

GRS 800

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 211630Z F C O

TELNO 1235

OF 211345Z OCTOBER 86

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

*A very important message
COP.*

US/SOVIET RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN CALLED ON SHEVARDNADZE ON 20 OCTOBER TO CONVEY SHULTZ'S PROPOSAL THAT THEY SHOULD MEET IN VIENNA ON 5/6 NOVEMBER. AMIABLE BUT REVEALING RETROSPECT ON REYKJAVIK. LOW-KEY EXCHANGE ON EXPULSIONS. ATMOSPHERE GOOD.

DETAIL

presumably no longer!

2. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS GIVEN ME (AND THE FRENCH AND FRG AMBASSADORS) AN ACCOUNT OF HIS CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE (AT HIS OWN REQUEST) ON 20 OCTOBER. HARTMAN'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO CONVEY TO SHEVARDNADZE SECRETARY SHULTZ'S HOPE THAT THEY COULD MEET IN VIENNA TO DISCUSS FOLLOW-UP TO REYKJAVIK. IN PRINCIPLE, SHEVARDNADZE WELCOMED THE PROSPECT OF A MEETING: THERE MAY BE LOGISTIC DIFFICULTIES - SHULTZ CANNOT ARRIVE IN VIENNA UNTIL 5 NOVEMBER AND SHEVARDNADZE HAS TO DEPART FOR MOSCOW ON 6 NOVEMBER - BUT THESE ARE CERTAIN TO BE SURMOUNTED.

3. HARTMAN TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT BOTH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SHULTZ BELIEVED THAT REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE DURING THE REYKJAVIK DISCUSSIONS. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, TWO SIGNIFICANT AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT:-

A) SDI.

IN REYKJAVIK, THE US DELEGATION HAD BEEN GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT BY "LABORATORY RESEARCH" THE RUSSIANS HAD IN MIND RESEARCH WITHIN THE CONFINES OF FOUR WALLS AND A ROOF. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SINCE INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE A BROADER DEFINITION OF RESEARCH AND TESTING ON EARTH, WHILE REMAINING ADAMANT ON RESEARCH OR TESTING IN SPACE. THE US INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT NEVERTHELESS REMAINED THAT, EVEN ON A "RESTRICTIVE" INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY, IT PERMITTED THE TESTING IN SPACE OF "CONCEPTS" OR "COMPONENTS" ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT PERMIT THE TESTING IN SPACE OF COMPLETE ABM WEAPONS SYSTEMS. SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, ANY ABM-RELATED TESTING IN SPACE CONSTITUTED A

CONFIDENTIAL

VIOLATION

CONFIDENTIAL

VIOLATION OF THE ABMT. HE SAID THAT HE WAS NEVERTHELESS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE DIFFERENCES WITH SHULTZ AND THEY COULD BE EXPLORED IN MORE DETAIL BY THE US AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA. HARTMAN CONCLUDED FROM THIS THAT THE SOVIET POSITION MIGHT NOT BE TOTALLY INFLEXIBLE.

B) STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS

HARTMAN EXPLAINED THE US POSITION ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS REDUCTIONS OVER 10 YEARS, NAMELY THAT DURING THE FIRST 5-YEAR PERIOD STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALL CATEGORIES SHOULD BE REDUCED BY 50% BUT THAT IN THE SECOND 5-YEAR PERIOD THIS REDUCTION WOULD APPLY ONLY TO BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE RATIONALE FOR THIS WAS NOT ONLY THAT, SINCE THE PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS WAS RELATED TO A 10 YEAR COMMITMENT TO NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABMT, THE REDUCTIONS SHOULD AFFECT THOSE WEAPONS (IE BALLISTIC MISSILES) TO WHICH THE ABMT WAS RELEVANT; BUT ALSO THAT, BEFORE MOVING TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO DEAL WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND CW, IN VIEW OF SIGNIFICANT SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN BOTH CATEGORIES. SHEVARDNADZE MAINTAINED THAT IN REYKJAVIK THE AMERICANS HAD AGREED THAT THE REDUCTIONS PROCESS SHOULD APPLY TO ALL CATEGORIES OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING THE WHOLE 10-YEAR PERIOD (HARTMAN - PLEASE PROTECT - HAS TOLD ME THAT AT SOME POINT DURING THE REYKJAVIK DISCUSSIONS PRESIDENT REAGAN DID IN FACT SPEAK IN TERMS WHICH WERE OPEN TO THIS INTERPRETATION, ALTHOUGH THE US POSITION WAS REDEFINED IN A PAPER HANDED TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE END OF THE TALKS). SHEVARDNADZE NEVERTHELESS ALLOWED THAT THESE DIFFERENCES, TOO, SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA. HE ALSO AGREED THAT THE ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHICH HARTMAN HAD RAISED WAS LEGITIMATE, WHILE POINTING OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ADVANCED REDUCTIONS PROPOSALS IN BOTH AREAS. SHEVARDNADZE WAS VAGUE ON LINKAGE. HE CATALOGUED SOVIET "CONCESSIONS" AT REYKJAVIK - ON UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS, ON SOVIET INF REDUCTIONS IN ASIA, AND IN AGREEING TO TALKS ON SRNF - BUT MADE NO REFERENCE WHATSOEVER TO NUCLEAR TESTS.

Yes
another
version

But this
is much
better

AK.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. ON US AND SOVIET EXPULSIONS, HARTMAN TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT HE HOPED THAT THE PROCESS WOULD STOP SHORT OF A POINT AT WHICH HE WOULD BE LEFT WITHOUT ADVISERS IN HIS EMBASSY. SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT THE EXPULSION OF 5 US STAFF FROM MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD WAS THE 'MINIMUM RESPONSE' WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT COULD MAKE TO THE US ACTION IN SEEKING THE WITHDRAWAL OF 25 MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET UN MISSION. (HARTMAN MENTIONED, IN PARENTHESIS, THAT AT REYKJAVIK SHEVARDNADZE HAD TOLD SHULTZ THAT SOME OF THE SOVIET STAFF EXPELLED FROM NEW YORK WERE 'PEOPLE ON WHOM HE DEPENDED', THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT SOME OF THE EXPELLEES HAD A DUAL KGB/MFA FUNCTION AND THAT THE US ACTION CONSEQUENTLY HURT NOT ONLY THE KGB BUT THE MFA AS WELL.)

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 5863

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS
LIMITED

SOVIET DEPT.
DEFENCE DEPT.
RESEARCH DEPT.
PLANNING STAFF
EED
NAD
WED
ACDD
CRD
NEWS DEPT.
INFO DEPT.
ECD(E)
FED
NED
POD
PUSD
CSCE UNIT
PROTOCOL DEPT. ESSD
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON

PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
CHIEF CLERK
MR GOODALL
MR FERGUSSON
MR GILLMORE
MR RATFORD
MR DAUNT
MR FEARN
MR LONG
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR BARRINGTON
MR WINCHESTER
MR RENWICK

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

(COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.)

3

CONFIDENTIAL