

## LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT: TERRORISM

1. The Foreign Ministers turned to this subject during their meeting on the morning of 8 June and discussed it for an hour.

2. Sir G Howe said that the Libyan episode had brought home to Britain the defects of the existing system. There was a case for re-examining some aspects of the Vienna Convention, eg the immunity of the diplomatic bag. But did governments apply the Convention adequately in such matters as the size of Embassies and the immunity of Embassy and other premises? Did governments know enough about the activities of the members of foreign missions? Should they coordinate more? Were there gaps in national legal systems which needed to be studied jointly? At the very least, a fuller exchange of information seemed desirable.

3. Herr Genscher said that governments must fight terrorism and this was a responsibility of Foreign Ministers. There should be a better exchange of information, eg within NATO, so that no person expelled from Britain (for example) would be accepted by an Allied country. But it would be wrong to arouse false expectations. The main need was for much better cooperation between security organisations. A lot could be done by simple means. With some countries the FRG had a system allowing a finger-print to be checked in 60 seconds: with others they had to use the postal service.

4. Mr Shultz said that the problem went deeper than that of diplomatic missions. There was an enormously bigger problem of state sponsored terrorism all round the world. He did not know the answers but would like the questions to be discussed. There were balances to be struck. Purely defensive measures were unlikely to be wholly successful. Pre-emptive or retaliatory action could sometimes be essential. It was vital to have good intelligence, but organisations were often reluctant to exchange it as they should. Another difficult question was: how good did evidence need to be before a case of terrorism could be regarded as established? Unfortunately terrorism could be seen to have worked on some occasions: the North Koreans had killed 21 members of the South Korean Cabinet, and the attacks on US Marines had changed American policy in the Lebanon.

5. Sr Andreotti suggested that the Summit should state that the participants had a definite political will to defeat terrorism and were resolved to unify their efforts to this end.

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But if they were to go beyond this, they must adopt objectives which were credible. The Bonn Declaration of 1978 had had some beneficial effect on the numbers of aircraft hijackings, even though it had been applied unevenly by the signatories. He was not sure how specific the present Summit would be able to be. Certainly some questions needed to be studied, eg how to stop certain countries abusing the immunity of diplomatic premises. But to abolish diplomatic privileges altogether would do more harm than good.

6. Sr Andreotti said that Italy noted an important link between terrorism and the drug trade. Experience with Turkey, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia made this clear. Another problem was the fanatical terrorist who believed that his deed and his death would take him to paradise. There were two internal problems in Italy. First, in the mind of many Italians the label "freedom fighter" justified any behaviour, including acts of terrorism. Secondly, the law gave protection to those who committed crimes for political reasons. Italy had had to pass a special constitutional law in order to permit extradition under a UN Convention against genocide which Italy had signed.

7. As regards Embassies, Sr Andreotti thought that much could be done by applying the principle of reciprocity and by better monitoring and control of the activities of those concerned. But it would not be possible to reject any diplomat who had ever been a member of a secret service. The Vice President of the United States had been Head of the CIA. The CIA was not the KGB, but one must be careful of any policy which could provoke awkward questions. Certainly any person expelled from one of our countries should not be accepted by another. The exchange of information and mutual help between police forces was essential: Italy had made great progress recently with France and the FRG. But the London Summit should concentrate on stating a definite political will to avoid those who wished to destroy our system.

8. M. Cheysson said that the Summit was not a place for decision-taking: the problem affected many governments not represented in London, nor should the Summit give the impression that it was trying to run the world. But three things could be done. The first was to express political determination, and France would associate herself with any statement to this effect. M. Cheysson interjected that terrorism sometimes occurred when those concerned fell into a mood of despair as a result of finding all other doors closed to them: this had happened with Iranians and Palestinians and would be repeated one day with black South Africans.

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It would also be consistent with the political philosophy in Eastern Europe if those countries were to promote terrorism in the West: this could be as dangerous for the West as freedom of expression was for the East. There were also practical problems of many kinds, eg whether to open fire on a truck which circled Lancaster House five or six times and take the risk of it being a florist and looking for the right addressee for his load.

9. Secondly, M. Cheysson said that there was a need for progress in the legal field. This required action in the organisations concerned. The Summit participants should not put obstacles in their own path by adopting definitions that might prove too restrictive.

10. Thirdly, M. Cheysson saw the possibility of collective sanctions in specialised international organisations: he had been encouraged by the amendments made to the Chicago Convention following the KAL airliner incident.

11. Reverting to the practical difficulties, M. Cheysson recalled that there were 50,000 Iranians in France ranging from the sister of the late Shah to the leader of the Mujahidin. We should not put ourselves in a strait-jacket. The same policy on extradition would not do for both Italy and Iran. Nor should we adopt attitudes which we might immediately want to reverse, as had happened when flights to Moscow were cut off after the KAL airliner incident. Even the suspension of flights to Afghanistan as part of the Summit policy on hijacking had led to the difficulty of deciding when and how they should be resumed.

12. M. Cheysson emphasised the need for cooperation between specialist services. There had been more talk than action in this field, although there were plenty of interesting ideas in circulation. The problem of Embassies was not the most serious. But a diplomat expelled from one of our countries should not be admitted to any other. France had been grateful to be informed by Italy of the reasons why two diplomats from Eastern Europe, nominated recently for posts in Paris, had been rejected by the Italian government. Improvements were possible in this field, but there must be no publicity.

13. Sir G Howe said that Mr Shultz had posed the difficult question of the line to be drawn between prevention and pre-emption. Another problem was how to avoid damaging our own interests by adopting measures in conflict with our laws. Should we review the level of our diplomatic relations, and perhaps the scale of our political contacts, with states which sponsored terrorist acts? After the incident in St James's Square it had been clear that Britain must break off diplomatic relations with

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Libya. But Britain had not broken off economic relations, and there was still roughly 8,000 British people working in that country, just as several hundred US citizens had remained notwithstanding the US government's attitude. (Mr Shultz interjected that the government had done all it could to prevent these people staying.) Similarly, Sir G Howe was pleased that Herr Genscher had postponed his visit to Tripoli, but presumably the question of his going later would arise. Another question was whether our governments should permit the sale of weapons to such states as Libya. Britain had discontinued supplies, but the gap would no doubt be filled by eg Czechoslovakia or North Korea.

14. Mr Abe said that all participants should firmly combat terrorism. Japan had noted successes in Burma and the Philippines. The possibility of further terrorist incidents could not be denied. There was a need for a firm attitude and for strengthened cooperation on eg training, technology and the exchange of information.

15. Mr MacEachen said that during the incident in St James's Square the Canadian government had declared its readiness to associate itself with any action which Britain would find helpful. Canada could go along with the consensus that seemed to be emerging, although with a heavy heart and a sense of frustration at the difficulties.

16. Sir G Howe pointed out that activity was already under way in the Ten and in the Council of Europe. The UN was probably a vain hope, although terrorism was on the agenda of the International Law Commission. He suggested that the existing Summit Seven Experts' Group on the Bonn and Venice Declarations should continue and extend its work. Mr Shultz agreed: the Group should take the present discussion as the basis for further activity, and do the staff work for a further discussion by Foreign Ministers later.

17. Sr Andreotti repeated his point about the link between terrorism and drugs. Italy had had excellent results since establishing links with the US organisation concerned. He saw a little hope in the UN, where some Member States were frankly on the other side.

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