

PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET MEETING IN REYKJAVIK: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

The President said that he would be seeking your views on his meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik next weekend. Since you will be away at the Party Conference, you may like to consider sending a message now.

The attached letter from the Foreign Office sets out the various points which the Foreign and Defence Secretaries believe you might cover in the message. There is also the text of a message itself. It is workmanlike. But I think the President's eyes may glaze a bit. I have therefore done an alternative draft in a rather more relaxed style.

C D P

It is still very long. However we have to remember that this is NOT the Summit.

C D POWELL

3 October 1986

I would deal with it in a different order

(1) Although we must not look at relations with the USSR in terms of arms control, it seems inevitable that arms reduction & nuclear tests... etc [Suggest you leave out chemical weapons]

(2) I know that you never let any meeting pass without reference to human rights etc.

SL2AJ0

(3) Should you consider any regional issues

On Afghanistan

On the Middle East

SECRET

leave Angola out

Suggest we then thank him for his staunch support against S. A. - damaged & Saudi vote etc etc

SECRET

TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Ron,

① You were kind enough to say that you would be seeking my views on your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Since I shall be away from London next week attending our annual party conference, I thought that I would let you have my thoughts straightaway.

② I am sure you were right to take up Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting. He clearly feels the need to form a first-hand personal assessment of what might be achieved at a Summit. Only you can give him that. And having handled him so skilfully in Geneva, you have established a very strong position for dealing with him in future.

③ ~~Although~~ ^(we deal with arms reduction as on p. 2) we must not look at relations with the Soviet Union just in terms of arms control. ^{One matter which I hope you will cover with him is human rights. I had a long talk recently with Mr. Sharansky. The sort of treatment which people like him, thousands of them, still receive in the Soviet Union is utterly appalling. You have ^{been very successful in} done well to secure the release of Sharansky and Orloff, with the prospect perhaps of others to follow. But I hope you will bring home to Gorbachev the point that releasing a few individuals is not enough. ^[The Soviet Union simply cannot expect to be treated like other countries while it continues to treat its own citizens in this way.] You will also, I am sure, leave Gorbachev in no doubt that the US and the UK - and I hope other countries - will take a very firm line on the issue of human rights at the Vienna CSCE meeting in November.}

④ I ^{understand} imagine that you will ^{propose to} raise some regional issues. ~~The three that come to my mind are Afghanistan, the Middle East and Southern Africa.~~ ^{On} Afghanistan I am worried by signs that the mujahedin are coming under increasing pressure, ^{and at this} with growing doubts about their ability to hold out. I hope therefore that you ^{will again} continue to bring strong pressure on Gorbachev for early Soviet withdrawal.

SECRET
It seems to me increasingly likely that we will
have to be an international - 2 - effort with Soviet
participation (but to veto over program). You may want the moderate
Arab govts. see Gorbachev's view at an int'l. You may want to urge
we need a fresh effort Gorbachev

9
In the Middle East, I believe that we shall have fresh
opportunity to make progress on the Arab/Israel dispute
once your congressional elections are out of the way. There
appears to be growing acceptance that an international
conference could offer a way forward. Even the moderate Arab
countries see a Soviet presence at such a conference as vital,
although the Russians must not be allowed to block
negotiations between the countries directly concerned at it.
I hope you will press Gorbachev to fulfil the requirements for
Soviet participation, particularly in terms of relations with
Israel. Also that you will raise with him the need to stem
the flow of arms to Iran.

You could
urge
Gorbachev
to put
the Soviet
Union's
relations with
Israel on
a footing
which allows
you to
participate in an
international
effort

In Southern Africa, I remain very worried by the scale of
Soviet military aid to and involvement in Angola. I hope you
will bring home to Gorbachev the concern with which we in the
West view this.

10
3
Tada to P. 1
it seems inevitable that the issues of arms
reductions and nuclear tests will take up a great deal of the
time at your meeting. I am rather puzzled why Gorbachev is
adopting such a high profile on the issue of a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. He must know that he is not going to achieve
it, given your position. But he will need to register some
progress in the area of nuclear testing if he is not to lose
face. I hope therefore that you will follow up what you said
in your speech to the United Nations a fortnight ago: that is,
press for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions treaties, while proposing further limits on
testing in parallel with cuts in offensive forces. Readiness
to move here may make him more forthcoming in other arms
control areas.

4
Of these, INF seems to offer the best prospect for
agreement. Soviet willingness to eliminate all reference to
British and French forces is a great step forward and, of
course, a condition for our accepting any agreement. When it
comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I want
you to know that we will accept an agreement based on any

equal ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that other Alliance conditions, above all on SRINF, are met. ~~I know that this latter point is of particular concern to Helmut Kohl.~~

5 My views on the handling of the ABM Treaty, and the link with the SDI, remain as ~~I put them to you~~ in my message of last February. The key is to provide the Russians with reassurance that there will be no sudden break-out from research to deployment, while preserving your right to conduct research within the hitherto accepted interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The proposals which you put to Gorbachev in your message of last July and ~~your clear statement of the link between offensive and defensive forces~~ were very helpful in this respect. ~~Clearly this remains a very difficult issue for the Soviet Union. But I believe the approach which you have charted can succeed.~~ In this next phase, I would suggest you ~~work towards agreement on what the ABM Treaty does and does not allow in the way of research, and on the length of the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty.~~ *concentrate on trying to reach*

6 On START, I could support an interim agreement on the lines proposed by your negotiators in Geneva last month. But I hope the objective of even greater reductions in strategic forces will not be lost.

Finally it would be very welcome if you would encourage Gorbachev to respond to the British proposals on challenge inspection, as part of the arrangements for verifying a ban on chemical weapons.

10 I send you my very best wishes for this meeting. You have our absolute confidence and trust.

With warm regards,

Margaret

SECRET

TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Ron,

① You were kind enough to say that you would be seeking my views on your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Since I shall be away from London next week attending our annual party conference, I thought that I would let you have my thoughts straightaway.

② I am sure you were right to take up Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting. He clearly feels the need to form a first-hand personal assessment of what might be achieved at a Summit. Only you can give him that. And having handled him so skilfully in Geneva, you have established a very strong position for dealing with him in future.

~~(We deal with arms reduction as in p. 2)~~
③ ~~Although~~ we must not look at relations with the Soviet Union just in terms of arms control. ~~One matter which I hope you will cover with him is human rights. I had a long talk recently with Mr. Sharansky. The sort of treatment which people like him, thousands of them, still receive in the Soviet Union is utterly appalling. You have done well to secure the release of Sharansky and Orloff, with the prospect perhaps of others to follow. But I hope you will bring home to Gorbachev the point that releasing a few individuals is not enough. [The Soviet Union simply cannot expect to be treated like other countries while it continues to treat its own citizens in this way.] You will also, I am sure, leave Gorbachev in no doubt that the US and the UK - and I hope other countries - will take a very firm line on the issue of human rights at the Vienna CSCE meeting in November.~~

~~undisturbed~~ ~~propose to~~
④ I imagine that you will raise some regional issues. ~~The three that come to my mind are Afghanistan, the Middle East and Southern Africa.~~ On Afghanistan I am worried by signs that the mujahedin are coming under increasing pressure, with ~~growing doubts about their ability to hold out. I hope therefore that you continue to bring strong pressure on Gorbachev for early Soviet withdrawal.~~ ~~ad at this~~ ~~will again~~

It seems to me increasingly likely that we will have to be an international - 2 - effort with Soviet participation (but no veto over program). ~~You may want the moderate Arab governments to take an initiative on this. We need a fresh effort.~~ Gorbachev

In the Middle East, I believe that we shall have fresh opportunity to make progress on the Arab/Israel dispute once your congressional elections are out of the way. There appears to be growing acceptance that an international conference could offer a way forward. Even the moderate Arab countries see a Soviet presence at such a conference as vital, although the Russians must not be allowed to block negotiations between the countries directly concerned at it. I hope you will press Gorbachev to fulfil the requirements for Soviet participation, particularly in terms of relations with Israel. Also that you will raise with him the need to stem the flow of arms to Iran.

You could urge Gorbachev to put the Soviet Union's relations with Israel on a footing which allows you to participate in an international effort

In Southern Africa, I remain very worried by the scale of Soviet military aid to and involvement in Angola. I hope you will bring home to Gorbachev the concern with which we in the West view this.

3) ~~It~~ ^{Talk to P.1} it seems inevitable that the issues of arms reductions and nuclear tests will take up a great deal of the time at your meeting. I am rather puzzled why Gorbachev is adopting such a high profile on the issue of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. ^{pressing so pressing so hard for which he} He must know that he is not going to achieve it, given your position. But he will need to register some progress in the area of nuclear testing if he is not to lose face. I hope therefore that you will follow up what you said in your speech to the United Nations a fortnight ago: that is, press for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, while proposing further limits on testing in parallel with cuts in offensive forces. ~~Readiness to move here may make him more forthcoming in other arms control areas.~~

4) Of these, INF seems to offer the best prospect for agreement. ^{on arms reductions} Soviet willingness to eliminate all reference to British and French forces is a great step forward and, of course, a condition for our accepting any agreement. When it comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I want you to know that we will accept an agreement based on any

equal ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that other Alliance conditions, above all on SRINF, are met. ~~I know that this latter point is of particular concern to Helmut Kohl.~~

5 My views on the handling of the ABM Treaty, and the link with the SDI, remain as ~~I put them to you~~ in my message of last February. The key is to provide the Russians with reassurance that there will be no sudden break-out from research to deployment, while preserving your right to conduct research within the hitherto accepted interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The proposals which you put to Gorbachev in your message of last July and ~~your clear statement of the link between offensive and defensive forces~~ were very helpful in this respect. ~~Clearly this remains a very difficult issue for the Soviet Union. But I believe the approach which you have charted can succeed.~~ In this next phase, I would suggest you ^{concentrate on negotiating so well} work towards agreement on what the ABM Treaty does and does not allow in the way of research, and on the length of the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty.

6 On START, I could support an interim agreement on the lines proposed by your negotiators in Geneva last month. But I hope the objective of even greater reductions in strategic forces will not be lost.

Finally it would be very welcome if you would encourage Gorbachev to respond to the British proposals on challenge inspection, as part of the arrangements for verifying a ban on chemical weapons.

10 I send you my very best wishes for this meeting. You have our absolute confidence and trust.

With warm regards,

Margaret