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DEDIP

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 130310Z JANUARY, 1984
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 133 OF 13 JANUARY.

XI

81

YOUR MEETING WITH SHULTZ.

1. RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO COVER THE WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES, I THINK YOU MAY FIND IT MOST PROFITABLE TO CONCENTRATE ON PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH SHULTZ ON THE TWO ISSUES WHICH ARE UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND, AND NO DOUBT ALSO IN OURS: NAMELY THE HANDLING OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST (ON WHICH PLEASE SEE MIPTS).

2. FIRST, HOWEVER, I SHOULD SAY THAT SHULTZ HAS BEEN SHOWING SOME SIGNS OF FRUSTRATION AND HAS AGAIN BEEN GETTING A LESS GOOD PRESS IN RECENT MONTHS. HE FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO OPERATE IN THE HIGHLY FRAGMENTED AND SOMEWHAT ANARCHIC DECISION MAKING PROCESSES HERE, WHERE ONE HAS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF SO MANY CONFLICTING INTERESTS AND POINTS OF VIEW AND PRESSURES, WHETHER FROM THE DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISERS AT THE WHITE HOUSE, THE PENTAGON, CONGRESS AND SO FORTH. THE DIFFICULTIES OF ACHIEVING A COHERENT POLICY ARE GREAT; AND SHULTZ DOES NOT LIKE INCOHERENCE. HE STILL HAS TO DEVOTE AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF TIME TO FIGHTING OFF SUCH PROPOSITIONS AS, FOR INSTANCE, THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RETALIATE IN SOME WAY FOR THE KILLING YESTERDAY OF A US HELICOPTER PILOT NEAR THE NICARAGUAN BORDER; OR MRS KIRKPATRICK'S IDEAS THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BACK UNITA RATHER THAN GOING ON TRYING FOR A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT.

3. MORE SERIOUSLY, SHULTZ REALISES THAT THE UNITED STATES TO SAY NOTHING OF THE OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS IS IN A DECIDEDLY AWKWARD PREDICAMENT IN THE LEBANON: THAT DOMESTIC PRESSURES MAY NOT ALLOW THE ADMINISTRATION MUCH TIME; AND THAT IT IS GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT TO FIND A WAY THROUGH. THE PRESS TEND TO FIND HIM SOMEWHAT WOODEN AND UNIMAGINATIVE, THOUGH WHAT THEY DISLIKE MOST IS HIS MASSIVE DISCRETION. HE IS NOT A MAN, LIKE KISSINGER, HIMSELF TO CHANGE EVENTS, TO GO BACK TO DAMASCUS AND WHEEL AND DEAL WITH ASSAD, AND AS YOU KNOW FROM YOUR OWN MEETINGS WITH HIM HIS

~~TO CHANGE EVENTS, TO GO BACK TO DAMASCUS AND WHEEL AND DEAL WITH, ASSAD. AND AS YOU KNOW FROM YOUR OWN MEETINGS WITH HIM HIS DISCRETION AT TIMES IS EVIDENT EVEN IN HIS PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH TRUSTED ALLIES. MOREOVER, HE IS A HARD-LINER ALBEIT OF A PRAGMATIC BENT IN HIS OWN VIEW OF SOVIET BEHAVIOUR: AND HE WAS A HUNDRED PER CENT WITH THE PRESIDENT OVER THE INTERVENTION IN GRENADA.~~

4. BUT YOU ALREADY KNOW HIS SOBER QUALITIES, HIS STRENGTH OF CHARACTER AND THE GENERALLY BENEFICIAL AND STEADYING INFLUENCE HE EXERTS HERE. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME DIFFERENCES OF VIEW, HE FINDS IT MUCH EASIER TO WORK WITH MCFARLANE THAN HE DID WITH CLARK. AND, WE ARE TOLD, HE HAS SUCCEEDED WHERE IT MATTERS MOST IN THE SYSTEM HERE IE. IN ESTABLISHING A REALLY GOOD PRIVATE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT HE CAN GET THE PRESIDENT TO OVER-RULE OTHER COLLEAGUES: THAT IS NOT THE PRESIDENT'S WAY. BUT HE HAS GOT THE PRESIDENT'S CONFIDENCE IN A WAY HAIG NEVER HAD. YOUR TALKS WITH HIM ON SUNDAY WILL PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROBE HIS THINKING IN MORE DEPTH AND DETAIL THAN HAS BEEN POSSIBLE IN THE MEETINGS WITH OTHER EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES PRESENT. ON THE ISSUES, PLEASE SEE MIFTS.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS ALSO TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET.

WRIGHT

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