

GRS 400

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FM MOSCOW

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELNO 719

OF 101230Z JUNE 86

INFO GUTINE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 696 (NOT TO ALL).

CALL ON ZAGLADIN: EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. FOLLOWING OUR DISCUSSION OF PARLIAMENTARY VISITS I ASKED ZAGLADIN (DEPUTY HEAD, INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU) HOW Y NOW SAW THE PROSPECTS FOR A SECOND US/SOVIET SUMMIT. ZAGLADIN RESPONDED BY ASKING ME HOW I SAW PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT STATEMENT ON THE SALT 2 TREATY. I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, WHETHER RATIFIED OR NOT, AND WISHED TO RESTORE THEIR CREDIBILITY BEFORE ENTERING INTO NEW ONES. SO FAR AS THE UK WAS CONCERNED WE HOPED THAT IT WOULD IN THE EVENT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE SALT 2 TREATY TO SURVIVE BUT THIS WOULD DEPEND ON THE US JUDGEMENT OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE: THE DOOR HAD NOT BEEN CLOSED AND WE HOPED THAT IT WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE.

2. ZAGLADIN SAID THAT THREE THINGS PUZZLED HIM. FIRSTLY, WHETHER PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION ON SALT 2 HAD BEEN HIS OWN OR WHETHER IT WAS THE RESULT OF POLITICAL PRESSURES. SECONDLY, THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD APPARENTLY TAKEN THE DECISION WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH HIS ALLIES (I DID NOT RISE TO THIS). AND, THIRDLY, WHY PRESIDENT REAGAN ACCUSED THE SOVIET UNION OF VIOLATING SALT 2 WHEN EVEN HIS OWN GENERALS APPEARED TO TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW. THE SOVIET UNION NEVERTHELESS REMAINED READY TO DISCUSS ALL AREAS OF ARMS CONTROL, FROM A TEST BAN TO THE SS25S, WITH THE AMERICANS: BUT THE AMERICANS, IT SEEMED, WERE NOT WILLING.

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3. WHEN I ASKED ZAGLADIN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE AREAS IN WHICH, AS GORBACHEV APPEARED TO WISH, AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED IN ADVANCE OF A SUMMIT AND SIGNED AT IT, ZAGLADIN FIRST MENTIONED A TEST BAN. I DREW ZAGLADIN'S ATTENTION TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO DISCUSS THE TECHNICALITIES OF TESTS AND VERIFICATION: THIS MIGHT OFFER A WAY FORWARD (THE EQUIVALENT COMMITTEE ON CV HAD MADE A LITTLE PROGRESS) TOWARDS ENSURING THAT A CTB WOULD IN PRINCIPLE BE VERIFIABLE. ZAGLADIN SAID THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN AD HOC COMMITTEE AND SEEMED INTERESTED IN THE IDEA. I SAID THAT, IF HE WISHED, I COULD PROVIDE HIM WITH DETAILS (WHEN THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD, WHO SUPPORTED IT ETC.): ZAGLADIN SAID THAT HE WOULD WELCOME THIS. IF YOU SEE NO OBJECTION, I SHOULD LIKE TO USE THIS AS A WAY OF CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHAT I MIGHT SAY TO ZAGLADIN OR INCORPORATE IN A LETTER TO HIM.

CARTLEDGE

**EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS**

**LIMITED**

**[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]**

SOVIET D  
DEFENCE D  
R D  
PLANNING STAFF  
EED  
NAD  
WED  
ACDD  
CRD  
NEWS DEPT.  
INFO DEPT.  
FED  
NED  
PUSD  
PROTOCOL DEPT.

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR FERGUSSON  
SIR W HARDING  
MR RATFORD  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
MR LONG

CHIEF CLERK  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR BARRINGTON  
MR WINCHESTER

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