TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD. HE MADE THE FAMILIAR CRITICISM THAT CONTINUATION OF THE PROGRAMME WOULD DRAW THE WORLD TO A NEW STAGE OF THE ARMS RACE AND WOULD DE-STABILISE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. 'IF THE PRESIDENT COUNTS ON SDI..... IT IS IN VAIN. THE SYSTEM WILL ONLY BE EFFECTIVE IF ALL MISSILES ARE ELIMINATED BUT THEN WHY IS AN ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE NECESSARY AT ALL?' 'SO FAR WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE AMERICA TO GIVE UP THE DANGEROUS UNDERTAKING. WE ARE URGING THE US ADMINISTRATION TO LOOK FOR INVULNERABILITY AND PROTECTION ALONG THE PATH OF A COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE CREATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE ANY WARS - BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL'.

EXCLUDE ANY WARS - BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL

4. GORBACHEV ALSO SAID THAT THE US POSITION AT REYKJAVIK ON SDI RAN
COUNTER TO THE ABM TREATY. ARTICLE 15 ALLOWED FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM
THE TREATY BUT ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, NAMELY IF
"EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE PUT (A PARTY'S) SUPREME INTERESTS
UNDER THREAT". "THERE HAVE BEEN NO SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AND THERE
ARE NONE NOW..... THE ELIMINATION ON NINTAR WEAPONS, IF STARTED,
WOULD MAKE THE EMERGENCE OF SUCH EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS STILL LESS
PROBABLE". ARTICLE 13 OF THE ABM TREATY ENVISAGED THAT THE SIDES
SHOULD "CONSIDER AS NECESSARY POSSIBLE PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER
INCREASING THE VIABILITY OF THE TREATY". THE US, ON THE
CONTRARY, WERE ATTEMPTING TO DEVALUE IT. GORBACHEV COMMENTED: "IT
IS HARD FOR THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION TO LEARN LESSONS".

5. AFTER REYKJAVIK THE US HAD RECENTLY TAKEN ACTIONS "WHICH
FROM A NORMAL HUMAN POINT OF VIEW LOOK SIMPLY WILD AFTER SUCH AN
IMPORTANT MEETING". GORBACHEV REFERRED TO THE EXPULSION OF 55
SOVIET MEMBERS OF STAFF FROM THE US. "WE WILL OF COURSE ADOPT
MEASURES IN RESPONSE, VERY TOUGH MEASURES, SO TO SAY, ON AN EQUAL
FOOTING. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING SUCH AN OUTRAGE.....
WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT IS IT, WHAT CAN ONE EXPECT FROM IT ON OTHER
MATTERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE? WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF THE
UNPREDICTABILITY OF ITS ACTIONS? NOT ONLY DOES IT HAVE NO
CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS ON KEY QUESTIONS OF DISARMAMENT BUT IT DOES
NOT EVEN HAVE A DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THE ATMOSPHERE ESSENTIAL FOR
NORMAL CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE..... QUITE AN UNATTRACTIVE
PORTRAIT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF A GREAT COUNTRY IS EMERGING.....
EITHER THE PRESIDENT CANNOT DEAL WITH AN ENTOURAGE WHICH LITERALLY
BREATHES HATRED FOR THE SOVIET UNION..... OR ELSE HE HIMSELF WANTS
THAT. IN ANY CASE THERE ARE NO CONSTRAINTS ON THE HAWKS IN THE
WHITE HOUSE....."

6. GORBACHEV CONTINUED WITH AN ATTACK ON THE US CONCEPT OF FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION, AND THE PRESENTATION OF REYKJAVIK. PRESIDENT
REAGAN HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE US RECOGNISED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND
THE RIGHT TO LISTEN TO ANY POINT OF VIEW, BUT THE FACT WAS THAT
THE NOVOSTI ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEXT OF GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE
AND SPEECHES WERE NOW HELD IN US CUSTOMS. IN ADDITION, BY
COMPARISON WITH AMERICAN FILMS IN THE SOVIET UNION, HARDLY ANY
SOVIET FILMS WERE SHOWN IN THE US, AND THE RATIO OF PUBLISHED
RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN BOOKS IN EACH OTHER'S COUNTRY WAS RESPECTIVELY
20:1. ON RADIO INFORMATION, GORBACHEV HAD SUGGESTED TO REAGAN
"WE WILL GIVE UP JAMMING VOA IF YOU ALLOW US THE POSSIBILITY OF
SETTING UP RADIO BROADCASTS FOR THE US, EITHER ON YOUR TERRITORY
OR NEARBY". THE PRESIDENT HAD PROMISED TO CONSIDER THIS.

7. THE US HAD DISTORTED THE OUTCOME OF REYKJAVIK. WHILE SHULTZ
HAD SAID THAT THE PROPOSED DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT IN REYKJAVIK
COVERED ALL STRATEGIC WEAPONS, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ASSISTANTS
HAD SAID THAT ONLY BALLISTIC MISSILES WERE INVOLVED, LEAVING OUT
BOMBERS AND ALL CRUISE MISSILES. "WITH ALL RESPONSIBILITY AS A
PARTICIPANT IN THE TALKS I SAY: THE PRESIDENT - ALBEIT WITHOUT
PARTICULAR ENTHUSIASM - GAVE HIS AGREEMENT THAT ALL STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, AND NOT ONLY CERTAIN OF THEM, WOULD BE DESTROYED.
THEY WOULD BE DESTROYED PRECISELY OVER 10 YEARS, IN TWO STAGES."
THE DISCUSSION ON NUCLEAR TESTING HAD ALSO BEEN DISTORTED. THE
SOVIET UNION HAD NOT AGREED TO THE US UNILATERAL APPROACH, "NOR
COULD IT HAVE".

8. SOME VOICES IN WESTERN EUROPE WERE NOW MAINTAINING THAT IT WAS
DIFFICULT TO PART WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. "POLICY MAKERS" IN THE
WEST CLAIMED THAT THE DIFFICULTIES AT REYKJAVIK RESULTED FROM THE
PACKAGE NATURE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. "ALL OUR PROPOSALS MADE
IN REYKJAVIK ARE OBJECTIVELY CONNECTED WITH THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC
WEAPONS SYSTEMS. OUR CONCESSIONS ARE ALSO PART OF THE PACKAGE.
NO PACKAGE, NO CONCESSIONS". GORBACHEV CONCLUDED: "THE SOVIET
UNION HAS DEPLOYED MAXIMUM GOOD-WILL IN ITS PROPOSALS. WE ARE NOT
WITHDRAWING THESE PROPOSALS, WE ARE NOT WITHDRAWING THEM (EXCLAM)
EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT THEIR BASIS AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT
REMAINS IN FORCE".

*To Mr. Barkley
right*

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MIPT: GORBACHEV'S TV ADDRESS: COMMENT

SUMMARY

1. A FIRM, AT TIMES ANGRY, BUT NOT VERY POLISHED SPEECH OCCASIONED BY US EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS BUT DIRECTED AT THE POST-REYKJAVIK SITUATION. NO NEW IDEAS. GORBACHEV EXPOSES AMERICAN CONFUSION OVER WHETHER AGREED STRATEGIC CUTS INCLUDED ALL, OR ONLY BALLISTIC, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ADDRESSED. SOVIET SCORN FOR THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AND REAGAN. THE IMPLICATION THAT FURTHER SUMMIT UNLIKELY AND FOCUS GRADUALLY TURNING TOWARDS THE POST-REAGAN ERA. GENERAL OBJECTIVE - TO SHOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT BE PUSHED AROUND.

DETAIL

2. ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV FOCUSED HEAVILY ON THE REYKJAVIK OUTCOME, AND IN DOING SO REPEATED MUCH OF WHAT HE HAD SAID BOTH IN REYKJAVIK AND ON SOVIET TELEVISION ON 14 OCTOBER, HIS MAIN MOTIVE FOR MAKING ANOTHER TV APPEARANCE SO SOON WAS CLEARLY TO RESPOND TO THE AMERICAN EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC STAFF. BOTH FOR HIS INTERNATIONAL, AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE FOR HIS DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, HIS MESSAGE WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION, WHILST EXERCISING GREAT RESTRAINT IN THE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE, WAS NOT GOING TO BE KICKED AROUND.

3. THE SPEECH WAS LESS POLISHED THAN THE REYKJAVIK PRESS CONFERENCE OR HIS TV ADDRESS ON 14 OCTOBER. GORBACHEV CLEARLY INTENDED HIS ANGER TO SHOW. BUT HIS DELIVERY WAS NOT FLUENT AND DESPITE THE FIRM TONE HE SEEMED AT TIMES UNEASY. THE SPEECH WAS CLEARLY RECORDED BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SOVIET COUNTER-EXPULSIONS AND OTHER MEASURES AS GORBACHEV REFERRED TO THEM IN THE FUTURE TENSE. BUT BY THE TIME THE SPEECH WAS BROADCAST THE MEASURES HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE PUBLIC. (MY TELNO 1243).

4. IT IS VERY UNUSUAL FOR A GENERAL SECRETARY TO APPEAR SO FREQUENTLY ON TELEVISION AND EVEN MORE SO FOR HIM TO COVER SO MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND SEVERAL TIMES. SINCE HE HAD SO LITTLE NEW TO SAY, I BELIEVE HE RISKS OVER-EXPOSURE IN THE EYES OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC.

HE HAD SO LITTLE NEW TO SAY, I BELIEVE HE RISKS OVER-EXPOSURE IN THE EYES OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC.

5. THE ARMS CONTROL PART OF THE SPEECH CONTAINS LITTLE NEW. IT IS INTERESTING THAT GORBACHEV HAS NOW BEEN STUNG INTO ASSERTING PUBLICLY THAT REAGAN HAD INDEED AGREED TO THE OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING ALL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 15 OF THE ABMT IS ALSO A NEW BUT NOT VERY SIGNIFICANT ARGUMENT AGAINST US WITHDRAWAL.

GORBACHEV ALSO INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO UNSPECIFIED WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS WHO FAVOUR THE RETENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEREBY REVEALING THAT THE "MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX" ON WHOM, AS BEFORE, MUCH OF THE BLAME IS PLACED, ARE NOT ALONE IN THEIR CONCERN.

6. THE PASSAGE ABOUT FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IS ALSO INTERESTING, PERHAPS AS A FORETASTE OF THE CAMPAIGN ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WEST FORESHADOWED IN GORBACHEV'S TALK WITH THE DANISH PRIME MINISTER (MY TELNO 1240). IT IS SURPRISING THAT GORBACHEV WAS PREPARED PUBLICLY TO ADMIT TO JAMMING THE VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCASTS, AND TO OFFER TO END THE JAMMING AGAINST A CONDITION WHICH COULD, IF REAGAN WISHED, QUITE EASILY BE MET. THE ARGUMENT ABOUT NEEDING A TRANSMITTER CLOSE TO OR IN THE US TO REACH AMERICANS ON MEDIUM WAVE SCARCELY APPLIES TO SOVIET BROADCASTS TO THE UK NOR, THEREFORE, TO SOVIET JAMMING OF THE BBC RUSSIAN SERVICE. IT MAY BE WORTH CONSIDERING CALLING WHAT AMOUNTS TO A SOVIET BLUFF.

7. THE SPEECH CONTAINS A NUMBER OF CONTRADICTIONARY SIGNALS. ON THE ONE HAND, GORBACHEV EXPRESSES FAIRLY OPEN CONTEMPT FOR THE US ADMINISTRATION AND REAGAN PERSONALLY ("IT IS HARD FOR THE CURRENT US ADMINISTRATION TO LEARN LESSONS", "WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT IS THIS?", "QUITE AN UNATTRACTIVE PICTURE IS EMERGING OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF A GREAT COUNTRY"). ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SPEECH OPENS WITH A REFERENCE TO THE "HIGHER LEVEL" OF UNDERSTANDING WHICH REYKJAVIK HAD CREATED AND THE RAISING OF THE DIALOGUE TO A "NEW LEVEL", AND ENDS WITH A FIRMLY EMPHASISED RE-STATEMENT OF THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE NOT BEING WITHDRAWN. GORBACHEV SEEMS TO HAVE WISHED TO SIGNAL TO THE DOMESTIC AND WIDER PUBLIC THAT THE SOVIET UNION REMAINED READY TO NEGOTIATE, AND *Resolute* IN THE SEARCH FOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, BUT THAT THESE WERE NOW INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY AS WAS ALSO BY IMPLICATION A FURTHER SUMMIT, AND THAT IT MIGHT PROVE NECESSARY TO LOOK BEYOND REAGAN. HOWEVER, THE WAY AHEAD WAS NOT TOUCHED ON AT ALL AND THE SPEECH LEFT A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS HANGING IN THE AIR.

CARTLEDGE

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