



cc/ /
A.S.C. 74
f.a.

NOTE FOR THE RECORD OF A MEETING WITH THE HONORABLE CASPAR WEINBERGER
THE US DEFENCE SECRETARY ON 2ND APRIL 1984
AT 6.45PM IN CESME, TURKEY

Present:

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for Defence

The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
US Secretary of Defence

Sir John Graham
UK Permanent Representative to
NATO

The Honorable David Abshire
Ambassador, US Mission to NATO

Field Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall
Chief of the Defence Staff

General John Vessey
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr J Blelloch
DUS(P)

The Honorable Richard Perle
Assistant Secretary of Defence

Mr Richard Mottram
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State

Major General Colin Powell
Military Assistant to the
Secretary of Defence

Mr Ronald Lauder
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defence

INF Basing

1. Mr Weinberger said that, in his talks with the Netherlands Government, he had not succeeded in persuading them to proceed with the basing of GLCMs in Holland. The Dutch Prime Minister was helpful but his Government was split and the Defence Minister was unwilling to take any positive role. He would be grateful for anything we could do to bring pressure to bear on the Dutch to face up to their responsibilities. Mr Abshire suggested that it would help to influence the Dutch Government if Mr de Reuter had to report back from the present meeting strongly held views of other governments on the need to proceed. The Secretary of State said that he would do whatever he could to help and would consider with the Prime Minister whether she might raise the matter with Mr Lubbers.

2. There was a brief discussion of the recent off base deployment of GLCMs from Greenham Common. The Secretary of State said that he had felt it important to have a second "success" before Easter and had been grateful for the assistance of the US authorities in again making available a C5 for back-up. He recognised that we needed soon to move from the quick dash approach to a more normal pattern involving an extended period off-base. For the moment the priority was to get



through the Easter period without substantial demonstrations. There was evidence that public interest in defence matters was falling away and it was in our interests to keep the temperature down.

3. The American side reported that the deployment was proceeding to timetable elsewhere.

35th Anniversary of NATO

4. The Secretary of State said that he hoped that the Communique and press conference at the end of the meeting could focus on the fact that it coincided with the 35th Anniversary of the signing of the NATO treaty. Mr Weinberger said that he supported this. A major celebration was planned in Washington in May but it would be helpful to celebrate the actual date in the way the Secretary of State had suggested.

Infrastructure

5. Mr Weinberger said that much of his bilateral meeting with Dr Woerner, which had just taken place, had been taken up with trying to persuade the Germans to adopt a more positive line on infrastructure funding. Their attitude had been not in any way encouraging. Dr Woerner had said his Minister of Finance was unwilling to see any increase.

Sea Launched Cruise Missiles

6. The Secretary of State said that he wished just to mention that the deployment of SLCMs on US ships and submarines was beginning to become a matter of controversy in Britain. He would be grateful if in considering any announcements about this programme the US Government would have in mind, as one of the points on their checklist, the possible reaction in Britain. We were likely to face questioning on whether SLCM carriers would be based in Britain and if so, would they be subject to the joint decision arrangement? Mr Weinberger said that he would have this in mind: obviously the less that had to be said about this, the better.

7. Iran/Iraq

The Secretary of State said that the British Government had found Mr Luce's visit to Washington most valuable and it seemed to have gone well. Mr Weinberger confirmed this. He said that the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis had compounded the problem since it was now very difficult for the US Government to give clear support to Iraq. But an Iranian victory would mean that a set of madmen would be in charge all the way to Syria. Since the US Government could not give overt support to Iraq they were concentrating on trying to cut off the supply of useable military goods to Iran. The Secretary of State commented that there were in any case arguments against any open US support for Iraq. This would provide the Iranians



with a justification for the war and encouragement to continue to prosecute it. Should the situation deteriorate and the Gulf be closed, he felt that it would be most important for there to be a period in which the Western powers were seen to be trying to find a peaceful solution before there was any resort to force. In any case we should need to think carefully about military action. It would be important not to become sucked in on the ground into hostilities with an Iranian Government and Armed Forces who were motivated by fanaticism.

MBFR

8. Mr Perle said that the German Government, having agreed that the Alliance should table a common MBFR position in Vienna, now appeared to be making clear their differences from the proposed approach. The Russians would take due note of this and the effectiveness of any Alliance position would thereby be weakened. The Secretary of State said that he understood the argument for Alliance cohesion and for all speaking with a single voice. But we had to see the problem also from the German point of view. All European Governments faced the criticism that they simply echoed the American position rather than taking any independent stance. The Germans were also under domestic pressure to do something to give the arms control process some momentum. Mr Weinberger commented that we would play into the Soviet hands if we kept trying to take initiatives by offering new concessions. They could play a much longer term game. The Western position in the START and INF talks had been bedevilled by our continually chopping and changing our proposals without any Soviet response. They, unlike us, did not have to worry about pressure from public opinion. The Secretary of State agreed.

9. The meeting ended at about 7.15 pm.

3rd April 1984

Rm
(R C MOTTRAM)
Private Secretary

DISTRIBUTION:

PS/Minister (AF)	DUS (P)	Head of DS12	PS/Prime Minister
PS/Minister (DP)	DCDS	Head of DS17	PS/Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
PS/USofS (AF)	AUS (D Staff)		PS/Secretary of the Cabinet
PS/USofS (DP)	ACDS (P)		Sir Oliver Wright, Washington
PSO/CDS	Head of GF3		Sir John Graham, UKDEI NATO
PS/PUS	Head of DS8		Sir Jock Taylor, Bonn
PS/2nd PUS	Head of DS11 ₃		