

GR 886

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM MOSCOW 231415Z FEBRUARY

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 190 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO , WASHINGTON, PARIS AND BONN

INFO SAVING TO EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, PEKING , UKDEL VIENNA
UKMIS GENEVA, THE HAGUE, ROME, BRUSSELS AND TOKYO.

ARMS CONTROL : UNOFFICIAL US/SOVIET EXCHANGES.

1. A MEETING OF THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL PANEL OF THE AMERICAN UN ASSOCIATION WAS HELD IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK. THE LEADERS OF THE LARGE AND PARTICULARLY STRONG US TEAM WERE WALTER STOESSEL (FORMERLY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE AND AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW), ELLIOTT RICHARDSON (FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENCE) , HAL SONNENFELDT (FORMERLY KISSINGER'S ASSISTANT IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL) AND STAN RESOR (FORMER MBFR NEGOTIATOR). THE MEETING WAS CHAIRED BY ARBATOV OF THE USA/CANADA INSTITUTE, BUT ON THE SOVIET SIDE WAS DOMINATED BY COLONEL-GENERAL CHERVOV OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHO, THE AMERICANS BELIEVE, PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN THE FORMULATION OF ARMS CONTROL POLICY. ACCORDING TO MY US COLLEAGUE, HIS INTERVENTIONS WERE DETAILED AND ARTICULATE BUT HIS ATTITUDE HIGHLY POLEMICAL. HE DECLINED TO DISCUSS ANY OF THE SPECULATIVE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY THE ACADEMIC EXPERTS IN THE US TEAM , AND REVERTED TIME AND TIME AGAIN TO THE THEME THAT US OFFICIAL POSITIONS WERE NOT ONLY UNREASONABLE BUT NOT HELD IN GOOD FAITH. HARTMAN COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICAN RESPONSES WERE ILL-COORDINATED AND , IN HIS VIEW, THE DELEGATION WOULD HAVE DONE WELL TO CUT SHORT THE FORMAL SESSIONS OF THE MEETING WHICH WERE IN THE ESTIMATION OF THE U S EMBASSY THE LEAST PRODUCTIVE EVER HELD BY THE PANEL.

2. I.N.F. SONNENFELDT, WHO GAVE A LOCAL BRIEFING TO REPRESENTATIVES OF NATO MISSIONS , SAID THAT THE SOVIET ACCOUNT OF START AND INF WAS EXPOUNDED IN STANDARD TERMS WITHOUT THE LEAST SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY AND WAS COMPLETELY NEGATIVE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR BOTH SETS OF GENEVA TALKS. STOESSEL TOLD ME THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD EVEN HINTED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR BREAKING OFF EITHER OR BOTH NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT ON THE AMERICAN SIDE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 3. THE SOVIET

3. THE SOVIET TEAM SAID THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING WAS UNACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE AND DECLINED TO BE DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION OF AN INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION. THE AMERICANS HAD TOLD THEM THAT THE CHOICE WAS BETWEEN " UNCONSTRAINED OR CONSTRAINED " PERSHING DEPLOYMENT. THE RUSSIANS THREATENED COUNTER- DEPLOYMENT . SONNENFELDT SAID THAT IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION ABOUT PERSHING'S RANGE WITH CHERVOV (WHO CLAIMED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONCEALING ITS TRUE EXTENT), HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT IN ANY INF AGREEMENT, THIS COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF " COLLATERAL RESTRAINT ". CHERVOV REJECTED THIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IMPLIED SOME DEPLOYMENT 9% 034'28,8. SONNENFELDT SAID AT HIS BRIEFING THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE CONCERNED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD COME UP WITH A COUNTER PROPOSAL TO ANDROPOV'S 21 DECEMBER INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR LIMITED PERSHING DEPLOYMENT AND SUCCESSFULLY APPEAL TO PUBLIC OPINION IN WESTERN EUROPE.

THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS.

4. CHERVOV, APPARENTLY READING FROM A SOVIET RECORD OF THE VLADIVOSTOK NEGOTIATIONS, SAID IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRESENTATION THAT IT HAD BEEN CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE UNITED STATES THAT FORWARD-BASED AND THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS SHOULD BE RAISED AT A FUTURE DATE. SONNENFELDT COMMENTED TO US THAT THE SOVIET CASE FOR SS20'S IN COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS WAS "PHONEY". IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1972 US/SOVIET SUMMIT , KISSINGER AND THE RUSSIANS HAD WORKED OUT A FORMULA FOR NUMBERS IN THE SALT I AGREEMENT. THIS HAD PROVIDED FOR CEILINGS ON SEA AND LAND - BASED MISSILE FORCES , WITH PROVISION FOR REPLACEMENTS, IN THE SOVIET CASE , OF SS7'S AND 9'S BY " BOATS AND SUBMARINE- LAUNCHED SYSTEMS " AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE. THIS HAD BEEN INTENDED AS A " BUILT-IN CUSHION " TO COVER THE FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW AMPLY COMPENSATED BY THEIR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED SYSTEMS AND THOSE ICBM'S TARGETTED ON WESTERN EUROPE.

5. THE RUSSIANS MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN INFORMAL EXCHANGES :

- (A) THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED LIMITS ON SS20'S EAST OF THE URALS.
- (B) US INTENTIONS TO DEPLOY NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN THE EAST (SONNENFELDT TOOK THIS TO MEAN SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES) GAVE THE SOVIET UNION THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION THROUGH SS20 DEPLOYMENT EAST OF THE URALS.
- (C) ARBATOV HAD INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET " WHITE HOUSE WATCHERS " WERE ASSUMING THAT REAGAN WOULD RUN AND

2
CONFIDENTIAL

/ WIN IN 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

WIN IN 1984 AND THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD THERE-
FORE HAVE TO COME TO TERMS WITH HIM AND , AT SOME
STAGE, CONTEMPLATE A SUMMIT. BUT ANDROPOV WOULD DO
NOTHING TO HELP REAGAN WIN.

CONCLUSION

6. BOTH STOESEL AND SONNENFELDT CONCLUDED THAT, WITH NO INCENTIVE TO SUGGEST IN ADVANCE OF THE OUTCOME OF THE FRG ELECTIONS THAT THERE COULD BE ANY MODIFICATION OF THEIR POSITION ON INF , THE RUSSIAN INTENTION APPEARED TO BE TO SIGNAL THE TOUGHEST POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON. THE EXCHANGES HAD PROVIDED NO INDICATION AS TO WHETHER THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO BUDGE AFTER THE ELECTIONS. SONNENFELDT COMMENTED THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE A SHIFT THEY HAD A NUMBER OF OPTIONS INCLUDING MATCHING SS20'S WITH FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS ON THE BASIS OF A WARHEAD COUNT WITH A PROVISION FOR SUBSEQUENT COMPENSATION FOLLOWING THE MIRVING OF THESE SYSTEMS.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

SUTHERLAND

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

LIMITED
DEFENCE D
ACDD
NEWS D
EESD
NAD
WED
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR GOODISON

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
START

3
CONFIDENTIAL