



Prime Minister 2
WR
8/4

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~2307922~~ 218 6169

MO 5/21

7th April 1983

Dear Willie,

David MB

In accordance with Article 121 of the 3rd Geneva Convention, it has been necessary to carry out formal inquiries into, and produce reports on, two incidents involving the death of and injury to Argentine prisoners-of-war while in British custody last year: on 1st June, an ordnance explosion at Goose Green killed four and injured eight prisoners-of-war; and on 2nd July at Pebbly Pond near Port Stanley a prisoner-of-war who was engaged on the marking out of Argentine minefields stepped on a mine which resulted in the loss of his left leg below the knee. In both incidents the prisoners-of-war were engaged on work which could be regarded as "dangerous" under the terms of Article 52 of the Geneva Convention; and it has therefore been necessary to prove as far as possible that the men were volunteers for the respective tasks (as required by Article 52), and that their supervisors, both British and Argentine, did not disregard the risks involved.

A report has been produced covering both incidents, and this has been approved by my Secretary of State and by FCO Ministers. A copy is attached for your information; and in accordance with usual practice copies are being sent to the Argentine authorities (via Brazil) and to the ICRC.

An inspired PQ has been arranged to announce the conclusions of the report, and my Secretary of State will make a written reply to a question from Mr John Heddle MP on Monday 11th April. I attach for your advance information a copy of the draft PQ and Answer, and also a copy of the defensive material prepared for use by our Press Office, and which your own office may find helpful. I might add that press interest in the two incidents has been minimal, particularly when compared with that generated by the death on 26th April 1982 at Grytviken of Suboficio Artuso.

A copy of this letter, and of the PQ and Q & A material, goes to Roger Bone in the FCO.

Yours ever,
Barry Neale


(B P NEALE)

W F S Rickett Esq

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1
TELEPHONE 01-219 1000



28 APR 1983



DRAFT PQ

Q. To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether inquiries into the death and injury of Argentine prisoners of war while in British custody on the Falkland Islands, have been completed, and if he will make a statement.

A. Inquiries into the death and injury of Argentine prisoners of war at Goose Green on 1 June 1982 and into the injury of one prisoner of war at Pebbly Pond have been completed.

Following the action at Darwin and Goose Green large quantities of Argentine arms and ammunition were found scattered in and around the settlement. This posed an extremely serious threat to the civilian population who could not return home until the houses had been checked and cleared. The British forces had to give high priority to the task of making the ammunition safe and clearing it to a central collection point at the airfield and in addition they had to guard the large number of Argentine prisoners of war who were accommodated in a large sheep-shearing shed.

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On the afternoon of 1 June 1982, a prisoner of war work detail under the supervision of an Argentine officer and guarded by three British soldiers was engaged on the task of moving ammunition from near the sheep-shearing shed when there was a loud explosion. A very fierce fire began and although rescuers managed to pull the injured clear one prisoner of war was seen to stagger back into the flames. Attempts to reach him failed and a Sergeant of the British forces, who had, over a period of some minutes, been repeatedly driven back by the heat and flames and who thought the prisoner was beyond assistance but still alive and in agony, obtained a rifle and fired three or four shots at the man.

Three prisoners of war died in the incident and a fourth died later at Ajax Bay. A further eight members of the detail were injured and received immediate first aid from the doctor and other medical staff present.

Shortly after the incident an Argentine officer complained that a British soldier had shot a prisoner of war. Eye-witnesses, including the

...../Cont'd


(2)

Sergeant, were interviewed and the facts explained to Argentine officers who accepted them and did not pursue the matter further.

As soon as practicable after hostilities had ceased an inquiry was convened which was unable to interview all the witnesses since the Argentinian prisoners of war had been repatriated. Further investigations were therefore made as units and individuals returned from the Falklands. The resulting full reports have been carefully considered and it has been concluded that the work undertaken by the detail could be classed as dangerous for the purposes of article 52 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 but that the prisoners of war undertook the task without coercion. The explosion was probably caused by a mine initiated by a faulty or mishandled grenade: phosphorus from charge bags probably caused the ferocity of the fire.

The full results of all these inquiries have been studied by the competent legal authorities who have concluded that no proceedings (whether in a civil court or by court martial or through military disciplinary proceedings) should be instituted against any individual involved.

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The problems created by the inadequate recording and marking of the extensive Argentine minefields are well known. On 2 July 1982 a group of volunteer Argentine Army engineers were assisting in locating and marking the limits of minefields on Stanley Common. An Argentine officer, followed by Cabo Primero Cattay moved across an area near Pebbly Pond to mark off the end of the minefield when there was an explosion and Cabo Primero Cattay fell with a foot injury. He was treated immediately and evacuated to hospital by helicopter where he had his left leg amputated below the knee.

An inquiry was convened and confirmed that Cabo Primero Cattay was a volunteer in the task of marking off minefields, that he was not engaged on the locating and lifting of individual mines, that the briefings, safety precautions and supervision provided by British and Argentine officers were adequate and that first aid and emergency arrangements ensured rapid medical attention and hospitalisation. It was thought that the mine was probably outside the known limits of the minefield and that Cabo Primero

...../Cont'd

Cattay stepped on it accidentally when he followed the officer round what was believed to be the limits of the minefield. These reports have been considered by the competent authorities who have concluded that no blame should be attached to any of the British or Argentine personnel involved.

A report, covering both incidents, has been prepared in accordance with article 121 of the Third Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war. This report has been communicated to Brazil, as the protecting power, and a copy has also been passed to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The report includes statements from Argentine prisoners of war although in the case of the incident at Goose Green, the operational situation and rapid repatriation of the prisoners of war prevented the taking of statements from Argentine prisoners of war, with one exception.

I have placed a copy of the report in the Library.

Q & A BRIEF

Q1 Why has it taken so long to prepare the report?

A1 Operational requirements prevented the usual immediate inquiry which could only be convened when hostilities had ceased. The availability of witnesses remained a problem and in view of the serious nature of the incident further inquiries were made over a long period as units returned to the UK. The results had to be collated and considered by the appropriate authorities before the report could be prepared for the Protecting Power and the International Red Cross Committee.

Q2 What happened to the Sergeant who fired the shots; was he disciplined?

A2 No. His actions, following his repeated rescue attempts, were taken to reduce the agony of a man who he believed was burning to death in front of him and who was certainly beyond hope and probably already dead.

Q3 Surely his actions were illegal?

A3 The competent legal authorities have carefully studied the evidence and decided that no proceedings should be instituted.

..../Cont'd

Q4 Why not?

A4 It is not the practice to give reasons or explanations for the decision of prosecuting authorities in individual cases. In this case the facts probably speak for themselves.

Q5 Who were the prisoners of war involved in the incident at Goose Green?

A5 Their names are not known. Senior Argentine officers on the spot made casualty lists and by the time British official inquiries began most of the prisoners of war had been evacuated.

Q6 Why were prisoners of war allowed to do dangerous tasks and was this in breach of the Geneva Convention?

A6 Although this work could be considered to be dangerous no Argentine prisoners of war were coerced into doing these tasks and there has not therefore been a breach of the Convention in either incident. Article 52 of the Third Geneva Convention allows prisoner of war volunteers to undertake such tasks.

Q7 Have you included the statements of British personnel in the report?

...../Cont'd

A7 No. The report contains a full summary of all the evidence which was obtained during our inquiries and the statements which it was possible to obtain from prisoners of war. In the case of the Goose Green incident, rapid evacuation of prisoners of war from the area, which was essential for operational reasons, prevented the taking of statements except for one officer.

Q8 Are you covering up what really happened at Goose Green?

A8 No. The British servicemen were giving evidence under the normal procedures of boards of inquiry or military police investigations and their statements, together with the full proceedings of the inquiries are privileged.

Q9 How many more incidents involving the death and injury of Argentine prisoners of war remain to be reported.

A9 None, There were three incidents which fell to be reported under Article 121 of the Third Geneva Convention; the incidents at Goose Green and Pebbly Pond and the earlier incident at Grytviken when Suboficial Primero Artuso was killed which has already been reported.



**EXPLOSION OF ORDNANCE ON 1 JUNE 1982
IN WHICH FOUR ARGENTINE SOLDIERS DIED
AND EIGHT OTHERS WERE INJURED WHILE IN THE CUSTODY
OF BRITISH FORCES AT GOOSE GREEN, EAST FALKLAND**

**INJURY TO 243522 CABO PRIMERO NESTOR RUBEN CATTAY,
601 ENGINEER COMPANY, ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES
ON 2 JULY 1982
WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF BRITISH FORCES AT PEBBLY POND,
NEAR STANLEY, EAST FALKLAND**

**REPORTS AND STATEMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 121
OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 12 AUGUST 1949**

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EXPLOSION OF ORDNANCE ON 1 JUNE 1982
IN WHICH FOUR ARGENTINE SOLDIERS DIED
AND EIGHT OTHERS WERE INJURED WHILE IN THE CUSTODY
OF BRITISH FORCES AT GOOSE GREEN EAST FALKLAND

REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 121 OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR OF 12 AUGUST 1949

1. Immediately following the action in which the Second Parachute Battalion recovered the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green on East Falkland, very large quantities of abandoned Argentine weapons and ammunition were found scattered in and around the settlements where the Argentine forces had constructed in-depth defensive positions. The nature and condition of the ammunition, which included fused explosive ordnance, posed an extremely serious threat to the civilian population which had been held under guard in the Community Hall by the Argentine forces for 30 days before their release by the British forces. In addition the civilian population could not be allowed to return to their homes until they had been checked for ordnance and made habitable following occupation by the Argentine forces. In addition to the high priority task of checking and clearing the arms and ammunition the small British force had to ensure the welfare of and adequate guards for over 1000 Argentine prisoners of war, until arrangements could be made for their evacuation from the settlements. There was no habitable accommodation for the large numbers of British and Argentine troops, apart from a large sheep-shearing shed within the Goose Green settlement fairly close to the airfield and the prisoners of war were accommodated in that shed.
2. An Argentine battery of 105mm artillery guns had been located a few metres from the shed and two caches of mixed ordnance and small arms ammunition were located in the same area. These caches included ammunition for the guns as well as mixed ordnance and ammunition, some of which had been collected from the immediate area, ready for eventual removal to the airfield where a Central Ammunition Collection Point had been established. On the 1 June, it is believed that one of these caches was about 15 metres long and about 2 metres wide and contained 105mm shells, charge bags, boxes of mines, both anti-personnel and anti-tank, loose mines and grenades and a large quantity of small arms ammunition. In the cache there were also about six or seven large items which were probably aircraft bombs.
3. Responsibility for clearing up the settlement and making safe and collecting ammunition was delegated to a Major of 2 Parachute Battalion. He was aware that Argentine officers were concerned about collecting their dead. An approach was therefore made to Argentine officers through a Lieutenant Gomez who spoke English, and a Major Frontera, who was believed to be the senior officer present, agreed that prisoners of war could be employed in collecting the Argentine dead, clearing up the settlement and moving ammunition to collection centres. The only condition imposed by the Argentine officers was that they should not be required to work but would be present to supervise the work details.
4. At about 0900 on 1 June a Corporal, who was a trained engineer, approached the Lance Corporal responsible for the booking in and out of prisoners of war and asked for a work detail to move ammunition. 20 men and 1 officer were booked out and the Argentinian officer who was regarded as the official interpreter was told that the intention was to split the work detail into two groups, one to provide general airfield assistance to British forces in clearing up the settlement and the other to move spent ammunition from the area of the anti-aircraft gun in the settlement. The Argentine interpreter officer explained the tasks to the supervising officer and the work detail. The prisoners-of-war supervised by their officer continued these tasks until lunchtime when they returned to the sheep-shearing shed, and the Corporal informed the interpreter that he would return for another work detail at about 1400. At that time the interpreter asked whether it would be possible to move some ammunition which was in the shed as well as

the large pile just outside near the guns. During the lunch break the Corporal removed the ammunition in the shed which consisted of rifle grenades, some anti-personnel mines and small arms ammunition; to the Collection Point at the airfield.

5. At about 1400 hours the Corporal returned to the shed and asked for a similar work detail. He told the interpreter that the detail could move the pile of ammunition just outside the shed which had been mentioned before lunch. The Argentine officer said that there would be a delay of about half-an-hour before the men would be available. While waiting the Corporal checked the mines in the pile and found two which were fused, which he made safe. He also checked the grenades to ensure that the pins were in position and ensured that there was nothing hazardous in the small arms ammunition which was loose in the pile. He had been informed earlier that the 105mm shells had been examined by other experts and pronounced safe. Apart from the large objects which were thought to be aircraft bombs he considered that the ammunition was safe for moving.

6. At 14.30 hours the Prisoner-of-War work detail was signed out, and through the interpreter, the Corporal explained what he wanted the detail to do; that is, move all the ammunition which he considered safe except for the bombs which were unfamiliar to him. The interpreter assured the Corporal that everything was clearly understood and after the supervising officer had briefed the detail they made their way to the pile of ammunition. The Corporal handed items to each man and then accompanied the detail to the Collection Point at the airfield where he explained that items should not be mixed but placed in separate piles. When he saw that the detail was carrying out his instructions he left them in the care of their officer and three guards.

7. The distance to the airfield was about 200 metres and after items had been collected the detail walked in line to the Collection Point and then returned, again in single file. The guards took up positions about 10 metres away from the detail so that they could keep the officer and twenty men under observation throughout the journey. On return from their second trip to the airfield, the officer, according to a witness, appeared to be indicating to the five men of the detail who had reached the ammunition pile what should be picked up next, when there was a loud explosion, which may have been preceded by a smaller one. A very fierce fire broke out immediately and at least three prisoners-of-war had their clothes set on fire. One of them who, according to another witness, was already engulfed in flames, was seen to stagger or fall back into the seat of the fire. British personnel including medical staff who, with a doctor, were located nearby pulled injured members of the detail clear of the flames and the immediate hazard that had developed from ignition of small arms ammunition in the pile. Despite the danger, attempts continued for some minutes to reach the prisoner-of-war who could be seen within the fire. A Sergeant managed to get close to the man but was driven back by the heat and ferocity of the fire. He tried several more times from different directions but was unsuccessful. About four to five minutes after the explosion and start of the intense fire, the Sergeant, who was in considerable distress because he thought he saw the man moving and could not reach him, obtained a self-loading rifle and fired three or four shots with the intention of ending his apparently intense suffering because he considered that he was beyond further assistance and in agony.

8. In addition to the man who died in the flames, two other men of the detail were killed by the explosion and fire and a fourth, who had lost both legs, died shortly after arrival at the medical centre at Ajax Bay. Eight members of the detail were injured and received immediate first aid from the doctor and other medical staff present. Those requiring further treatment were transferred by helicopter to the Advance Dressing Station at Ajax Bay. The combined efforts of British and Argentine personnel, assisted by civilians, brought the fire under control and put it out within about half an hour.

9. British Officers and medical staff were unable to identify the dead and injured Argentine prisoners-of-war but a senior Argentine officer and Major Frontera of the Argentine forces made lists of the injured. Shortly after the incident Major Frontera, together with Lieutenant George Gopceovich, who acted as

interpreter, complained to a British officer that one of their officers had seen a British soldier shoot a prisoner-of-war. This complaint was also made by another Argentine officer interpreter, Sub Lieutenant Gomez. The matter was investigated immediately by British officers and the true facts confirmed by the Sergeant concerned and eye witnesses to the incident. An explanation was given to the Argentine officers through Sub Lieutenant Gomez who accepted it and did not pursue the matter further. On 3rd June, two days after the incident, prisoners-of-war remaining in the custody of British forces at Goose Green were invited to make statements on the incident. Only one statement was made and that is attached to this report.

10. For the purposes of ascertaining the facts surrounding this incident and in accordance with Article 121 of the Third Geneva Convention, a full inquiry was convened by the Commander Land Forces, Falkland Islands and conducted on his behalf by four officers, one of whom was a qualified doctor; none were from Units involved in the incident. This action was taken as soon as practicable after hostilities had ceased, when witnesses could be made available. The inquiry concluded that the movement of ammunition under the circumstances prevailing at Goose Green on 1 June 1982 could be classified as dangerous work for the purposes of Article 52 of the Third Geneva Convention but that the prisoners-of-war were volunteers for the purposes of that Article; that four prisoners died and eight were injured; that their identities were not known to the British authorities but that Major Frontera, the senior Argentine Army officer present listed the names of those Argentine prisoners-of-war involved in the incident; that the body of a badly injured or dead prisoner-of-war was shot by a Sergeant who believed that the prisoner was alive but beyond further assistance and wished to spare him further agony; that adequate medical aid and assistance was quickly available and all casualties evacuated to the Main Dressing Station at Ajax Bay within 30 minutes of the explosion; that three of the prisoners died from multiple blast injuries directly resulting from the initial explosion, including one who died later at Ajax Bay; that the cause of death of the fourth may have been the result of burning or of gunshot wounds or both, noting that the deceased had been exposed to very intense heat in the centre of the fire for some four or five minutes before the shots were fired; the condition of the body precluded confirmation of injuries other than burning or gunshot wounds; that the cause of the explosion was unknown but may have been caused by a cigarette, a booby trap or faulty ammunition.

11. In view of the seriousness of the incident and the unavailability of some witnesses at the time of the inquiry, further investigations were made and additional reports on the incident were prepared. The evacuation of the injured prisoners-of-war and the rapid repatriation programme prevented the obtaining of further statements from Argentine prisoners-of-war.

12. The Government of the United Kingdom has made a careful study of this tragic incident and has considered all the facts which emerged from the inquiry and subsequent investigations. All the relevant information has been submitted to the competent legal authorities who have concluded that no proceedings (whether in a civil court or by court martial or through military disciplinary proceedings) should be instituted against any individual involved.

13. In the circumstances prevailing, it is considered reasonable that the prisoners-of-war should have been allowed to move ammunition which was considered safe after examination and the prisoners-of-war undertook this work without coercion. Following the explosion Argentine prisoners-of-war at Goose Green indicated that in future they did not wish to be involved in moving ammunition.

14. It is noted that expert opinion at the time of the incident and in the subsequent inquiry could not determine the cause of the explosion. Later expert opinion however, based on the various accounts of the incident, suggested that, in the absence of fragmentation in the surrounding area, which would have been present had a 105mm shell exploded, the likeliest cause was a mine, either anti-tank or anti-personnel. Two or three such mines would sound similar to the detonation of a 105mm shell, and being encased in thin

plastic would not provide evidence of fragmentation. The explosion of the mines could have been initiated by a grenade either because of a fault or through mishandling. The ferocity of the fire was probably caused by phosphorus from the charge bags.

TRANSLATION OF ARGENTINIAN WITNESS STATEMENT

Second Lieutenant MARCELO RAUL COLOMBO

On hearing a loud explosion and seeing everyone moving away from one of the entrances, I managed to see through a window that one soldier was opening fire on the body of another Argentinian soldier lying on the ground outside, about 40 or 50 metres from where I was. I was unable to recognise the soldier firing as he had his back to me.

(Signed)

INJURY TO 243522 CABO PRIMERO NESTOR RUBEN CATTAY,
601 ENGINEER COMPANY, ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES
ON 2 JULY 1982
WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF BRITISH FORCES AT PEBBLY POND, NEAR STANLEY,
EAST FALKLAND

REPORT AND STATEMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 121 OF THE THIRD GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 12 AUGUST 1949

1. During their occupation of the Falkland Islands, Argentine forces laid a number of minefields, some of which, after repossession by the British forces, were found to be inadequately recorded and marked. In many cases the mines used were of plastic construction and impossible to locate with the available mine detection equipment. In view of the risk posed by these minefields, particularly to the civilian population, members of the Argentine forces individually volunteered to assist in the task of clearing minefields. However, at the time of the incident in which Cabo Primero Cattay suffered his injury, following a series of accidents to British personnel, defusing and clearing mines had been stopped and the work was confined to marking out the minefield limits using barbed wire or white tape.
2. On 2 July 1982, a group of Argentine Army Engineers, including Cabo Primero Cattay was engaged on locating and marking the limits of minefields on Stanley Common. Work on two minefields had been completed and work commenced on Minefield 106, near Pebbly Pond, under the direction of an Argentine Engineer Officer who had been involved in the laying of the minefield. The British forces supervised the fencing off which was being carried out with six foot pickets and two strands of barbed wire. At about 1405 hours the Argentine officer and Cabo Primero Cattay moved across to mark off the end of the minefield when there was an explosion and Cabo Primero Cattay was seen to fall with a foot injury. British personnel who were present promptly gave first aid and an emergency call for a helicopter was immediately relayed to Headquarters Land Forces Falkland Islands. The helicopter arrived at about 1420 and Cabo Primero Cattay was admitted to hospital at 1430. He had suffered a severe mutilation injury to his left foot and ankle. After immediate emergency treatment for his injury and its effects he was taken to the operating theatre at 1530 and his left leg amputated below the knee. The surgeon considered that the prompt and effective first aid, coupled with the rapid evacuation to hospital, probably saved Cabo Primero Cattay's life.
3. For the purposes of ascertaining the facts concerning this incident and in accordance with Article 121 of the Third Geneva Convention, an inquiry was convened by the Commander, Land Forces, Falkland Islands and conducted by a Major of the British forces assisted by two officers, one of whom was an Engineer; all were unconnected with the incident itself. Having taken evidence from those involved, the inquiry concluded that Cabo Primero Cattay was a volunteer for the task of locating and marking Argentinian minefields; that he was not involved in the locating and lifting of individual mines within the minefield; that the mine, which was believed to be a P4-B Anti Personnel Mine was probably outside the known perimeter of Minefield 106 at Pebbly Pond; and that Cabo Primero Cattay stepped on it accidentally when he followed the officer marking out the perimeter round what was thought to be its end limits. The inquiry considered that the briefings, safety precautions and supervision provided by the British and Argentine officers concerned in the operation were adequate and that first aid and emergency arrangements had ensured rapid medical attention and hospitalisation.
4. The findings of the inquiry were submitted to the competent superior authorities who endorsed them and concluded that the injury to Cabo Primero Cattay was an unfortunate accident and that no blame attached to any of the British or Argentine personnel engaged on the essential task of locating and marking of minefields pending clearance in areas normally accessible to the civilian population. The Government of

the United Kingdom have carefully considered both the findings of the inquiry and the conclusions of the superior military authorities and fully endorse them.


5. Statements taken from members of the Argentine forces who assisted the inquiry, including a statement by Cabo Primero Cattay, while in hospital, are appended.

**STATEMENT BY LT H D BLANCO
601 ENGR COY – ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES**

The time being 1627 hours, I make the following statement concerning the accident in which Cabo 1st CATTAY was involved. The following were the circumstances:

1. I was marking the limits of the minefield with picquets; when I came to the end of the area being marked off I saw another peg approximately 3 metres away from the end of the line of our demarcation.
2. I went towards the end of the pond to put more picquets in when I heard the explosion of an anti-personnel mine behind me, I then saw Cabo 1st CATTAY fall down shouting.
3. I went to where he was and called to Cabo VILLAREAL who was about 50 metres away.
4. The English SNCO quickly went to get a helicopter which arrived approximately 20 minutes later.
5. I then tried to find out what had happened; it appeared that there was some of the original wire laid by the Argentinians missing; I do not know why.
6. I write this statement of my own free will.
7. I do not sign this statement because I have not had the authorisation to do so.
8. The accident occurred at approximately 1430 hours at the pond in the environs of Port Stanley.
9. I give this statement to WO1 A C CANESSA.

DIAGRAM OF ACCIDENT



H D BLANCO
Lt
Argentine Armed Forces

STATEMENT BY A BROUSSON
LIEUTENANT – 601 ENGINEER COMPANY
ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES

I proceed to write concerning the accident involving Cabo 1st of Engineers Nestor Ruben Cattay. The following circumstances occurred:

1. I was approximately 1 km from the place where the accident happened, employed on similar work.
2. Between 1400 and 1430 approximately, I heard a explosion and I sent to Sr Mullen and the SNCO in our work group who were coming from the area of the explosion.
3. A few minutes later another Argentinian SNCO ran towards us asking for a helicopter.
4. Sr Mullen ran to the radio and the rest went to the scene of the accident.
5. The first to arrive was the SNCO i/c the group (an English sergeant) and he gave an ampoule of morphine to two Argentinian SNCOs; the morphine was applied to the casualty immediately.
6. Approximately 20 to 25 minutes after the accident happened, a helicopter arrived; it took the casualty to the civil hospital.
7. I was questioned straight away by a doctor who asked me what had happened; he also asked me to explain to Cabo 1st Cattay that he would be operated on and that he would be asleep in 10 minutes.
8. Approximately one hour later, somebody came out of the operating theatre and told me that Cabo 1st Cattay's condition was good and that he would be asleep for a few hours.
9. All the English authorities we depend were at the hospital.

I certify that I have not been forced to make this statement, and I do not sign as I have not received the necessary authority to do so.

I give this to Sr WO1 A C CANESSA.

2 July 1982

ALEJANDRO BROUSSON
Lieutenant
601 Engineer Company

STATEMENT BY C V DOMINGO
601 ENGINEER COMPANY
ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES

It being 11.30 hours, I proceed to bear witness concerning the accident which involved Cabo 1st Class Nestor Cattay.

I was carrying pickets when I heard an explosion and I saw the Cabo 1st fall. I went to help him with the Blanco. The safety measures in force were very well taken. The fencing was right and the minefield was securely marked off.

Cabo Bono Valligigo ran to fetch help and the English sergeant immediately requested help on the radio.

I write this statement freely of my own will.

I do not sign because my superiors have not given me the necessary authority.

I bear witness of this to Sr. WO1 A C CANESSA.

2 July 1982
Port Stanley

CABO VILLARREAL DOMINGO
601 Engineer Compnay

This statement was taken in the King Edward Memorial Hospital in Port Stanley on 7 July 1982. WO 1 Canessa acted as the interpreter for the Board when it questioned Corporal 1st Class CATTAY.

I 243522 Corporal 1st Class Nestor Ruben CATTAY of 601 Engineer Company having been duly sworn state:

Q. Can you tell the Board in your own words what happened.

A. We were putting in pickets when we came to the end of the wire, which gives the impression of the end of the minefield. We then headed towards the coast to close the minefield when the accident occurred. Lt Blanco was leading.

Q. Had you been involved in marking other minefields before you began work on the Pebbly Pond minefield? If so had you been forced to carry out these tasks?

A. Yes, I had. No, I had not been forced.

Q. Did you volunteer to help mark the Pebbly Pond minefield?

A. Yes.

Q. You have made this statement voluntarily?

A. Yes.

7 July 1982

Signed
N R CATTAY
Corporal 1st Class



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1983

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 7 April to Willie Rickett and its enclosures describing the outcome of formal enquiries into two incidents involving the death of and injury to Argentine prisoners of war last year. The Prime Minister has further noted your Secretary of State's intention to make a written reply on these matters today.

A. J. COLES

Barry Neale, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SB