

FRANKS REPORT

FB

CONCLUSIONS OF A MEETING HELD AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET ON
17 JANUARY 1983 at 2 PM

Present:

| | | |
|-----------------------|---|--------------------------|
| Mr B Ingham | - | Prime Minister's Office |
| Miss R Christopherson | - | Prime Minister's Office |
| Mr J Goulden | - | FCO |
| Mr N Taylor | - | MoD |
| Mr J Stubbs | - | MPO |
| Mr D Colvin | - | Cabinet Office |
| Mr I Kydd | - | Prime Minister's Office. |

The meeting considered Bernard Ingham's minute of 17 January concerning publication arrangements for the Franks Report. The following conclusions were reached:

- Locked Room Technique (Question 1)

It was agreed that this approach would not be appropriate.

- Lobby Briefing (Question 2)

The Lobby did not want a briefing but Mr Taylor and Mr Goulden would hold themselves in readiness to join Mr Ingham if the Lobby requested a briefing or if there was a demand from diplomatic/defence correspondents.

- Official Reaction

In addition to drawing on the Prime Minister's statement, Government spokesmen would indicate general satisfaction of an authoritative report.

- Ministerial Interviews (Question 5)

The Prime Minister had accepted that Ministers should not give interviews although she had not absolutely ruled out the possibility that she might need to herself. No 10 had informed Departments represented on the "War Cabinet", including the Attorney General's and Paymaster General's offices. In addition No 10 had spoken to Mr Biffen's Office and the Treasury. The Group would review the position on Wednesday morning.

- Distribution of Copies (Question 5)

To be handled by Miss Christopherson. No 10 had ordered 500 for distribution as follows:-

100 for MPO
50 for MoD
50 for FCO
100 to be retained by No 10
250 to Press Gallery (200 for Lobby/Press Gallery, 50 for foreign Press).

MPO, MoD, FCO would arrange to collect their copies from No 10 at 3.15 pm. MPO would make copies available to leader writers.

- Defensive Briefing

Consideration should be given to any other questions likely to be raised by the Press and not covered by Annex A of Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 14 January.

- JIC

Any questions should be referred to No 10. It was noted that Sir Anthony Acland ceased to be the Chairman of the JIC on 6 January 1982 when Patrick Wright took over.

- Witnesses

All those who gave evidence were identified by name with the exception of 4 or 5 members of the Intelligence community.

- Unions

The PUSS at the FCO might call in representatives of the unions concerned and provide copies of the Report.

- Sir Anthony Parsons

No 10 would ensure he was aware of the position regarding interviews.

- Lead Departments

Lead Departments were identified in respect of the briefing prepared by the Cabinet Office (see list attached).

- Responsible for Invasion?

The Argentine Junta.

It was agreed that there should be a further meeting at 09.45 on Wednesday to review the situation.

IK

IAN KYDD

18 January 1983

ANNEX A

OBSERVATIONS OF THE FRANKS REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING
OF THE DISPUTE WITH ARGENTINA OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
AND A REASONED COMMENTARY ON EACH

(Note: all paragraph references are to the Franks Report)

- FCO A1 - Mr Ure's report, recommending fuller contingency plans, in June 1981 (paragraph 90)
- FCO A2 - Failure to heed the warning of HM Ambassador, Buenos Aires, in June 1981 (paragraph 91)
- FCO A3 - British policy after October 1981 as 'Micawberism' (paragraph 104)
- MOD A4 - No detailed contingency plans by the Ministry of Defence (paragraph 113)
- FCO A5 - Demise of leaseback leading inevitably to confrontation (paragraph 124)
- MOD A6 - No immediate response to Prime Minister's request of 3 March 1982 for contingency planning (paragraphs 152 and 303)
- FCO A7 - Delay in circulating paper on civil contingency planning (paragraph 155)
- Tsy A8 - Treasury refusal to meet costs of civil contingency planning from the Contingency Reserve (paragraph 188)
- MOD A9 - No recommendation to send surface ships on 30 March (paragraphs 224-225)
- FCO A10 - Argentina's belief that the United States would not actively oppose forceful action (paragraph 276)
- MOD A11 - Effect of successive Defence Reviews (paragraphs 278-279)
- FCO (MOD/HO) A12 - Policies casting doubt on British commitment to the Islands (continued arms sales to Argentina, 1976 Shackleton survey and British Nationality Act (1981)) (paragraph 280)
- MOD A13 - HMS Endurance (paragraph 288)
- FCO A14 - Lord Carrington allowed the initiative to pass to Argentina (paragraph 29)
- FCO A15 - No OD paper circulated in March 1982 (paragraphs 291-292)
- FCO A16 - No Cabinet or OD discussion between January 1981 and 25 March 1982 (paragraphs 291-292)
- FCO A17 - Misjudgement of Argentine intentions by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (paragraph 296)
- FCO A18 - Failure of Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials to press for action (paragraphs 300, 302 and 330)
- No 10 A19 - Argentina and the Falklands a relatively low intelligence priority (paragraph 304)

- No 10 A20
 No 10 A21
 MOD A22
 FCO/No 10 A23
 No 10 A24
 FCO A25
 MOD A26
 No 10 A27

 - No revision of the July 1981 JIC assessment (paragraphs 308; 309 and 315)
 - No allocation of additional intelligence resources (paragraph 311)
 - Defence Attache, Buenos Aires, had no remit to obtain detailed information on Argentine military movements (paragraph 312)
 - Insufficient weight paid to Argentine press campaign and to effects of actions by the British Government (paragraph 316)
 - Assessments machinery too passive and in need of review (paragraphs 318-319)
 - Need for better liaison between Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Embassy in Buenos Aires and the Governor (paragraph 323)
 - SSN should have been sent earlier (paragraph 332)
 - Prime Minister not clear enough over meeting force with force (paragraph 333)