

*Defense  
Spies Control*

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GR 750  
SECRET  
FM WASHINGTON 042309Z FEB 83  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 302 OF 4 FEBRUARY

*Lead in full.*

*A.S.C. 7/2.*

VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO LONDON: INF

1. BUSH'S FINDINGS ON HIS RETURN FROM EUROPE WILL BE OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE US ADMINISTRATION'S THINKING ON INF.
2. WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION AT PRESENT THERE ARE DIVIDED VIEWS. SHULTZ HAS BEEN ARGUING BEHIND THE SCENES FOR AN APPROACH WHICH CORRESPONDS VERY CLOSELY TO THE LINE TAKEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN PARLIAMENT ON 18 JANUARY, WHICH WAS WIDELY WELCOMED HERE. SHULTZ FAVOURS HOLDING ON TO THE ZERO OPTION AS THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE, WHILE SUGGESTING INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS BASED ON EQUAL NUMBERS OF US AND SOVIET INF WARHEADS AT SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED LEVELS, SHULTZ HAS BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE VICE-PRESIDENT. THE PRESIDENT, WE ARE TOLD, HAS SEEMED REASONABLY SYMPATHETIC. THE ADMINISTRATION IS LIKELY TO MOVE TO THIS POSITION IN DUE COURSE. WEINBERGER, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN ARGUING AGAINST ANY FALLING AWAY FROM THE ZERO OPTION: AND IT HAS NOT BEEN THOUGHT DESIRABLE TO MAKE ANY MOVE FOR THE TIME BEING BECAUSE KOHL HAS BEEN UNDEMANDING OF ANY CHANGE BEFORE THE GERMAN ELECTIONS.
3. THE VICE-PRESIDENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION GENERALLY, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN SHOWING AN INCREASED REALISATION OF THE DANGERS VIS A VIS EUROPEAN OPINION OF APPEARING TO SUGGEST THAT THE ZERO OPTION IS AN ALL OR NOTHING, TAKE IF OR LEAVE IT PROPOSAL. INSTEAD, THEREFORE, OF ANY FORMAL CHANGE IN THE NEGOTIATING POSITION, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ADJUSTING THE LANGUAGE IN WHICH IT IS PRESENTED. THE PRESIDENT IN RECENT STATEMENTS ON ARMS CONTROL HAS BEEN PUTTING THE EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR EQUAL, BALANCED AND FULLY VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS AT REDUCED LEVELS. IN HIS SPEECH IN BERLIN (BONN TELNO 109 TO YOU) BUSH EMPHASIZED THAT THE IRREDUCIBLE ELEMENTS WERE:
  - I) THE NUCLEAR THREAT MUST BE REDUCED TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL:
  - II) THERE MUST BE A BALANCED OUTCOME WITH NO SOVIET MONOPOLY:
  - III) CIRCUMVENTION OF ANY KIND MUST BE PREVENTED.
4. THIS LATTER POINT IS VERY IMPORTANT. SHULTZ HAS JUST HAD AN EARFUL FROM NAKASONE ON THE UNACCEPTABILITY TO JAPAN OF ANY AGREEMENT WHICH RESULTED IN THE SOVIET UNION SIMPLY TRANSFERRING MORE SS20S EAST INTO SOVIET ASIA. THE AMERICANS, WITH GOOD REASON, WOULD NOT REGARD ANY AGREEMENT OF THAT KIND AS WORTH HAVING.

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5. YOU WILL WANT TO ASK BUSH WHAT IMPRESSIONS HE HAS DERIVED FROM HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER EUROPEAN LEADERS. KOHL WILL HAVE GIVEN THE PRIME MINISTER HIS OWN ACCOUNT OF HIS TALKS WITH BUSH: NO DOUBT WE WILL BE IMPRESSING ON THE VICE-PRESIDENT OUR DETERMINATION TO PROCEED WITH THE DEPLOYMENT IF THE NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT PRODUCE AN ACCEPTABLE RESULT. CLEARLY A ZERO OUTCOME SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AS THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS MUST BE EXCLUDED. IF WE HAVE OURSELVES COME TO THAT CONCLUSION, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO BUSH THAT IN OUR VIEW AN AGREEMENT BASED ON GENUINELY EQUAL NUMBERS, AND NO BOGUS COUNTING, SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE: AND THAT IT WILL PUT ALLIANCE GOVERNMENTS IN A STRONGER POSITION TO GET THE DEPLOYMENT THROUGH IF IT IS MADE CLEAR THAT, FOR OUR PART, WE CAN ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON GENUINE EQUALITY. ANY SUCH PROPOSAL SHOULD CORRESPOND TO THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN YOUR MESSAGE OF 26 JANUARY TO COLOMBO (YOUR TELNO 23 TO ROME). WE MIGHT ALSO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO EMPHASIZE THAT NITZE HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO EXPLORE ANY SIGNS OF MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION. THIS WOULD AFFORD THE BEST POSSIBLE BASIS ON WHICH TO SEE THE DEPLOYMENT THROUGH.

6. NONE OF THIS WOULD COME AS ANY SURPRISE TO BUSH. MUCH WILL DEPEND, HOWEVER, ON KOHL'S ATTITUDE. THE TIMING OF AN EVENTUAL MOVE WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, IN RELATION TO THE GERMAN ELECTIONS.

WRIGHT

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ACDD  
  
EESD  
NAD  
WED  
PS

PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR GOODISON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
START

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SECRET