

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

13 January 1986

Dear Mark,

POLICE REPORT ON THE TOTTENHAM RIOT

The Home Secretary has asked me to let you have the attached copy of the report prepared by the Metropolitan Police for the Haringey Police/Community Consultative Group on the riot at the Broadwater Farm Estate.

The police report attracted considerable coverage in the press over the week-end and this morning, much of it inaccurate. There is, for example, nothing in the police report to suggest that the riot was planned months in advance, as the stories in the "Mail on Sunday" and today's "Guardian" suggest. What the police report does say is that over a period of three weeks leading up to the riots there were a number of specific incidents as well as unconfirmed rumours of impending trouble (set out in paragraph 4 of the report) which led to an atmosphere of increased tension in the area. The story in the "Mail on Sunday" appears to have mistaken these indicators of tension as evidence of pre-planning. The police view remains that there is no evidence of long term planning of the riot.

The editorial in the "Mail on Sunday" was also misleading, in that in condemning "consultative committees" it confused the community/police consultative groups recommended in the Scarman Report, which Section 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act put on a statutory basis, with the so-called police committees set up by some Labour local authorities. Contrary to what the "Mail on Sunday" says, the police are very much in favour of consultative committees and, in London help to set them up. The police have produced reports on the Brixton and Tottenham riots for the consultative committees at Lambeth and Tottenham respectively. The Haringey Consultative Committee is as yet in its infancy but appears to have responded favourably to the police report, which it will debate fully at its next meeting. The Lambeth Consultative Committee is now well established and played a valuable role following the Brixton riots in playing down tensions in the area and attempting to ensure a quick return to normality.

We are attempting to correct the misleading impression which these press reports have given about the background to the Tottenham riot and the Haringey Consultative Committee. Mr Shaw appeared on "The World at One" today and will attempt to set the record straight in his winding up speech in the Second Reading of the Public Order Bill this evening.

Copies of this letter go to Joan MacNaughton (Lord President's Office), Alston Smith (Lord Privy Seal's Office) and Andrew Lansley (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office).

Yours,
Steph

S W BOYS SMITH

Mark Addison, Esq.

To The Chairman and Members of
The Haringey Police/Community Consultative Group

This concise, factual report touching upon the events at the Broadwater Farm Estate, London, N17, on 6th and 7th October 1985, is presented in order that discussions currently taking place within the Consultative Group as to the most effective policing policies for a multi cultural society may be better informed. The report compliments the verbal presentation given by police to the Group on 31st October 1985.

The complaint investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Mrs. Cynthia Jarrett, headed by Assistant Chief Constable Simpson and supervised by the Independent Police Complaints Authority, continues. So, too, does the separate criminal inquiry being conducted into the murder of Police Constable Keith Blakelock and the riot. Great care, therefore, has had to be taken to ensure nothing written within this report can be construed as being prejudicial to the outcome of those inquiries.

My thanks are due to Chief Superintendent David Williams and his fellow team members who have undertaken the bulk of the work which has made the presentation of this report possible.



M.D. RICHARDS

Deputy Assistant Commissioner

SERIOUS PUBLIC DISORDER IN TOTTENHAM

6TH OCTOBER 1985

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The riot which occurred at Broadwater Farm Estate, Tottenham on the night of Sunday 6th October 1985, was similar in many respects to that which had occurred at Brixton a few days previously. Both were triggered by emotive incidents - the shooting of Mrs. Cherry GROCE in Brixton and the death of Mrs. Cynthia JARRETT in Tottenham - and each was preceded by a demonstration outside the local police station. The Tottenham riot was significantly different, however, in a number of respects: the unprecedented level of violence that was directed towards police, the death of a police officer as a result of this violence, the use of firearms to attack police and the deployment of officers trained in the use of baton rounds (plastic bullets). All this adds up to an unwelcome escalation which makes a return to "normality" much more difficult to achieve.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty what amounts to "normality" in the Broadwater Farm situation. The estate has earned an unenviable reputation over recent years as one where normal policing methods are resisted by a vociferous minority and where unprovoked attacks on police are all too common. To instance but a few of the more serious :

2.1.1 On 12th August 1982, P.C. HOLLAND, a Home Beat Officer, visited the Youth Association's Office by invitation with the local Police Community Liaison Officer. Whilst he was there and in conversation with Mrs. Dolly KIFFEN, he was struck over the head from behind with a bottle by an unidentified assailant.

2.1.2 On 2nd November 1982, two metal beer kegs were dropped from one of the high level walkways onto a police car driven by Inspector POULTER, who was fortunate to escape serious injury. Later the same day, P.C. STRATTON, one of the local Home Beat Officers, was ambushed by black youths and struck on the head with a billiard cue, as a result of which he suffered a serious injury.

2.1.3 On 4th August 1983, P.C. BETTS was standing alongside a police van that he had driven to the estate to collect other officers, when he was stabbed in the back by a black youth.

2.1.4 On 11th September 1985, P.Cs. NICHOLSON and MORLEY, both Home Beat Officers, were attacked with missiles by a gang of black youths. NICHOLSON was struck on the head and he sustained injuries which placed him on the sick list for several weeks.

2.2 In an effort to meet the policing needs of the estate in these circumstances it has been policed for some time by a team of dedicated officers, working in pairs, who have attempted to exercise their responsibilities towards all the residents whilst avoiding, as far as possible, confrontation with a minority.

3. PRESSURE OF OUTSIDE EVENTS

3.1 The recent disturbances at Toxteth, Handsworth and Brixton appear to have contributed to an escalation of tension on the Broadwater Farm Estate. In the two or three days that followed each of these incidents, there were reports of youths apparently emulating what they had seen on television by walking about wearing masks and balaclava helmets.

4. TENSION INDICATORS

4.1 This was followed in the week immediately preceding the riot by persistent rumours that there were plans afoot for a major disturbance and looting, Wood Green Shopping City being identified as the prime target. It is emphasised that these were only rumours, but there were a number of occurrences which tended to indicate that there may have been some substance in them :-

4.1.1 On 17th September 1985, and again on 19th September, unconfirmed reports were coming to the notice of police to the effect that petrol was being syphoned from the tanks of cars parked on the estate.

4.1.2 On 20th September 1985, the Asian-owned supermarket on the deck of Tangmere block was daubed with the following graffiti, "CURRY EATING BASTARDS. TANDORI SHIT GET OUT. NIGGERS RULE". The perpetrators of this offence are unknown to police (although they are believed to be known to a council officer) but it may be significant, as will be shown later, that this was one of only two Asian owned premises on the estate singled out by the rioters for looting and fire-bombing.

4.1.3 On 22nd September 1985, a black man was shot in the residents' club in Stapleford block. Another black man has been charged with this offence.

4.1.4 On 28th September 1985, the night of the Brixton riots, there were reports of large numbers of youths gathering in Wood Green wearing helmets and balaclavas. No disorder ensued however.

- 4.1.5 On 1st October 1985, at 4.30pm there was an emergency call to an alleged robbery in Gloucester Road. This was proved to be a false call, but at 5.08pm an actual robbery, involving 20 - 25 masked black youths, took place at a Post Office in Mount Pleasant Road about $\frac{1}{4}$ mile away.
- 4.1.6 Later the same day there was a call to Tottenham Police Station that 40 - 50 black youths armed with petrol bombs had gathered on the estate. This was followed by two further calls stating that petrol bombs had actually been thrown. Nothing was damaged. However, subsequent examination of the area failed to confirm such events had taken place.
- 4.1.7 On 2nd October 1985, a petrol bomb was found in a drain under one of the walkways of the estate.
- 4.1.8 On the same day information was received that bottles were being collected by youths in the area.
- 4.1.9 On 3rd October 1985, just after 10pm, a hoax "999" call was made claiming that two police officers were being attacked on the estate by 20 black youths. There were no officers in the vicinity at this time.
- 4.1.10 On 4th October 1985, Post Office officials reported to police that postmen delivering mail to the estate were being subjected to harassment by youths.

4.1.11 Later the same day a person who had been arrested for a drug offence told police that petrol bombs had been made and were being stored somewhere on the estate but the exact location was never determined.

4.2 Whilst it is accepted that some of these reports were based upon unconfirmed rumour, or may have been created by persons intent on provoking confrontation, many were a matter of record and were accepted by police as evidence of mounting tension and potential disorder.

5. POLICE CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS

5.1 As a result it was decided to set up a limited reserve of police officers at Wood Green during the weekend of October 5th - 6th, purely as a precaution against potential disorder. There were no incidents on Saturday 5th October, until the death of Mrs. JARRETT, about 6pm, which was the immediate trigger incident for the riot. It is a matter of conjecture what would have occurred had Mrs. JARRETT not died.

6. THE DEATH OF MRS. CYNTHIA JARRETT

6.1 The circumstances leading to the death of Mrs. JARRETT were fully aired in an inquest, at which a verdict of "accidental death" was recorded at its conclusion on 4th December 1985. The matter is still the subject of an investigation being conducted under the supervision of the Independent Police Complaints Authority and it would be improper to examine it further here.

7. POLICE ACTION FOLLOWING THE DEATH

7.1 In the hours immediately following the death, Superintendent BUCHAN, the duty senior officer, and Chief Superintendent STAINSBY, the acting Commander 'Y' District, visited the JARRETT household and spoke to members of the family. Chief Superintendent STAINSBY initiated the police complaints procedure under Part IX of

the Police and Criminal Evidence Act which provides an independent body, the Police Complaints Authority, to supervise allegations of the type made in this case. A senior officer from another force, Mr. P.J. SIMPSON, an Assistant Chief Constable from Essex, was appointed to conduct the enquiries, in order to ensure the impartiality of the investigation. In a police press release, sincere regrets were expressed at the unfortunate death of Mrs. JARRETT.

8. MINOR OUTBREAK OF DISORDER

8.1 At 1.45am on Sunday the 6th October, following a visit by the JARRETT family to Tottenham Police Station in furtherance of their complaint, a demonstration took place outside which resulted in 4 windows being smashed. No arrests were made and after a brief noisy protest the demonstrators, consisting of about 20 to 30 black people, were persuaded by the JARRETTs to leave the area. There was no further disorder.

9. MEETING WITH COMMUNITY LEADERS

9.1 Between 10am and 10.30am on the 6th October, the local police invited prominent members of the local community to meet them to discuss the growing problems resulting from the death of Mrs. JARRETT. As a result a meeting took place at Tottenham Police Station between 12.45pm and 1.50pm chaired by Deputy Assistant Commissioner RICHARDS in charge of 1 Area, who was accompanied by Chief Superintendent COUCH and Superintendent DORRICOFF.

9.2 Members of the community present were :-

Councillor Andreas MIKKEDES	- Deputy Mayor London Borough of Haringey
Councillor Eddie LARGE	- London Borough of Haringey
Mr. Roy LIMB	- Chief Executive
Mr. Eric CLARK	- Haringey Police Consultative Committee
Mr. Chris KAVALLARRES	- Chairman Haringey Community Relations Council

Mr. Jeffrey CRAWFORD	- Senior Community Relations Officer
Mrs. Hyacinth MOODY	- Haringey Community Relations Council - Police Liaison Committee
Mrs. Dolly KIFFEN	- Youth Leader
Mr. Floyd JARRETT)
Mr. Michael JARRETT) Sons of Mrs. Cynthia JARRETT

9.3 After considerable discussion it was agreed by those present that :

9.3.1 all parties would appeal for calm within the community

9.3.2 the enquiry into the death should be completed expeditiously

9.3.3 the Community Leaders would demand the report be made public and that DAC RICHARDS would pass this request to the Police Complaints Authority.

10. DISORDER OUTSIDE TOTTENHAM POLICE STATION

10.1 At just before 2pm about 100 black persons of both sexes and of varying ages congregated outside the police station displaying a variety of placards accusing police of murdering Mrs. JARRETT. The group succeeded in stopping all traffic in Tottenham High Road and diversions had to be introduced. Apart from two minor attacks on passing cars and one stone thrown through a station window (by a white youth), there was no violence and the demonstrators confined their action to shouting abuse at police officers positioned outside the station. The abuse from the crowd included threats to kill police officers and their families in revenge for the JARRETT death. There were also warnings of possible trouble later in the day.

10.2 Police officers who were present had differing conceptions of the intention of the demonstrators. Some thought that the threats that had been made were mere rhetoric arising from a release of anger and tension; others were quite convinced that there would be attacks on police and/or serious disorder later in the day.

11. ATTACK ON P.C. CATON

11.1 At 3.15pm, just before the demonstrators dispersed from outside the police station, P.Cs. CATON and HUGHES, both Home Beat officers, went to an address in The Avenue, N17, on the periphery of the estate, to investigate a complaint that someone had fired an airgun at the windows of a house. Whilst they were there, they noticed a crowd of black youths gathering outside, some of them armed with bricks. The demeanour of the youths was such that the officers feared for their own safety, so they left the house and hurried away. They were subjected to a barrage of missiles as they did so, one of which - apparently a section of broken paving stone - struck P.C. CATON in the back.

11.2 The full extent of CATON's injuries was not known until about two hours after the incident, when it was discovered he was suffering from internal bleeding. He underwent major surgery during which it was found that his spleen had been ruptured beyond repair.

11.3 In the meantime, in the hour that followed the attack on P.C. CATON, five "999" calls were made by residents of the Broadwater Farm concerning the movements of up to 100 youths, some of them wearing masks, who were alleged to be running through the estate banging on doors. Police did not respond to any of the calls, having first established by telephone to the various informants that, whilst the calls were genuine, no actual damage had been caused. It was felt that a police response at this time could have provoked confrontation and disorder.

11.4 There followed a period of absolute quiet, lasting nearly two hours, when no calls of any kind were made from the estate. It is now known that there was a meeting of youths being held during this period at the premises of the Broadwater Farm Youth Association. It has been claimed that a decision was made at the meeting to mount another "peaceful" demonstration outside Tottenham Police Station. Given the extent to which the youths were subsequently found to have armed themselves with petrol bombs, knives and machettes, doubt must exist about the validity of this claim.

12. IMMEDIATE BUILD UP TO RIOT

12.1 The peace was first broken at 6.09pm when a "999" call was received from an address in The Avenue, to alleged criminal damage to a window caused by 15 masked black youths. This was apparently a genuine call, but when police officers in a vehicle visited the scene at about 6.15pm, there were no youths in evidence, so they withdrew from the area.

12.2 The next call came at 6.25pm, again via the "999" system, when information was given that two youths had been detained at Willan Road (on the estate - see map at Appendix 'A') for car theft. This call could not be checked back to the informant and is now believed to have been a hoax, possibly to draw police into the estate.

12.3 In view of the doubts about this call, Inspector HUDSON decided to go from Tottenham Police Station to the vicinity himself to see what, if anything, was occurring. He was driving along The Avenue, about $\frac{1}{4}$ mile from the estate, when two black youths wearing helmets drew up alongside him on a motor cycle. One of them smashed a beer bottle into the window of the driver's door, which broke and scattered glass into his eyes. He managed to drive away and was taken to Moorfields Hospital for treatment. Fortunately he suffered no permanent eye damage.

13. POLICE MANPOWER SITUATION

- 13.1 It is relevant, at this stage, to examine the police manpower situation that was existing at this time. Following the JARRETT death and the subsequent demonstration outside the police station, there was a fear that there might be a similar escalation of violence to that which had occurred in Brixton following the GROCE incident. The reserve manpower for the area was, therefore, increased for Sunday to approximately 200, made up of some coach serials and some transits (District Support Units). Some of these were held at Wood Green and some at other nearby locations. It was necessary, in order to provide all day coverage, to have a 10am - 6pm shift and a 4pm - midnight shift, each of 200 men, the two hour overlap being required for briefing, feeding and change-over purposes.
- 13.2 The change-over was completed by 6.30pm and at 6.40pm all of the 10am - 6pm officers were dismissed. Many of them were at this time at the feeding centre in Northumberland Park, $\frac{1}{2}$ mile north of the estate. It appears that the progress of these off-duty officers southwards through Tottenham en route to their home Divisions was noticed by observers who formed the erroneous impression that they were making their way to the estate in order to "seal it off". This mistaken belief has been mentioned in the reports of both the GLC Police Committee and the Haringey Police Sub-Committee.
- 13.3 In fact at 6.40pm there were only two DSUs, both formed of local 'Y' District officers, in the vicinity of the estate, their brief being to respond to emergency calls only.
- 13.4 Understandably, following the attack on P.C. CATON and the ambush of Inspector HUDSON, it was now considered prudent to use only protected DSU vehicles to answer emergency

calls. At 6.49pm a "999" call was received to the effect that a large group of black youths were throwing stones at doors in The Avenue. As the informant was anonymous, there is no means of knowing whether this was a genuine call or a hoax. The DSUs made a brief visit to The Avenue where they saw some youths but no immediate disturbance, so they again withdrew. A further "999" call was made at 6.53pm, again to The Avenue, stating that police were "urgently required". No reason was given. A DSU (Y32) went to the scene to investigate but shortly after their arrival, at 7.05pm, they were subjected to a violent attack by a large group of black youths, who threw bricks and petrol bombs at their vehicle and struck at the bodywork with machetes. The ferocity of this attack was such that had the officers not been in a protected vehicle they would almost certainly have been killed or seriously injured.

14. THE RIOT

- 14.1 After being attacked, Y32 withdrew to a safe location in order to don their protective equipment (shields, overalls and helmets). Meanwhile the Control Room at Wood Green began to mobilise the men who were immediately available.
- 14.2 Units began to arrive at the scene from 7.10pm onwards. They found that barricades of blazing vehicles had been erected at all four vehicular entrances to the estate, (Gloucester Road, Willan Road, Griffin Road and Adams Road) and at each location they came under missile and petrol bomb fire as they approached.
- 14.3 It took only about twenty minutes from the start of the riot to the erection of barricades at locations that are several hundred yards apart. There can be little doubt that this was part of a pre-arranged plan, rather than a spontaneous reaction to police "surrounding" the estate as has been claimed by some people.

14.4 The experience of one family who were driving into the estate to visit a relative gives a dramatic picture of the nature of events. As they entered, they found their way blocked by a group of youths who had just overturned a car in the centre of the road. The youths attacked their vehicle with knives, slashing the tyres to immobilise it. They then threatened to petrol bomb the car with the people in it unless they got out. When they did so they were not harmed by the youths but were told to go away because "our war is not with you!" There were no police in the street where this occurred at this time and nothing to suggest that the estate was being "surrounded".

14.5 No senior officers were on duty in the vicinity of the estate when the riot broke out but as soon as the extent of the disorder became apparent Chief Superintendent COUCH and Superintendent SINCLAIR went to the scene from Tottenham Police Station, Superintendent FRENCH from Hornsey and Chief Inspector ROWE from Northumberland Park. One of these officers went to each of the four main locations, COUCH to Gloucester Road, SINCLAIR to Willan Road, FRENCH to Griffin Road and ROWE to Adams Road, where they took command. About two hours later when Chief Superintendent JEFFERS came on duty, he was sent to Griffin Road to take charge because this was the scene of the worst rioting as well as being the place where firearms had already been used on more than one occasion.

14.6 Police manpower built up fairly quickly, with all the immediate reserves being deployed within a few minutes of the riot breaking out. These were augmented by some of the transit serials that had been dismissed at 6.40pm who had heard what was going on on the radios in their vehicles and volunteered to return to the scene. This was followed by a general mobilisation of DSUs and other units from all over London.

14.7 By about 8pm a pattern of behaviour by the rioters had emerged. About 200 - 300 youths would emerge from under

the tower blocks and attack one or more of the barricaded locations with bricks and petrol bombs. There was evidence of a degree of organisation in this. Particular individuals were observed on several occasions giving directions to others by words or gestures. After each attack, when ammunition was exhausted, the rioters would withdraw to re-arm, and then attack again, either in the same location or at one of the others. The most ferocious attacks were made at Griffin Road and Adams Road, where the defended positions were so close to the overhead balconies and walkways that any attempt by the police to advance and repel the rioters could be met by a barrage of missiles from above.

14.8 Willan Road was also attacked with some ferocity, which included having blazing vehicles driven at the police line, but it was more easily defended because of its location at the top of a slope. Apart from the initial attack, when the barricades were erected, there was no assault upon the Gloucester Road location.

14.9 The first report of the use of a firearm came as early as 7.55pm when a member of a DSU (S32) deployed at Griffin Road found that he had sustained what appeared to be a bullet hole in his shield. Shortly afterwards it was discovered that P.C. PATT, who had been taken to hospital injured from Griffin Road, had, in fact, been struck in the body by a bullet. As a result of these two incidents officers from D11 Branch (the Force firearms unit) were alerted soon after 8pm and sent to Tottenham to stand by.

14.10 Following this, at least one shotgun was fired at police in Griffin Road and several officers and two BBC cameramen sustained pellet wounds, fortunately none serious. It was reported by one officer, experienced in the use of firearms, that he had heard a shotgun fired more than thirty times in the Griffin Road area during the evening.

14.11 In the light of the nature of the violence and the use of firearms, it was soon recognised that the police strategy for dealing with the riot could only be one of containment. Although a number of forward movements took place at different locations, any concerted effort to advance into the body of the estate (in which lakes of petrol were seen) could well have resulted in death or serious injury to police and/or members of the public, whilst a withdrawal from the defended locations would have permitted the rioters to spill out into the side streets around Mount Pleasant Road, where fires in the old terraced houses could have been easily started by petrol bombs and would very quickly have got out of control. It was not likely that this would happen on the estate, which is built of concrete and has no ground floor flats. In this context it is relevant to point out that as soon as police were forced to retreat part of the way along Adams Road, an occupied private house in that street outside the defended area was set on fire as the result of the actions of the rioters in petrol bombing the cars outside.

14.12 The "containment" strategy was misunderstood by many people, including some police officers, to mean that we were surrounding the estate in an attempt to prevent the rioters leaving. All we were doing, in effect, was containing the attack on police to a limited number of defensible locations. The strategy also allowed an attempt to be made to identify and arrest persons seen to be organising or controlling the actions of rioters. Had the rioters not been so contained that kind of action would not have been possible. Unlike most other recent riots, all of the energies of the rioters were directed to the attack on police. There was little gratuitous violence to the person or property of others - unlike Brixton where there was widespread looting and a number of assaults, including rapes, upon members of the public. It is perhaps significant in this respect that subsequent

enquiries revealed allegations that some basement garage areas on the estate had been flooded with petrol, for the alleged purpose of use in the event of an incursion by police.

14.13 As has already been mentioned, only two premises remote from the actual riot locations were fire bombed. They were the Asian-owned shops on the deck of Tangmere block. It is not clear why these shops were singled out for attack, but it has been rumoured that relationships between the owner of the supermarket and some of the black youths on the estate have not always been cordial.

14.14 It was the fire in the supermarket that led to the unfortunate death of P.C. BLAKELOCK. Just before 10pm Chief Superintendent COUCH had a discussion with members of the Fire Brigade, who were becoming concerned that the fire, which had been burning for some time, was getting so fierce that there was a danger that it would begin to spread to the occupied flats immediately above it. There had been no incident or attack at the Gloucester Road location for some hours and no observed movement in the vicinity of Tangmere of the rioters, who appeared to be pre-occupied with the attack upon the other three locations, about 400 yards away. COUCH therefore decided to send a small group of officers into Tangmere with the Fire Brigade, to protect them whilst they extinguished the fire. There was clearly some element of risk, given what had occurred so far during the evening, but it was a risk that had to be taken as the lives of members of the public were thought to be in danger.

14.15 The exact circumstances of BLAKELOCK's murder cannot be set out in detail here, pending the outcome of the trial of persons who have been charged with this offence. Suffice it to say that the officers concerned were the subject of a quite horrendous attack by a heavily armed gang who appear to have run from elsewhere on the estate when they realised that the officers were there.

14.16 About half-an-hour before the BLAKELOCK killing the scale of the attack in Griffin Road had become so ferocious that there was a real danger of many more serious injuries being caused unless something could be done to subdue the crowd. Deputy Assistant Commissioner RICHARDS, who was in overall charge, obtained authority from the Commissioner at 9.45pm for the use of baton rounds and/or CS Gas as a last resort should all else fail. In the event, by the time that the specially equipped team of officers from the Force's Firearms Branch (D11) had arrived at Griffin Road from Tottenham at about 10.20pm, the severity of the attack had lessened considerably, mainly it would appear because the BLAKELOCK incident had drawn some of the rioters away to the other side of the estate. The baton round trained officers were not, in fact, called to take action. The attacks continued to midnight but reduced in severity. In the meantime, groups of youths had built up outside the periphery of the estate in a number of locations. Many were merely spectators but some were apparently intent upon joining the rioters. Unable to do so because of the presence of police, they created minor disturbances, including some petrol bombing, in streets immediately to the east. A number of police units, led by Chief Inspector FREEBORN, were deployed during the evening to deal with this and the situation was largely contained.

14.17 As the evening progressed there were instances of shop window smashing and looting in Bruce Grove and Tottenham High Road. There were also burglaries and criminal damage committed in two schools and a day nursery which are situated just north of the estate (see Appendix 'B' for details of the reported crimes).

14.18 Whilst the attacks on police had largely abated by midnight, information had been received from a resident as late as 11.45pm that large groups of youths were still gathered in the darkness beneath the tower blocks, apparently lying in wait for police. It was, therefore,

decided, in the light of this information and the fact that firearms had been used against police on several occasions during the evening, that it would be ill-advised to enter at this stage. As a result, police did not go in until 4.30am on Monday morning when a planned operation was put into effect. Almost all the rioters had dispersed by this time and there was no disorder.

15. ARRESTS

15.1 Few arrests were effected on the night of the riot but many have been made since the event, as the result of enquiries, and the details of these are shown in Appendix 'C'. The criminal investigation into the murder of Police Constable BLAKELOCK and the riot is headed jointly by Detective Chief Superintendent GALLAHER and Detective Chief Superintendent MELVIN. The inquiry is exceedingly complex and is likely to continue for some time. Officers concerned in the inquiry who are charged with the responsibility of arresting suspects and searching premises are often armed and equipped with heavy implements which enable them to enter well protected properties. The need for such action must be seen in the context of the search for deadly weapons and the reluctance of some to admit police to premises albeit that search warrants authorising entry are in existence. The need for professionalism at every stage of the inquiry is paramount.

16. COMMENT

16.1 It will be seen that more than half of those charged are from the Tottenham area outside the Broadwater Farm Estate and that a substantial minority are white.

17. INJURIES

17.1 Details of reported injuries to police and public are shown in Appendix 'D'. It will be seen that almost all

the injuries inflicted were suffered by police officers rather than members of the public - confirmation of the fact that we were the main target for the rioters.

18. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

8.1 Since the riot the estate has been intensively policed but progressively numbers have been reduced. The need for high profile uniform policing has been necessary to maintain The Queens Peace, reduce the fear of crime and enhance the quality of life for the residents. Other considerations have been :

18.1.1 To afford protection to the patrolling uniform officers themselves who must still be seen to be under threat. (Prior to the events of 6th October 1985, four uniform officers had been assaulted, some seriously)

18.1.2 To give support to those residents both black and white, who have made statements to police and feel under threat.

18.1.3 To respond to the call of many who have articulated their need for a heavy police presence (they perceived the estate as "a no go area" although police officers never allowed it to reach that stage).

18.1.4 To give support to C.I.D. officers who are still making inquiries within the estate and are frequently executing search warrants and making arrests.

18.2 Police are anxious to establish normality of policing on the estate as soon as may be possible and consultations have taken place, and will continue, with groups who have an interest in the wellbeing of the residents.

Suggestions vary from the creation of a "no go" area to the imposition of high profile uniform policing, and from total demolition of the estate to amelioration and improvement. There is no easy solution but police and the community will continue to strive for the right one.

19. CONCLUSIONS

19.1 Naturally a great deal has been written and spoken about the riot since it occurred. There have been innumerable press, radio and TV analyses, pronouncements by politicians and lengthy reports by those employed by the GLC and Haringey Police Committees. Some police officers have publicly expressed anger and frustration at the tragic death of a colleague and the fact that they were placed in an "Aunt Sally" situation, not of their own making, where they had to stand for hours under attack without being able to take effective counter measures.

19.2 Some of the basic truths of the situation have been lost sight of in the welter of criticism and analysis of the disorders and need to be restated. The most important is that the police were most anxious to diffuse the situation following the untimely death of Mrs. JARRETT and everything that happened on the day was done with this in mind. In particular:-

19.2.1 A lengthy meeting of community leaders was called by police with the specific intention of enlisting their support in calming the situation.

19.2.2 Despite the fact that offences of criminal damage, obstruction and threatening behaviour were committed by identified individuals outside Tottenham Police Station, no arrests were made as a matter of policy in the hope that this might help to calm the situation.

- 19.2.3 A decision was made that no officers would enter the Broadwater Farm Estate in the ensuing period unless it was necessary to respond to emergency calls. In fact five such calls were received between 3.20pm and 4.20pm but on each occasion the matter was resolved by telephone and no officers were sent there.
- 19.2.4 It was decided to maintain a reserve of officers at police premises within the general area in light of threats that had been received and persistent rumours of potential disorder.
- 19.2.5 At 6.40pm when it is suggested that we were "sealing off" the estate half of our manpower was being dismissed and sent back to their own Districts.
- 19.2.6 When the riot erupted there were only two police units, both DSUs, in the vicinity of the estate. Their presence had become necessary only because of "999" calls from local residents about the behaviour of youths and because response to such calls by unprotected units had become inadvisable.
- 19.2.7 At no time was it our intention to enter the estate. It was made very clear by the senior officers on the ground in several radio transmissions that such an option was not viable. We were committed to maintaining a defensive, holding operation at four locations which had been chosen by the rioters as part of a clear pre-arranged plan. Indeed it was they who "sealed off"

the estate at a very early stage with their burning barricades. Our primary function of protection of life and property made withdrawal from these locations unthinkable.

19.3 In the context of the search for truth the activities of those employed by Local Authority Police Committees give cause for concern. They publish detailed reports giving what appear to be objective analyses of situations based upon careful evidence gathering. In fact, whether through naivety or disinterest in the truth, what they often produce is a gross distortion of it. It is they who have perpetrated the myth about police "sealing off" the estate. If, as they both claim, they were monitoring police radio transmissions during the evening, it is difficult to see how they could have come to the conclusion that this was actually the case.

19.4 No doubt this report will itself now come in for detailed analysis and criticism, particularly in those areas where it does not accord with other people's preconceived ideas. It is relevant to point out, therefore, that most of it is based upon matters of record rather than of opinion or speculation.

APPENDIX 'B'

CRIMES REPORTED

ROBBERY	4
MURDER	1
ARSON - Motor Vehicle	34
Dwelling	4
CRIMINAL DAMAGE	53
THEFT from motor vehicles	1
THEFT Cycle	1
ASSAULTS ON POLICE	232
ASSAULTS ON PUBLIC	7
BURGLARY	9

PRISONERS
STATISTICAL INFORMATION

<u>NUMBER OF ARRESTS (up to 6.12.85)</u>		186
<u>NUMBER OF PERSONS CHARGED</u>		84
<u>IDENTITY CODES</u>	IC1 (White)	- 23
	IC2 (Mediterranean)	- 2
	IC3 (Black)	- 58
<u>SEX</u>	Female	- 7
	Male	- 77
<u>OCCUPATION</u>	Employed	- 17
	Unemployed	- 44
	School	- 3
	Not known	- 10
<u>ADDRESSES</u>	Broadwater Farm Estate	- 19
	Tottenham Division	- 47
	Elsewhere	- 18
<u>AGES OF PERSONS CHARGED</u>	Between 12 - 16	- 19
	17 - 20	- 38
	21 - 25	- 15
	26 - 40	- 12

APPENDIX 'D'

INJURIES TO PUBLIC AND POLICE

<u>INJURIES TO PUBLIC</u>	7
<u>INJURIES TO POLICE</u>	248
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<u>TOTAL</u>	255
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OF THOSE PLACED SICK INJURIES ARE SHOWN AS FOLLOWS

<u>HEAD</u> including ONE Burn	42
FOUR Gunshot	
ONE Stab	
<u>CHEST</u>	8
<u>LEG</u> including One Gunshot	15
<u>SHOULDER</u> including ONE Gunshot	7
ONE Stab	
<u>ANKLE</u>	3
<u>BACK</u>	5
<u>ARM</u> including ONE Gunshot	3
<u>HAND</u>	3
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<u>TOTAL</u>	86
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9. without copy list
3 without —

