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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 4/9/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: PEPR UR US UK AR FA

SUBJECT: CONSEQUENCES FOR US-UK INTERESTS OF UK-
ARGENTINE ARMED CONFLICT

REF: SECTO 5014

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING IS THE ANALYSIS YOU REQUESTED IN REPTEL
[REDACTED]

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OF THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR BRITAIN, THE U.S.,
AND THE WEST IF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO AVERT ARMED
CONFLICT FAIL. YOU WILL BE BEST JUDGE OF HOW (AND HOW
MUCH OF) THIS ANALYSIS SHOULD BE USED IN LONDON AND
BUENOS AIRES.

3. BEGIN ANALYSIS

I. INTRODUCTION

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A. BY DISPATCHING THEIR FLEET AND ANNOUNCING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE TO RE-ESTABLISH THEIR ADMINISTRATION OF THE FALKLANDS, THE BRITISH ARE INCREASING THE LEVEL OF UNCERTAINTY AND RISK FOR ARGENTINA. BRITAIN'S POLITICO-MILITARY LEVERAGE WILL CONTINUE TO BUILD AS ITS FLEET NEARS THE FALKLANDS. IF HOSTILITIES BEGIN, HOWEVER, THAT LEVERAGE COULD FALL PRECIPITOUSLY, RESULTING IN A SITUATION IN WHICH MEDIATION IS IMPOSSIBLE AND IN WHICH THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL INTERESTS OF THE WEST ARE JEOPARDIZED. THIS PAPER ANALYZES THE DAMAGE TO SHARED WESTERN INTERESTS WHICH COULD OCCUR IF THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE IS NOT RESOLVED PEACEFULLY AND PROMPTLY.

B. THE CHALLENGE TO WESTERN INTERESTS EXTENDS ACROSS THE GLOBE. SO DO THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC FAILURE AND OF THE ONSET OF MILITARY HOSTILITIES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO EXAGGERATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THESE IMPLICATIONS. BUT WE HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO CONSIDER WHAT THEY ARE, AND HOW THEY ARE RELATED TO EACH OTHER. THE SOVIET UNION TAKES A GLOBAL VIEW OF THE COMPETITION BETWEEN ITS VALUES AND INTERESTS AND OURS. BRITAIN AND THE U.S.

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MUST HAVE A COMPARABLE PLANETARY PERSPECTIVE. WE CAN AFFORD NO LESS. THERE ARE IMPLICATIONS IN AT LEAST THREE CRITICAL AREAS: NATO-RELATED, ECONOMIC, GLOBAL AND SOVIET-RELATED POLITICO-MILITARY, AND LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL.

II. NATO-RELATED POLITICO-MILITARY CONSEQUENCES

A. THE WEST'S ABILITY TO DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION WOULD BE WEAKENED.

-- BRITAIN'S DIVERSION OF A LARGE FRACTION OF ITS FLEET FROM SACLANT AND CINCHAN TASKS, ALTHOUGH WITHIN ITS ALLIANCE RIGHTS, HAS ALREADY WEAKENED NATO'S ABILITY TO DEFEND THE ATLANTIC APPROACHES TO EUROPE.

-- LOSSES AND SIMPLY THE COST OF WAR FIGHTING WOULD THREATEN PROGRAMMED IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO'S CAPACITY TO MEET THE SOVIET THREAT.

-- IF A CONFLICT WERE PROTRACTED, THERE WOULD BE SEVERE STRAINS ON BRITAIN'S ABILITY TO FULFILL ITS NATO ROLE. A SOUTH ATLANTIC COMMITMENT, ON TOP OF NORTHERN IRELAND, COULD PUT PRESSURE ON MAINTAINING THE BAOR.

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-- PROLONGED OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WOULD THREATEN THE TRIDENT NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY. AT ISSUE IS THE BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND A PERMANENT CHANGE OF THE STRATEGIC EQUATION.

-- GIVEN SOVIET CONCERN OVER GRAIN SUPPLIES, A SUBSTANTIAL ON-SCENE SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IS POSSIBLE. IF BRITISH-ARGENTINIAN HOSTILITIES RAISED THAT PRESENCE TO A LEVEL REQUIRING A COMPENSATING U.S. REACTION, THE NATO DETERRENT WOULD BE DEGRADED EVEN

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FURTHER AND A DIRECT EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION COULD RESULT.

B. THE POLITICAL UNITY AND COHESIVENESS OF THE WEST WOULD BE THREATENED.

-- POPULAR SYMPATHIES IN THE WEST, SO CLEARLY NOW WITH BRITAIN, COULD TURN SWIFTLY IF BRITAIN WERE SEEN TO BE ACTING WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE.

-- TURMOIL IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE WOULD DISTRACT AMERICAN ATTENTION FROM NATO AND EAST-WEST SECURITY CONCERNS, THEREBY REINFORCING CALLS FOR U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS.

-- THE U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN ALLIES ARE MAKING THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE UK IN SETTLING THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE. IT IS A SIMPLE FACT OF LIFE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT WESTERN ABILITY TO BE HELPFUL TO BRITAIN WOULD DECLINE IF A STATE OF WAR WERE TO COME INTO EXISTENCE.

-- EFFORTS TO BRING A PEACEFUL END TO THE DISPUTE ARE NOT NECESSARILY DAMAGED BY PREPARATIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION, BUT ACTUAL HOSTILITIES WOULD CERTAINLY HURT ANY NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL MEDIATION.

-- ALTHOUGH MANY ALLIES HAVE SUPPORTED BRITAIN BY TAKING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STEPS VIS-A-VIS ARGENTINA, ALLIED RESPONSIVENESS TO BRITISH REQUESTS WILL DECLINE AS THE PROPOSED MEASURES BEGIN TO IMPACT SERIOUSLY ON OTHER NATIONAL INTERESTS. THIS WILL LEAD TO TENSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

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-- EXTENDED ALLIANCE DEBATE OVER THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE COULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO BUILD UPON THE CONSENSUS REACHED AT THE LAST THREE NAC MINISTERIALS ON OUT-OF-AREA ISSUES, THEREBY DEGRADE OUR CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES EFFECTIVELY, AND THUS PROVIDE THE SOVIETS A PRACTICALLY COST-FREE GLOBAL BONUS.

III. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

A. THE PRIMARY ECONOMIC DANGER POSED BY INITIATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS OR BY A LENGTHY PERIOD OF TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA, CONCERNS THE STATUS OF ARGENTINA'S LARGE EXTERNAL DEBT. AS OF APRIL 1981 (LAST FIGURES AVAILABLE), ARGENTINA'S EXTERNAL DEBT WAS ABOUT 30 BILLION DOLLARS, WITH 44 PERCENT OF THIS OWED TO US BANKS AND APPROXIMATELY 13 PERCENT OWED TO BRITISH BANKS.

B. UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND THE INDIVIDUAL BANKS INVOLVED COULD WITHSTAND PRESSURES CAUSED BY A TOTAL DEFAULT BY ARGENTINA ON ITS EXTERNAL DEBT. HOWEVER, THESE ARE ANYTHING BUT NORMAL TIMES. GIVEN THE ACCUMULATED PRESSURES ON THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF MOUNTING DIFFICULTIES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SERIOUS DEBT PROBLEMS OF A NUMBER OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AN ARGENTINE DEFAULT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER ADVERSE EVENTS, WOULD THREATEN THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM COULD NOT WITHSTAND THIS THREAT; THE POINT IS THAT THIS IS A TEST WHICH WE SHOULD ALL WISH TO AVOID.

C. DESPITE ITS SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, ARGENTINA REMAINS A COUNTRY WITH GREAT ECONOMIC POTENTIAL. UNDER PROPER MANAGEMENT AND GUIDANCE,

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ARGENTINA SHOULD BE ABLE TO REGAIN THE POSITION OF ECONOMIC STRENGTH WHICH IT HAD AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II AND WHICH A SUCCESSION OF INCOMPETENT AND IRRESPONSIBLE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS HAVE DESTROYED. WE DO NOT WISH TO TAKE ANY STEPS WHICH WOULD DRIVE ARGENTINA AWAY FROM ITS CURRENT PATTERN OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE WESTERN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM TOWARD AN EVEN GREATER RELIANCE ON THE SOVIET UNION. AS THE PURCHASER OF APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF ARGENTINA'S WHEAT AND COARSE GRAIN EXPORTS IN 1981, THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN

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COMMERCE IS SUBSTANTIAL. THE CONCLUSION APRIL 7 OF A NEW SOVIET/ARGENTINE AGREEMENT ON THE SALE OF SOVIET OIL EXPLORATION/PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT VALUED AT 300 MILLION DOLLARS WAS CERTAINLY INTENDED BY THE ARGENTINES AS A SIGNAL OF A WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD WESTERN PRESSURES OVER THE FALKLAND DISPUTE CONTINUE.

D. WESTERN INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE SERVED BY A GROWING SOVIET ROLE IN ARGENTINA GIVEN THAT COUNTRY'S SIZE AND POTENTIAL. DESPITE THE FIRM ANTI-COMMUNIST VIEWS OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP, THE EXISTENCE IN ARGENTINA OF A LARGE AND DISENCHANTED LABOR MOVEMENT WITH SUBSTANTIAL RADICAL ELEMENTS WOULD GIVE THE SOVIETS A BASIS ON WHICH TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN ARGENTINA.

IV. GLOBAL AND SOVIET-RELATED POLITICAL/MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

A. AFTER AN INITIAL PERIOD OF HESITATION (REFLECTED IN MOSCOW'S REFUSAL TO BACK ARGENTINA IN THE UN), THE

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SOVIETS HAVE APPARENTLY DECIDED TO LAY THE GROUND FOR FUTURE DIPLOMATIC BACKING OF THE ARGENTINES, SHOULD AN ARMED CONFLICT WITH THE UK OCCUR. THE FIRST INDICATION OF SUCH A DECISION WAS THE INCREASINGLY PRO-ARGENTINE SLANT OF SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE. APART FROM THE DIRECT IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO, SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA IN THE EVENT OF WAR COULD HAVE SERIOUS POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN INTERESTS BOTH IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE WORLD AT LARGE.

B. IN THE EVENT OF WAR, THE SOVIETS WOULD AT A MINIMUM SUPPORT ARGENTINA THROUGH A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IN THE UN. WHILE THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY REFRAIN FROM ANY DIRECT MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFLICT, THEIR PROVIDING BUENOS AIRES WITH INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON BRITISH FORCES IS TO BE EXPECTED.

C. SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA COULD ALSO EXTEND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FORMAL ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP, WHICH COULD GIVE THE SOVIETS A MAJOR STRATEGIC FOOTHOLD ON THE SOUTH AMERICAN CONTINENT. THIS COULD HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE HEMISPHERE, PARTICULARLY IF -- AS THE RESULT OF OTHER STATES' IDENTIFYING THE UNITED STATES WITH THE UK SIDE IN THE CONFLICT -- IT ALSO INCREASED THE ATTRACTIVENESS

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OF THE USSR AS AN ARMS SUPPLIER TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. AN ARMS-SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA WOULD ALSO BE AN ECONOMIC BOON TO MOSCOW, SINCE IT WOULD RECTIFY THE ENORMOUS TRADE SURPLUS ENJOYED BY ARGENTINA.

BEYOND PROVIDING THE SOVIETS WITH AN IMPORTANT STRATEGIC OPENING TO THE HEMISPHERE, A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINA COULD ALSO HAVE THE FOLLOWING CONSEQUENCES:

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-- IT WOULD DIVERT WORLD ATTENTION FROM SOVIET-SPONSORED REPRESSION IN POLAND, SOVIET AGGRESSION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND SOVIET/CUBAN INTERFERENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND AFRICA, THEREBY REDUCING THE PRESSURES ON MOSCOW TO ACCOMMODATE WESTERN CONCERNS ON THESE ISSUES.

-- IT WOULD REVIVE PERCEPTIONS AMONG DEVELOPING NATIONS OF THE U.S., UK AND OTHER WEST EUROPEANS AS "NEO-COLONIALIST" POWERS, IN CONTRAST WITH THE SOVIETS AS THE SUPPOSED PROTECTORS OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THIRD WORLD NATIONS.

IT WOULD UNDERCUT OUR EFFORTS TO BUILD AND CONSOLIDATE OPPOSITION ON THE PART OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN STATES TO SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA, COLOMBIA, AND OTHER AREAS.

-- IT COULD CREATE NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET SPLITTING TACTICS IN WESTERN EUROPE (E.G., BY ENABLING THE SOVIETS TO PLAY TO LEFTIST PREDILECTIONS TO PORTRAY THE UK AS A COLONIAL POWER UNWILLING TO YIELD THE FALKLANDS TO THEIR "RIGHTFUL OWNER" AND ATTEMPTING TO "PLUNDER" ARGENTINA'S POTENTIAL OIL RESOURCES).

-- ALTHOUGH NOT AS LIKELY, A WAR COULD BE USED BY THE SOVIETS, LIKE SU32 IN 1956, AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS IN OTHER REGIONS (E.G., AN INCREASE IN SOVIET TROOP LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN; CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS AGAINST PAKISTAN; INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS INTO POLAND TO REINFORCE THE MARTIAL LAW REGIME; STEPPED-UP DELIVERIES OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TO CUBA, POSSIBLY INCLUDING ADDITIONAL MIG-23'S, AND/OR TO NICARAGUA).

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-- IT COULD ALSO ENCOURAGE OUTBREAKS OF REGIONAL

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CONFLICTS (VIZ. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE THE CURRENT SITUATION IS TENSE) BECAUSE OF WESTERN DISTRACTION.

V. REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF UK-ARGENTINE ARMED CONFRONTATION

A. THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN TRYING TO REJUVENATE AND REORIENT THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND RAISE AWARENESS OF THE SOVIET PROXY THREAT TO THE HEMISPHERE. THIS CRISIS HAS DETRACTED FROM OUR EFFORTS AT A CRITICAL TIME AND, SHOULD IT CONTINUE, WOULD SERIOUSLY SET BACK OUR EFFORTS TO BUILD A HEMISPHERIC CONSENSUS TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT TO OUR COMMON SECURITY. THE COLLAPSE OF THE U.S. PEACE EFFORT, PARTICULARLY IF FOLLOWED BY FURTHER HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINA, WOULD:

-- ESCALATE TENSIONS OVER OTHER TERRITORIAL DISPUTES (BEAGLE CHANNEL, VENEZUELA-GUYANA, GUATEMALA-BELIZE) WITH THE RISK THAT PARTIES TO ONE OR MORE OF THESE DISPUTES WILL BE TEMPTED TO TRY FOR A UNILATERAL MILITARY SOLUTION;

-- EXACERBATE THE LATIN/ENGLISH-SPEAKING SPLIT WITHIN THE OAS, FURTHER WEAKENING THE ORGANIZATION AND CONCEIVABLY EVEN LEADING TO A WALKOUT BY THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES IF THE GOA TRIES TO INVOKE THE RIO TREATY.

-- PRESENT THE U.S. WITH THE DECISION OF WHETHER TO OPPOSE RIO TREATY INVOCATION, THEREBY STRIPPING US OF THIS POTENTIALLY CRITICAL MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR USE IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

-- LEAD TO POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF LATIN COUNTRIES INTO POLITICAL CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.K. AND BY ASSOCIATION THE U.S.; WITH CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO OUR BILATERAL

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INTERESTS WITH LATIN COUNTRIES.

-- INCREASE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET INTRUSION AND WEAKEN LATIN-AMERICAN TIES WITH THE WEST. AT A MINIMUM, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLE TO ENHANCE THEIR POLITICAL STANDING IN THE REGION.

-- IF THE ARGENTINES SUFFERED A MILITARY DEFEAT, IT WOULD AFFECT THE VIABILITY OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND PROVIDE NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPANDED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN BUENOS AIRES.

B. MOREOVER, AN ARGENTINE MILITARY DEFEAT WOULD NOT PROVIDE A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE FALKLANDS PROBLEM.

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AN EMBITTERED AND IRREDENTIST ARGENTINA WOULD BE A CONTINUING THREAT TO STABILITY AND WESTERN SECURITY

INTERESTS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND THE HEMISPHERE AT LARGE.

END ANALYSIS

4. ARGENTINE MILITARY CAPABILITIES FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

THE ARGENTINE FLEET PROBABLY WILL AVOID COMBAT ON THE OPEN SEAS WITH THE BRITISH TASK FORCE. INSTEAD, ARGENTINE SHIPS WILL TRY TO OPERATE IN SHALLOW WATERS AND WITHIN RANGE OF LAND-BASED AIR.

THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES ARE WELL TRAINED AND DISCIPLINED. THEY HAVE GOOD NCO'S AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL. THE QUALITY OF THEIR DRAFTES IS HIGH. IN ADDITION, THE ARGENTINES HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY.

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THE ARGENTINE OFFICER CORPS IS WELL TRAINED AND HAS DEMANDING STANDARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL ADVANCEMENT. MANY OFFICERS HAVE ATTENDED STAFF COURSES OVERSEAS AND HAVE TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY.

ARGENTINE MAINTENANCE PRACTICES ARE EXCELLENT. THEY ALSO HAVE EXCELLENT FACILITIES FOR SHIP REPAIR AND GOOD ONES FOR AIRCRAFT. THEY MANUFACTURE THEIR OWN AMMUNITION, SMALL ARMS, 155MM FIELD GUNS, AND LIGHT AIRCRAFT.

THE ARGENTINES TROOPS PROBABLY WILL NOT SPREAD THEMSELVES THROUGHOUT EAST FALKLAND ISLAND, BUT WILL CONCENTRATE THEIR DEFENSES AROUND PORT STANLEY. WE EXPECT THE ARGENTINES TO PUT A TOTAL OF 7000 MEN ON THE ISLAND. THEY WILL BE WELL ENTRENCHED AND DIFFICULT TO DISLODGE. AIR. THE ARGENTINE PILOTS ARE FIRST-RATE. THE ARGENTINES, HOWEVER, MAY NOT BE FAMILIAR WITH THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SEA HARRIER, PARTICULARLY ITS UNIQUE VERTICAL FLIGHT AND MANEUVERING CAPABILITIES.

THE ARGENTINES HAVE FRENCH MATRA 530 AND PROBABLY ISRAELI SHAFIR AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES. BOTH ARE EXCELLENT WEAPONS. THE ARGENTINE-MADE IA-58 COUNTER-INSURGENCY AIRCRAFT COULD CAUSE THE BRITISH MAJOR DIFFICULTIES DURING A HELICOPTER ASSAULT. IT IS A MANEUVERABLE PLANE WITH A RANGE OF 1600 NAUTICAL MILES. FOUR ARE AT PORT STANLEY, AND A DOZEN MORE ARE EXPECTED SHORTLY.

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THE BRITISH TASK FORCE WILL HAVE TO NEUTRALIZE THE AIRFIELD AT PORT STANLEY PRIOR TO AN ASSAULT. THE AIRFIELD ALREADY HAS GOOD GROUND-TO-AIR DEFENSES. MOREOVER, OUR SEABEERS BELIEVE THE ARGENTINES PROBABLY CAN EXTEND THE RUNWAY BY 2000 FEET IN TWO WEEKS. (A SHIP CARRYING THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL IS EXPECTED [REDACTED])

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AT PORT STANLEY ON APRIL 10.) SUCH AN EXTENSION WOULD ENABLE THE ARGENTINES TO PUT A-4'S OR SUPER ETENDARDS ON THE ISLAND. JET FUEL IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE SHORTLY.

SUBMARINES. ARGENTINE FORCES POSE A THREAT TO BRITISH SUBMARINES. THE ARGENTINES MAY WITHDRAW THEIR OWN SUBMARINES FROM THE FALKLANDS AREA AND USE THEIR P-2 AND S-2 AIRCRAFT TO COUNTER BRITISH SUBMARINES. THE ARGENTINE AIR ASW CAPABILITY IS ABOUT EQUAL TO THE US CAPABILITY OF THE MID TO LATE 1960'S.

BRITISH SUBMARINES RUN THE RISK OF GROUNDING. THE WATERS NEAR ARGENTINA AND MUCH OF THE FALKLANDS ARE LESS THAN 100 FATHOMS, AND AVAILABLE CHARTS ARE INCOMPLETE. IN ADDITION, THE BRITISH NUCLEAR SUBMARINES PROBABLY CANNOT RELIABLY DETECT THE TWO NEWER ARGENTINE SUBMARINES (TYPE 209'S), WHICH ARE VERY QUIET.

WEATHER. WINTER WEATHER, WHICH BEGINS IN MAY, WILL SERIOUSLY HAMPER OPERATIONS ON BOTH SIDES. THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN HIGH WINDS AND ROUGH SEAS. STOESEL

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