



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 January 1983

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Michael,

I enclose herewith a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee.

The report will not be released to the press in advance of time of my statement tomorrow, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a personal and confidential basis.

I shall say in my statement that amendments to certain of the references to intelligence reports designed to minimise potential damage to British intelligence interests have been agreed with Lord Franks. Lord Franks agrees that:

- (1) all the references to intelligence reports included in the Committee's report as submitted have been retained in the report as presented to Parliament, most of them without amendment;
- (2) none of the amendments that have been made alters the sense, substance or emphasis of the reference to the intelligence report concerned, or removes anything of significance to the Committee's account of the matters

/referred

referred to it or to its findings and conclusions;

- (3) apart from those agreed amendments, no other deletions or amendments have been made to the Committee's report as submitted.

I should be perfectly happy for you to see a copy of the report as submitted, so that you could satisfy yourself about the amendments, if you wished to do so. For obvious reasons the unamended copies of the report are being kept under strict control, but the Secretary of the Cabinet has a copy of the report as submitted, with the amendments marked in it, and he would be very happy to make the necessary arrangements for you to inspect it.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. Michael Foot, M.P.



*free*

## 10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

You will remember that I wrote to you on 5 July about the establishment of the Committee of Privy Counsellors to review the way in which the responsibilities of Government were discharged in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982. I asked you to agree that the Committee should have access to any relevant documents of the administration for which you were responsible, subject to the conventions listed in my letter.

I am now enclosing an advance copy of the report which is to be published at 3.30 p.m. tomorrow, Tuesday 18 January when I hope to make a statement in the House of Commons. You will see from paragraph 16 that the Committee decided to treat 1965 as the starting point of their review since it was then that the dispute was first formally brought to international attention in the United Nations. The Committee did not therefore need to examine the papers of the administration in which you were Prime Minister. I am sure, however, that you will wish to see a copy of the Report: it will not be released to the press in advance of my statement to the House, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a strictly personal and confidential basis in the meantime.

The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, OM, FRS

Boe.



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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 January 1983

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

I am sending you with this letter a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Franks. The report is to be published tomorrow afternoon, Tuesday, 18 January, when I hope to make a statement in the House of Commons. The report will not be released to the press in advance of my statement, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a strictly personal and confidential basis.

sgd MT

The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, M.P.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 January 1983

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Peter,

I am sending you with this letter a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Franks. The report is to be published tomorrow afternoon, Tuesday, 18 January, when I hope to make a statement in the House of Commons. The report will not be released to the press in advance of my statement and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a strictly personal and confidential basis.

I am also enclosing, for your personal information, some notes prepared on the observations of the Franks Committee on the Government's handling of the dispute.

I will telephone you to discuss how we handle various matters.

Yours ever

Raymond

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Carrington, K.C.M.G., M.C.

DA.

file

6



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 January 1983

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear John.

I am sending you with this letter a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Franks. The report is to be published tomorrow afternoon, Tuesday, 18 January, when I hope to make a statement in the House of Commons. The report will not be released to the press in advance of my statement and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a strictly personal and confidential basis.

I am also enclosing, for your personal information, some notes prepared on the observations of the Franks Committee on the Government's handling of the dispute.

*Baroness*  
*Raymond*

The Right Honourable Sir John Nott, K.C.B., M.P.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 January 1983

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

*Revised.*

I am sending you with this letter a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Franks. The report is to be published tomorrow afternoon, Tuesday, 18 January, when I hope to make a statement in the House of Commons. The report will not be released to the press in advance of my statement, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a strictly personal and confidential basis.

*Yours  
Edward Heath*

The Right Honourable Edward Heath, M.B.E., M.P.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 January 1983

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

*Dear Humphrey,*

I am sending you with this letter a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Franks. The report is to be published tomorrow afternoon, Tuesday 18 January, when I hope to make a statement in the House of Commons. The report will not be released to the press in advance of my statement, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a strictly personal and confidential basis.

*Yours  
Raymond*

The Right Honourable Humphrey Atkins, M.P.





DA  
G. H.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 January 1983

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Nick,

I am sending you with this letter a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Franks. The report is to be published tomorrow afternoon, Tuesday, 18 January, when I hope to make a statement in the House of Commons. The report will not be released to the press in advance of my statement, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a strictly personal and confidential basis.

Yours ever

N. Ridley

—

The Hon. Nicholas Ridley, M.P.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 January 1983

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Sir Harold,

I am sending you with this letter a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Franks. The report is to be published tomorrow afternoon, Tuesday, 18 January, when I hope to make a statement in the House of Commons. The report will not be released to the press in advance of my statement, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a strictly personal and confidential basis.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. Sir Harold Wilson, K.G., O.B.E., M.P.



*Luce*

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 January 1983

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

*Dear Richard,*

I am sending you with this letter a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Franks. The report is to be published tomorrow afternoon, Tuesday, 18 January, when I hope to make a statement in the House of Commons. The report will not be released to the press in advance of my statement, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a strictly personal and confidential basis.

*Yours  
Richard*

Richard Luce, Esq., M.P.

*You will see that the report refers very nicely to your handling of the New York resolutions.*

A.F.C. 9/4

h-a-

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT, RADIO 4, SATURDAY 15 JANUARY

On Tuesday, the Franks Report on events leading up to the Falklands crisis is expected to be published. In view of the speculation that's been rife about blame that's to be apportioned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and talk of Mrs Thatcher's being at odds with the Foreign Secretary, Mr Pym, we asked our Diplomatic Correspondent, John Osman, who runs Britain's foreign policy.

A man who was not so long ago was himself this country's Foreign Secretary asserted a few days ago that the Foreign Office, as an institution, had many great virtues but also one supreme vice. Collectively he alleged the FO lacked backbone. The opinion I am quoting is that of Dr David Owen, who went on to call for Mrs Thatcher and Mr Pym to put their act together. Now, Dr Owen's view is spooned out of the British political stewpot and so perhaps does not have the weight that might be attached to a genuinely dispassionate judgement. But nevertheless the question which remains is valid. Have Mrs Thatcher and Mr Pym got their act together? I am the last man to try and assess that, having returned to this country only a couple of weeks ago after many years abroad, but what I can report reasonably confidently is that British diplomats, both here and overseas, reject the charge of British foreign policy being out of joint. They do however accept that there are two predominate voices on the international microphone. Those of Mrs Thatcher and Mr Pym. But, they stress, there are not two policies. The diplomats say it's all a matter of tactics and presentation. Whether it's on how to handle strategic disarmament, how to handle the Israelis and the Arabs, how to get a fair deal for Britain from Europe or indeed how best to secure the interests of the Falkland Islanders. The presentation is indeed a point which Mrs Thatcher herself made at the height of the Falklands crisis last year when she dismissed reports of Cabinet dissension and stressed that Mr Pym, among others, had done absolutely

marvellously. She then added 'Of course in formulating policy we argue. What else would you expect?' That seems to remain the position. Mrs Thatcher and Mr Pym still consult regularly. He saw her on Thursday on her return from the Falklands and normal working relationships go on. What's more, though the Foreign Office is bracing itself for possible, if not probable, criticism from Franks the state of morale does not appear to be anywhere near as low as some quarters have reported it to be. Indeed more sophisticated staff at the FO tend even to manage a wry smile as they recall the words only last summer of the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Mrs Kirkpatrick, who complained that British diplomacy had run rings round everyone else. One of those to perform this feat of course was Sir Anthony Parsons who recently retired from the Diplomatic Service to become Mrs Thatcher's Foreign Affairs Adviser. This, by itself, has been cited as evidence of a split between the Prime Minister's office and the Foreign Office. There's been a lot of gossip as to what Sir Anthony's precise role will be. Mrs Thatcher's hatchet man, or a healer and bridge builder? Reports have been published suggesting that he will tend towards healing and I would concur with that view. He's a man whom I would class as archetypally FO - informed, amusing, charming and tough, distinctly not lacking backbone. At the FO, I found no real evidence of resentment at the Parsons appointment from the professionals, rather perhaps the other way around. An example for young diplomats to aspire to in future years, perhaps a top job with some future Prime Minister. If what I've said so far tends perhaps to give an impression of complacency at the Foreign Office about Franks, and what his Report might contain, then this would be wrong. The Office was shocked by the resignation of Lord Carrington and two other Ministers and there's been a lot of critical self-examination. If the Franks Reports strongly condemns the FO it will inevitably affect staff morale but this need not be a bad thing if the existing system or structure is improved. The FO has cooperated to the full with the enquiry team and there will be action on whatever criticisms emerge. There's something of a sense of siege about the place and an awareness that for various reasons some people actually demand a scapegoat, even though the previous boss himself, Lord Carrington,

has already been sacrificed. Tuesday will undoubtedly be an important day in the life of one of the greatest British Departments of State.

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Ref. A083/0132

MR BUTLER

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--- I attach drafts of letters under cover of which the Prime Minister could send copies of the Franks Report on Monday to those who are to receive it in advance.

Mr Atkins has said that he would like his copy sent to my office, where he will collect it himself at lunch-time on Monday.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

14th January 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT LETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO THE  
RT HON MICHAEL FOOT MP

--- I enclose herewith a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee. The report is to be published at 4.30 pm tomorrow, after I have made an oral statement in the House of Commons in which I shall be suggesting that we should have a very early debate on it.

The report will not be released to the press in advance of time of publication, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a personal and confidential basis, and not to disclose any part of it or give any indication of its contents to the media before 4.30 pm tomorrow afternoon.

I shall say in my statement that the Government has agreed with Lord Franks amendments to certain of the references to intelligence reports with a view to minimising potential damage to British intelligence interests. I shall be able to tell the House that Lord Franks agrees that:

- (1) all the references to intelligence reports included in the Committee's report as submitted have been retained in the report as presented to Parliament, most of them without amendment;
- (2) none of the amendments that have been made alters the sense, substance or emphasis of the reference to the intelligence report concerned, or removes anything of significance to the Committee's account of the matters referred to it or to its findings and conclusions;



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(3) apart from those agreed amendments, no other deletions or amendments have been made to the Committee's report as submitted.

I should be perfectly happy for you to see a copy of the report as submitted, so that you could satisfy yourself about the amendments, if you wished to do so. For obvious reasons the unamended copies of the report are being kept under strict control, but the Secretary of the Cabinet has a copy of the report as submitted, with the amendments marked in it, and, if you would like to go round to the Cabinet Office to inspect that, he would be very happy to make the necessary arrangements.

DRAFT LETTER TO THE RT HON JAMES CALLAGHAN MP

Write similarly to

THE RT HON EDWARD HEATH MBE MP

SIR HAROLD WILSON KG OBE FRS MP

THE RT HON THE LORD CARRINGTON KCMG MC

THE RT HON HUMPHREY ATKINS MP

HON NICHOLAS RIDLEY MP

RICHARD LUCE MP

THE RT HON SIR JOHN NOTT KCB MP

I am sending you with this letter a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Franks. The report is to be published tomorrow, Tuesday 18th January, at 4.30 pm, after I have made a statement in the House of Commons, and I should be grateful if you would treat your copy of the report as strictly confidential until then. The report will not be released to the press in advance of time of publication, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a personal and confidential basis, and not to disclose any part of it or give any indication of its contents to the media before 4.30 pm tomorrow afternoon.

DRAFT LETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO THE  
RT HON MICHAEL FOOT MP

*PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL*

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The report will not be released to the press in advance of time of ~~publication~~ *my statement tomorrow*, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a personal and confidential basis, and not to disclose any part of it or give any indication of its contents to the media before ~~4.30 pm tomorrow afternoon~~ *H.M.*

I shall say in my statement that the Government has agreed with Lord Franks amendments to certain of the references to intelligence reports with a view to minimising potential damage to British intelligence interests. I shall be able to tell the House that Lord Franks agrees that:

- (1) all the references to intelligence reports included in the Committee's report as submitted have been retained in the report as presented to Parliament, most of them without amendment;
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CONFIDENTIAL

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DRAFT LETTER TO THE RT HON JAMES CALLAGHAN MP

Write similarly to

THE RT HON EDWARD HEATH MBE MP ✓

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HON NICHOLAS RIDLEY MP

RICHARD LUCE MP

THE RT HON SIR JOHN NOTT KCB MP ✓

~~IN CONFIDENCE~~ PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

I am sending you with this letter a copy of the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Franks. The report is to be published tomorrow<sup>afternoon</sup>, Tuesday 18th January, ~~at 4.30 pm, after I have made~~ <sup>when I hope to make</sup> a statement in the House of Commons, ~~and I should be grateful if you would treat your copy of the report as strictly confidential until then.~~ The report will not be released to the press in advance of <sup>my statement</sup> ~~time of publication~~, and I would therefore ask you to treat it as sent to you on a <sup>strictly</sup> personal and confidential basis, and not to disclose any part of it or give any indication of its contents to the media ~~before 4.30 pm tomorrow~~ <sup>before that time.</sup> ~~afternoon.~~

[To Lord Carrington and Sir John Nott only]

I am also enclosing, for your personal information, some notes prepared on ~~the~~ <sup>my</sup> ~~comments~~ <sup>made</sup> observations of the ~~made by~~ Franks Committee ~~on aspects of the~~ <sup>made</sup> ~~focus~~ on the Government's handling of the dispute.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD DRAFT

17 JANUARY 1983

FALKLAND ISLANDS REVIEW COMMITTEE: STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement about the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee.

2. The House will remember that I announced the setting up of the review committee in July 1982, after consultation with the rt. hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and leading Privy Counsellors in other parties. At that time I expressed the hope that the Committee would be able to complete its work within six months.

3. The Committee has justified that hope. I received its report on 31st December 1982, and I am presenting it to Parliament as a Command paper this afternoon. Copies are now available in the Vote Office.

4. I should like to express the Government's gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Franks, and to his colleagues for the amount of time and effort which they have devoted to producing such a thorough and comprehensive report in so short a time.

5. The report makes it clear that the Committee was provided with all the papers relevant to its terms of reference, including a comprehensive collection of reports from the intelligence agencies. The Committee's report contains a number of references to intelligence matters which would not in other circumstances be divulged. These references are essential for a full understanding of the matters into which the Committee was asked to inquire, and the Government has agreed that the public interest requires that on this occasion

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the normal rule against public reference to the intelligence organisation or to material derived from intelligence reports should be waived. The Government has, however, agreed with ~~the noble Lord,~~ Lord Franks, amendments to certain of the references to intelligence reports with a view to minimising potential damage to British intelligence interests. Lord Franks has authorised me to tell the House that he agrees that:

(1) all the references to intelligence reports included in the Committee's report as submitted | have been retained in the report as presented to Parliament, | most of them without amendment;

(2) none of the amendments that have been made alters the sense, substance or emphasis of the reference to the intelligence report concerned, or removes anything of significance to the Committee's account of the matters referred to it or to its findings and conclusions;

(3) apart from those agreed amendments, no other deletions or amendments have been made to the Committee's report as submitted.

6. The report is unanimous and is signed by all the members of the Committee without qualification. It falls into four chapters. The first gives an account of the dispute from 1965, when the issue was first brought formally to international attention by a Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to May 1979. The

CONFIDENTIAL

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second covers the period from May 1979 to 19th March 1982. The third deals with the fortnight from 19th March to 2nd April 1982 which included the South Georgia incident and led up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. The fourth and final chapter deals with the way in which the Government discharged its responsibilities in the period leading up to the invasion. There are six annexes, the first of which ~~comments on~~ <sup>deals with</sup> ten specific assertions which have been made by some who have ~~commented~~ <sup>expressed views</sup> on the matters in question.

*— i.e. those which deal with the way Govt discharged its responsibilities —*

7. In the fourth chapter of the report the Committee notes a number of points where in its judgement different decisions might have been taken, fuller consideration of alternative courses of action might have been advantageous, and the machinery of Government could have been better used. This chapter defines and addresses itself to two crucial questions:

- (1) Could the Government have foreseen the invasion of 2nd April 1982?
- (2) Could the Government have prevented the invasion?

8. The Committee emphasises that its report should be read as a whole. At this stage, therefore, I will do no more than quote the Committee's conclusions on these two crucial questions.

9. On the first question, whether the Government could have foreseen the invasion of 2nd April, the Committee's conclusion is as follows:

/ "266. In the



CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

"266. In the light of this evidence, we are satisfied that the Government did not have warning of the decision to invade. The evidence of the timing of the decision taken by the Junta shows that the Government not only did not, but could not, have had earlier warning. The invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2nd April could not have been foreseen."

I have quoted the whole of paragraph 266.

10. On the second question, whether the Government could have prevented the invasion, the Committee's conclusion contained in the final paragraph of the report is as follows:

"339. Against this background we have pointed out in this Chapter where different decisions might have been taken, where fuller consideration of alternative courses of action might, in our opinion, have been advantageous, and where the machinery of Government could have been better used. But, if the British Government had acted differently in the ways we have indicated, it is impossible to judge what the impact on the Argentine Government or the implications for the course of events might have been. There is no reasonable basis for any suggestion - which would be purely hypothetical - that the invasion would have been prevented if the Government had acted in the ways indicated in our report. Taking account of these considerations, and of all the evidence we have received, we conclude that we would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government

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- 5 -

for the Argentine Junta's decision to commit its act of unprovoked aggression in the invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2nd April 1982."

I have quoted in full the final paragraph of the report.

11. Mr. Speaker, time will of course be found for an early debate, and that will be discussed through the usual channels. The Government will welcome an early opportunity of discussing ~~in more detail~~ the matters concerned in the report more thoroughly than is possible this afternoon.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD

Second Draft  
14th January 1983

17<sup>th</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

Falkland Islands Review Committee

Statement by the Prime Minister

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement about the report of the Falkland Islands Review Committee.

2. The House will remember that I announced the setting up of the review committee in July 1982, after consultation with the rt hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and leading Privy Counsellors in other parties. At that time I expressed the hope that the Committee would be able to complete its work within six months.

3. The Committee has justified that hope. I received its report on 31st December 1982, and I am presenting it to Parliament as a Command paper this afternoon. Copies will <sup>now</sup> be available in the Vote Office at the end of proceedings on this statement. <sup>ARE</sup>

4. I should like to express the Government's admiration and gratitude to the rt. hon. and noble Lord, Lord Franks, and to his rt. hon. colleagues for the amount of time and effort which they have devoted to producing such a thorough and comprehensive report in so short a time.

5. The report makes it clear that the Committee was provided with all the papers relevant to its terms of reference, including a comprehensive collection of reports from the intelligence agencies. The Committee's report contains a considerable number of references to intelligence matters which would not in other circumstances be divulged. These references are essential for a full understanding of the matters into which the Committee was asked to inquire, and the Government has agreed that the public interest requires that on this unique occasion the normal rule against public reference to the intelligence organisation or to material derived from intelligence reports should be waived. The Government has, however,

CONFIDENTIAL

agreed with the ~~rt. hon~~ and noble Lord, Lord Franks, amendments to certain of the references to intelligence reports with a view to minimising potential damage to British intelligence interests. Lord Franks has authorised me to tell the House that he agrees that:

(1) all the references to intelligence reports included in the Committee's report as submitted / have been retained in the report as presented to Parliament, / most of them without amendment;

(2) none of the amendments that have been made alters the sense, substance or emphasis of the reference to the intelligence report concerned, or removes anything of significance to the Committee's account of the matters referred to it or to its findings and conclusions;

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7. In the fourth chapter of the report the Committee notes a number of points where in its judgment different decisions might have been taken, fuller consideration of alternative courses of action might have been advantageous, and the machinery of Government could have been better used. This chapter defines and addresses itself to two crucial questions:

- (1) Could the Government have foreseen the invasion of 2nd April 1982?
- (2) Could the Government have prevented the invasion?

8. The Committee emphasises that its report should be read as a whole. At this stage, therefore, I will do no more than quote the words in which the Committee sums up its conclusions on these two crucial questions.

9. On the first question, whether the Government could have foreseen the invasion of 2nd April, the Committee's conclusion is as follows:

"266. In the light of this evidence, we are satisfied that the Government did not have warning of the decision to invade. The evidence of the timing of the decision taken by the Junta shows that the Government not only did not, but could not, have had earlier warning. The invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2nd April could not have been foreseen."

I have quoted the whole of paragraph 266.

10. On the second question, whether the Government could have prevented the invasion, the Committee's conclusion is as follows: *contained in the report*

"339. Against this background we have pointed out in this Chapter where different decisions might have been taken, where fuller consideration of alternative courses of action might, in our opinion, have been advantageous, and where the machinery of Government could have been better used. But, if the British Government had acted differently in the ways we have *pointed out in the report*



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indicated, it is impossible to judge what the impact on the Argentine Government or the implications for the course of events might have been. There is no reasonable basis for any suggestion - which would be purely hypothetical - that the invasion would have been prevented if the Government had acted in the ways indicated in our report. Taking account of these considerations, and of all the evidence we have received, we conclude that we would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government for the Argentine Junta's decision to commit its act of unprovoked aggression in the invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2nd April 1982."

I have quoted in <sup>full</sup> ~~total~~ the final paragraph of the report.

11. Mr. Speaker, ~~rt. hon and hon Members of the House will wish to read the report in full before it is debated.~~ ~~Time~~ <sup>Time</sup> will of course be found for an early debate, and that ~~matter~~ will be discussed through the usual channels. That debate will provide us with an opportunity to deal more fully than is possible in this statement with the issues covered by the Committee's report.

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