

CONFIDENTIAL

5034 - 1

DD UKMIS NEW YORK 281530Z
OO WASHINGTON
GRS 726
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 28L445Z APRIL 83
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 157 OF 28 APRIL 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO (FOR PS/MR ONSLOW),
PORT STANLEY, BERNE, UKMIS GENEVA
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 279: ARGENTINE NEXT OF KIN AND THE UN
SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. THE PUS SPENT NEARLY TWO HOURS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT HEATHROW THIS MORNING: HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY URE, AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY STOPFORD ONLY.
2. MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS SPEAKING AT MY REQUEST, ACLAND REFERRED TO DESTEFANIS'S APPROACH TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND SAID THAT WE WANTED TO EXPLAIN TO HIM PERSONALLY WHY WE COULD NOT COUNTENANCE A VISIT UNDER SUCH AUSPICES, AND TO GIVE HIM THE BACKGROUND. ACLAND SET OUT OUR POSITION, REFERRED TO ICRC REJECTION OF DESTEFANIS AND SAID WE HOPED THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD PREVENT THE LATTER FROM SAILING AS OTHERWISE WE FEARED THIS COULD LEAD TO A POTENTIALLY INFLAMMABLE SITUATION. NO REQUEST WAS MADE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INTERVENE.
3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR GAVE URE THE TEXT OF DE SOTO'S REPLY TO DESTEFANIS WHICH READ:
QUOTE: YOUR 23 APRIL TELEX WAS RECEIVED AT UN HEADQUARTERS IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHO IS ABROAD ON AN OFFICIAL MISSION. UPON RECEIVING IT WE ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH BRITISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN. HE REITERATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION TO THE EFFECT THAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE HUMANITARIAN CHARACTER OF PROPOSED VISIT BY FAMILIES OF ARGENTINE VICTIMS OF SOUTH ATLANTIC WAR, MODALITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH IT SHOULD BE CONDUCTED MUST BE DEALT WITH THROUGH THE ICRC.
UNQUOTE
PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID HE HAD NO (NO) INTENTION OF BEING MOVED

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM THIS STATEMENT, AND IN ANY CASE HE DID NOT THINK THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WANTED TO BE PUBLICLY INVOLVED WITH DESTEFANIS.

4. ACLAND SHOWED PEREZ DE CUELLAR PUBLICITY MATERIAL (A CAR STICKER) PRODUCED BY THE CENTRE FOR VOLUNTEERS FOR THE FATHERLAND WITH THE WORD QUOTE VOLVEREMOS UNQUOTE PRINTED ABOVE A MAP OF THE FALKLANDS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THIS CONFIRMED HIS VIEW OF THE POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA MOTIVATION OF DESTEFANIS, AND HE ASKED TO KEEP IT AS EVIDENCE.

5. SECRETARY-GENERAL ENQUIRED WHETHER WE HAD CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF ALLOWING AN ARGENTINE SHIP TO BE ESCORTED TO AN OFFSHORE ANCHORAGE AND, WHILE DENYING IT BERTHING FACILITIES, OURSELVES ORGANISING THE FERRYING OF NEXT OF KIN ASHORE. ACLAND EXPLAINED THAT AN ARGENTINE VESSEL PENETRATING NOT ONLY THE EXCLUSION ZONE BUT ALSO FALKLANDS TERRITORIAL WATERS WOULD UNDERSTANDABLY ALARM AND BE OFFENSIVE TO THE ISLANDERS: THE NATIONALITY OF THE SHIP WAS IN ANY CASE ONLY ONE OF A NUMBER OF NECESSARY CONDITIONS WHICH DESTEFANIS WAS FAILING TO MEET. SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HE WAS WORRIED BY THE PROSPECT OF A QUOTE KAMIKAZI UNQUOTE INTRUSION BY DESTEFANIS IN SPITE OF ALL WARNINGS: HE WAS TOLD WE SHARED THIS CONCERN WHICH WAS WHY WE WERE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO DISCOURAGE DESTEFANIS FROM SAILING. WE WOULD BE MAKING A FURTHER CLEAR STATEMENT OF OUR POSITION TODAY.

6. SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCLUDED THIS PART OF DISCUSSION BY CONFIRMING THAT IF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT APPROACHED HIM ABOUT DESTEFANIS, HE WOULD URGE THEM TO STOP THE SAILING: IF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT DO NOT APPROACH HIM, HE WOULD NOT VOLUNTEER HIS VIEWS. ACLAND THANKED HIM FOR HIS FIRM ATTITUDE AND FOR HIS UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION.

7. SECRETARY-GENERAL WENT ON TO REFER TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT HE SHOULD REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL LATER IN THE YEAR ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR USING HIS GOOD OFFICES IN GENERAL REGARDING THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE. HE WOULD HAVE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH US IN DUE COURSE.

8. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY PRESS KNOWLEDGE OF THIS MEETING,

CONFIDENTIAL

5034 - 1

BUT IF QUESTIONED ABOUT IT WILL CONFINE OURSELVES TO SAYING THAT THE PUS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STOPOVER AT HEATHROW TO HAVE A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION WITH HIM ON A NUMBER OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN. CONVERSATION DID INDEED COVER VARIOUS OTHER TOPICS WHICH ARE REPORTED IN MIFT.

9. IN THE LIGHT OF THE SATISFACTORY NATURE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S RESPONSE I DO NOT THINK WE NEED ASK YOU TO SEEK A FURTHER INTERVIEW WITH HIM TODAY OR ON 30 APRIL. DE CUELLAR SHOWED HIMSELF ROBUST, AND SCEPTICAL BOTH ABOUT DESTEFANIS AND THE ARGENTINES. IT WAS CLEAR HOWEVER THAT IF ANY REQUEST FOR ACTION HAD BEEN PUT, VARIOUS UNACCEPTABLE SUGGESTIONS FOR COMPROMISE COULD, AS YOU FEARED, HAVE EMERGED FROM HIM OR HIS STAFF.

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FAKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL
FCO
FID
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
FAKLAND ISLANDS

3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5035 - 1

DD UKMIS NEW YORK (281530)

PP WASHINGTON

PP MEXICO

GRS 710

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 281530Z

FM FCO 281445Z APRIL 83

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 158 OF 28 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, MEXICO CITY

INFO SAVING TO SAN JOSE, LUANDA, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, TEHRAN,
BAGHDAD, KABUL

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. OTHER TOPICS DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE PUS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT HEATHROW TODAY INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING.

2. CENTRAL AMERICA SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HE WAS NOT CLEAR ABOUT THE US REACTION TO THE CONTADORA PEACE INITIATIVE, BUT THOUGHT THERE REMAINED DEEP MISTRUST BETWEEN THE US AND MEXICAN GOVERNMENTS ON CENTRAL AMERICAN SUBJECTS. THE US AND HONDURAN GOVERNMENTS' PROPOSAL FOR USING THE OAS WOULD NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE TO NICARAGUA AND CUBA. ALTHOUGH THE CONTADORA GROUP HAD MADE NO MOVES IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR THOUGHT THAT THE PROBLEM OF A PEACE INITIATIVE MIGHT ULTIMATELY LAND IN HIS LAP.

3. ARGENTINA. SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE IMPENDING ELECTIONS: HE FEARED THAT A POPULIST PERONIST GOVERNMENT WOULD PROVE UNSTABLE AND WOULD ONLY LEAD TO ANOTHER MILITARY TAKEOVER. MEANWHILE HE DEPLORED THE RE-ARMING OF ARGENTINA, WHICH WAS CAUSING ANXIETY NOT ONLY TO THE UK BUT TO ARGENTINA'S NEIGHBOURS SUCH AS CHILE AND BRAZIL.

4. NAMIBIA. SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA IN ADDIS ABABA, HE THOUGHT HAD EMERGED THAT A UN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCE MIGHT BE REQUIRED FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST TWO YEARS TO CREASE CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY. HE WAS INCLINED TO AGREE, THOUGH IT WOULD BE EXPENSIVE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5035 - 1

MEANWHILE HE WISHED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD ADOPT A MORE IMAGINATIVE APPROACH. UNLESS THERE WAS SOME PROSPECT OF A BREAK-THROUGH BEFORE THE NEXT SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING (NOW LIKELY TO BE IN JUNE), PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD BE OBLIGED IN VIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS POSITION WHICH HE HAD TO REFLECT TO ISSUE A 'VERY IMPARTIAL' REPORT WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE THE FRONT LINE STATES AND SWAPO AT THE EXPENSE OF THE AMERICANS. IT WAS TO BE REGRETTED THAT REAGAN AND SHULTZ DID NOT RECOGNISE THE POSSIBILITIES WHICH NAMIBIA OFFERED TO THEM TO PRODUCE A FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS OF THE SORT WHICH THE US ADMINISTRATION SO BADLY NEEDED. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WENT ON TO SAY THAT MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA WERE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE LACK OF CONCRETE SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIET UNION, AND THIS CONSTITUTED AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH THE WEST SHOULD NOT IGNORE. THE PUS EXPLAINED WHY HE CONSIDERED FURTHER TIME WAS NECESSARY TO REACH A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION, AND ADDED THAT MACHEL WOULD SHORTLY BE VISITING THE UK OFFICIALLY.

5. ETHIOPIA. SECRETARY-GENERAL, SPEAKING OF HIS RECENT VISIT, SAID THAT THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NEVER ANSWERED HIS OFFERS TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES, WHILE THE SOMALIS WERE ANXIOUS TO AVAIL THEMSELVES OF HIS SERVICES. WHILE THIS REMAINED THE CASE HE COULD DO NOTHING.

6. IRAN-IRAQ. SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT HE AND OLAF PALME (WITH WHOM HE HAD RECENTLY DISCUSSED THE MEDIATION EFFORT) SAW NO PROSPECT OF ANY IMMEDIATE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE BELLIGERENTS. WHEN HOWEVER A DIALOGUE DID BECOME POSSIBLE THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE SET UP VIA THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL RATHER THAN THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR ANY REGIONAL ORGANISATION SINCE THE COMBATANTS MISTRUSTED THESE ORGANISATIONS (JUST AS FOR DIFFERENT AND UNFAIR REASONS THEY HAD MISTRUSTED WALDHEIM).

7. AFGHANISTAN. SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTED THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD RECENTLY BEEN MADE ON THE FOUR POINTS (WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES, NON-INTERFERENCE, GUARANTEES AND REFUGEES) IN THE DIRECTION OF ESTABLISHING A PRECISE TIME-TABLE FOR ACTION. ANDROPOV DID NOT SEEM TO OBJECT TO EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THESE LINES. SECRETARY-GENERAL ASKED ABOUT RUMOURS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5035 - 1

THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE OVERTURES TO THE EXILED KING OF AFGHANISTAN. HE SEEMED TO THINK THIS A POSSIBILITY. MEANWHILE THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT WAS SHOWING ITSELF TO BE BOTH COOPERATIVE AND FLEXIBLE. WE HAD TO RECOGNISE THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR COULD NOT DEAL WITH THE AFGHAN REBELS BUT ONLY WITH THE REFUGEES (WHO TO SOME EXTENT REPRESENTED THEM): HIS TERMS OF REFERENCE ONLY ALLOWED HIM TO OPERATE WITH GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED AT THE UN. HE REMAINED HOPEFUL OF PROGRESS BUT WAS NOT YET OPTIMISTIC.

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FAIKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO

FID

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FAIKLAND ISLANDS

3
CONFIDENTIAL