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MY TELNO 2478 AND MOSCOW TELNO 1152: PROSPECTS FOR REYKJAVIK
SUMMARY

1. WHAT CAN THE RUSSIANS REALISTICALLY EXPECT TO GET AT REYKJAVIK? ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT ON THE ABMT LOOKS VERY UNLIKELY. AGREEMENT ON INF IS NOT YET RIPE, THOUGH FURTHER IMPETUS FROM THE TOP COULD BE PRODUCTIVE THIS WINTER. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, THE US POSITION IS NOW MORE NUANCE, AND SOME PROGRESS POSSIBLE, IF THE RUSSIANS ARE PREPARED TO ALLOW ON-SITE THRESHOLD VERIFICATION. BUT THE US WILL NOT GO FOR A MORATORIUM.

DETAIL

2. ALTHOUGH THE US ARE DETERMINED TO COVER THE WHOLE AGENDA (INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS, AND BILATERAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES) IN REYKJAVIK, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CORE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WILL BE ON ARMS CONTROL. IF ONLY BECAUSE GORBACHEV WILL INSIST (MOSCOW TUR). THE ASSUMPTION HERE IS THAT THE AREAS IN WHICH THE RUSSIANS WILL PRESS HARDEST IN PRIVATE, AND MAKE THE MOST OF IN PUBLIC, ARE THE ABM TREATY, INF, AND NUCLEAR TESTING.

3. ON THE ABM TREATY, THE SOVIET DEMAND WILL PRESUMABLY BE THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ACCEPT ITS EXTENSION FOR UP TO 15 YEARS (AND PERHAPS ALSO THE CODIFICATION OF THE VERY RESTRICTIVE SOVIET INTERPRETATION). THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENT AGREEING: TO DO SO WOULD BE TO GO VERY MUCH FURTHER ON SDI CONSTRAINTS THEN HE HAS SO FAR BEEN PREPARED (EG IN THE 25 JULY LETTER) TO GO. HOW FAR HE IN THE END GOES, EG AT A MOSCOW SUMMIT NEXT YEAR, WILL PARTLY DEPEND ON WHETHER A START DEAL HAS BY THEN COME TO THE BOIL. SINCE START IS NOT NOW BUBBLING, IT WOULD SELF-EVIDENTLY BE BAD NEGOTIATING TACTICS TO GIVE MORE SDI GROUND IN REYKJAVIK. THE RUSSIANS WILL PRESUMABLY REALISE THIS: IF THEY PLAY UP THE ABMT IN REYKJAVIK IT WILL THEREFORE BE PRIMARILY FOR PROPAGANDA REASONS, OR BECAUSE THEY HAVE DECIDED TO CALL OFF FURTHER SUMMITRY: ABMT MOVES THIS MONTH CANNOT BE THEIR LITMUS TEST IN DECIDING WHETHER A NOVEMBER/DECEMBER SUMMIT HERE MAKES SENSE.

4. ON INF THE POSITION IS MORE COMPLEX. THE OUTLINES OF A POSSIBLE FUTURE DEAL ARE NOW CLEARER, BUT DETAILED NEGOTIATION IS STILL REQUIRED ON AT LEAST FIVE ISSUES - VIZ ASIAN NUMBERS, DURATION, THE SOVIET WISH TO HAVE A SAY IN THE GLCM/PERSHING MIX IN WESTERN EUROPE, COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF, AND VERIFICATION.

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THE FIRST THREE ARE IN THEORY CAPABLE OF INSTANT SOLUTION AT A SUMMIT: BUT THE LAST TWO ARE NOT, AND THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS HAVE AS YET BARELY BEEN ADDRESSED IN GENEVA. THE RUSSIANS MAY OF COURSE WANT TO TAKE BOTH AT A GALLOP, IN ORDER TO MAXIMISE INTRA-ALLIANCE PROBLEMS OVER SRINF, AND MINIMISE INTRUSIVE US INSPECTION OF DESTRUCTION, NON-PRODUCTION, AND NON-DEPLOYMENT OF LRINF. BUT THEY MUST KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNLIKELY TO FALL FOR THIS: THE MOST THEY CAN REALISTICALLY EXPECT THEREFORE IS THAT BOTH SIDES WILL AGREE TO GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, WITH A VIEW TO HAVING AT LEAST HEADS OF AGREEMENT TO INITIAL AT A WINTER SUMMIT HERE.

5. SIR B CARTLEDGE POINTS OUT THAT NUCLEAR TESTING MAY BE THE KEY LITMUS ISSUE FOR GORBACHEV. I AGREE, BUT I DON'T AGREE WITH HIS CHARACTERISATION OF THE US POSITION AS QUOTE COMPLETELY HARD UNQUOTE. IN HIS UNGA SPEECH (MY TELNO 2434) THE PRESIDENT PUT FORWARD THE FOLLOWING THREE PROPOSALS, CULLED FROM THE 25 JULY MESSAGE:

- (A) QUOTE JUST AS ELIMINATING ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS OUR LONG TERM GOAL, SO TOO IS A TOTAL BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING. BUT THE REALITY IS THAT FOR NOW WE STILL MUST RELY ON THESE WEAPONS FOR THE DETERRENCE OF WAR UNQUOTE. (IE NUCLEAR TESTING WILL BE REQUIRED AS LONG AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE.)
- (B) BUT QUOTE WE ARE READY TO MOVE FORWARD ON RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND THE PNET, ONCE AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON IMPORTANT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES UNQUOTE ON WHICH THE US HAD TABLED NEW IDEAS.
- (C) QUOTE ON RATIFICATION OF THOSE TREATIES, AND IN ASSOCIATION WITH A PROGRAMME TO REDUCE AND ULTIMATELY ELIMINATE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WAYS TO IMPLEMENT A STEP-BY-STEP PARALLEL PROGRAMME OF LIMITING AND ULTIMATELY ENDING NUCLEAR TESTING UNQUOTE.

6. (A) AND (B) ARE NOT NEW, BUT (C) IS. (A) MEANS THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE AGAIN ON NOTICE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT PREPARED TO EMULATE THEIR MORATORIA AND SO MOVE TO A DE FACTO COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. BUT THEY HAVE KNOWN THAT ALL ALONG. ON (B) THE BALL IS IN THE SOVIET COURT. DURING THE RECENT EXPERT LEVEL TALKS IN GENEVA (BAND'S TELELETTER OF 2 OCTOBER TO PAKENHAM) THE US SIDE HAVE EXPLAINED THE TECHNIQUES WHICH THEY BELIEVE WOULD ENSURE SATISFACTORY VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 150 KT THRESHOLD IN THE TTBT: THE RUSSIANS THOUGH READY TO ENGAGE IN DETAILED TECHNICAL EXCHANGES CLEARLY HAD POLITICAL INSTRUCTIONS TO DISCUSS VERIFICATION ONLY OF A BAN, NOT OF A THRESHOLD. THE US PRIVATE SECTOR SCIENTISTS NOW AT THE SOVIET TEST SITE ARE TO BE THROWN OUT IF SOVIET TESTING RESUMES. THE AMERICANS HAVE INVITED THE RUSSIANS TO MONITOR THEIR TESTS, THE RUSSIANS ALLOW MONITORING ONLY OF THE TEMPORARY ABSENCE OF TESTS, THE WESTERN PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET MORATORIA COULD PERHAPS HAVE TURNED THE SPOTLIGHT MORE EFFECTIVELY ON THIS FLAW IN THE SOVIET CASE: BUT IT WOULD BE RASH FOR GORBACHEV TO ASSUME THAT THE AMERICANS WILL NOT DO SO IF HE TURNS UP THE HEAT IN REYKJAVIK.

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7. THE MOST INTERESTING ELEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION IS HOWEVER (C), WHICH WAS ANATHEMA IN EVERY AGENCY HERE UNTIL THE SPRING, AND IS STILL HOTLY CONTESTED BY THE PENTAGON AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. THERE IS AS YET NO BLUEPRINT HERE FOR A QUOTE STEP BY STEP PROGRAMME UNQUOTE OF DIMINISHING THRESHOLD LEVELS, OR QUOTAS OR TESTS: BUT THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOW ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD BACK SUCH A PROGRAMME MEANS THAT ONE WILL HAVE TO BE DEVISED (OF THE STAR WARS SPEECH IN 1983). IF THE REAL GORBACHEV LITMUS TEST IS AN QUOTE ACHIEVEMENT UNQUOTE ON TESTING, HE COULD PICK UP THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL. BUT IT IS OF COURSE CONTINGENT ON AGREEMENT ON ADEQUATE THRESHOLD VERIFICATION, AND IT IS THE HARD SOVIET LINE - CTB OR NOTHING - WHICH AT PRESENT BLOCKS THAT.

8. OUR INSTINCT IS THAT FOR THE PRESIDENT AGREEMENT ON THE DATE AND AGENDA FOR THE REAL SUMMIT REMAINS THE TEST OF SUCCESS AT REYKJAVIK. BUT HE WILL BE RELUCTANT TO PAY AN ARMS CONTROL PRICE TO SECURE IT. AND HIS RELUCTANCE WILL BE ENHANCED BY THE RIGHT WING REACTIONS HERE TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT REYKJAVIK, THE RIGHT MAINTAIN THAT HE CAVED IN TO SOVIET BLACKMAIL ON DANILOFF, AND AS A RESULT LEFT HIMSELF VULNERABLE TO MORE BLACKMAIL IN REYKJAVIK. NOT, I THINK, AN ACCURATE CHARACTERISATION, BUT ONE THE WHITE HOUSE WILL CERTAINLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT.

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