

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

38
39

IMMEDIATE

PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
~~SIR J BULLARD~~ MR GOODSON
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
~~MR EVANS~~
MR URE
~~MR STEPHENS~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (3)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR)
MISS M E CUND) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR A D S GOODALL) CABINET OFFICE
DIO)

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

HD/PUSD (2)
HD/SAMD
HD/FID
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF

MR A TITCHENER)
~~MR C U ROBERTS~~, IAT) DOT
MR A FORTNAM)

IMMEDIATE

RESIDENT CLERK

[Lipste aa]

MS

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM WASHINGTON 281800Z APR 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1152 OF 28 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, BERNE, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA, UKDEL
NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, STOCKHOLM, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO (FOR PS/MR
ONSLOW), REYKJAVIK, LIMA, SANTIAGO, QUITO, TOKYO, DUBLIN, MODUK,
OTHER NATO POSTS.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1135: FALKLANDS/ARGENTINE NEXT OF KIN.

1. MICHEL (DEPUTY TO ENDERS) TELEPHONED MINISTER THIS MORNING
TO SAY THAT AFTER THOROUGH DISCUSSION WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT,
THEY HAD RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING
CONSTRUCTIVE THE AMERICANS COULD DO TO DISCOURAGE THE DESTEFANIS
VENTURE. THEY HAD THOUGHT ABOUT THIS CAREFULLY BUT COULD NOT SEE
A WAY OF APPROACHING THE ARGENTINIAN AUTHORITIES WHICH WOULD BE
EITHER HELPFUL TO US OR AVOID BEING DAMAGING TO THEMSELVES.

2. MICHEL SAID THAT, FOR WHAT IT WAS WORTH, THE IMPRESSION
WHICH THE US EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES HAD GAINED WAS THAT
DESTEFANIS' INTENTION WAS TO TURN AROUND IF CHALLENGED BY THE
ROYAL NAVY. THEY DID NOT THINK HE WOULD COURT A SERIOUS
CONFRONTATION. HE WOULD OF COURSE EXPLOIT TO THE MAXIMUM THE
PRESENCE OF PRESS REPRESENTATIVES ON BOARD SO AS TO RECORD THE
INCIDENT FOR POSTERITY.

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3. THOMAS THANKED MICHEL FOR HIS QUICK RESPONSE. HE SAID IT WAS
FOR THE AMERICANS TO JUDGE WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING THEY COULD
USEFULLY DO OR NOT. HE HAD HOPED THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
FIND A WAY OF LETTING THE ARGENTINIANS KNOW THAT THEY DID NOT
SUPPORT THE WAY THE VISIT WAS BEING ORGANISED. WE KNEW FROM
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE PRONE TO MISREAD
SIGNALS AND IN THIS CASE AMERICAN SILENCE COULD BE TAKEN AS A
SIGNAL. AS MICHEL KNEW, OUR OWN OBJECTIVE WAS TO TRY TO MOVE
TOWARDS NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS AND WE BELIEVED THIS WAS ALSO
IN THE REAL INTERESTS OF THE ARGENTINIANS. IF DESTEFANIS
WENT AHEAD WITH HIS PLAN, IT WOULD CERTAINLY NOT HELP THE PROCESS
OF NORMALISATION. WE HOPED THAT FRIENDS WOULD FIND OPPORTUNITIES
OF GETTING THIS THOUGHT ACROSS. MICHEL WAS NOT TO BE MOVED.
HE REPEATED THAT WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD - AND THERE WAS
STRONG SYMPATHY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OVER THE PROBLEM
WE WERE FACED WITH - THEY DID NOT SEE ANYTHING THEY COULD
USEFULLY DO TO HELP.

WRIGHT

NNNN