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FM SALISBURY 261630Z FEB 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 118 OF 26 FEBRUARY

INFO ROUTINE CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, NAIROBI AND DOT (CREDA)

SAVING BONN, PARIS, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT : OFFICIAL TALKS.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD JUST OVER AN HOUR'S MEETING WITH MUGABE ON 25 FEBRUARY, AND SEPARATE TALKS WITH MANGWENDE (FOREIGN AFFAIRS) AND CHIDZERO (FINANCE AND ECONOMY). A MEETING OVER LUNCH WITH LEADERS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY WAS A HELPFUL PRELIMINARY TO THE TALKS WITH MUGABE AND CHIDZERO.

ZIMBABWE INTERNAL.

2. LORD CARRINGTON TOOK ADVANTAGE OF HIS TALK WITH MUGABE TO SPEAK FRANKLY OF THE NEGATIVE IMPRESSION OF DEVELOPMENTS IN ZIMBABWE WHICH WAS GAINING GROUND ABROAD. THE BAD PRESS WAS NOT CONFINED EITHER TO BRITAIN OR TO PAPERS WHICH MIGHT BE THOUGHT ILL-DISPOSED. THERE WAS A GROWING FEELING THAT WHITES IN ZIMBABWE HAD SOME REASON TO BE APPREHENSIVE (LORD CARRINGTON MADE SPECIFIC REFERENCE AS TO HIS CONTEXT TO THE STUTTAFORD CASE SPEECHES BY ZIMBABWE MINISTERS ABOUT NATIONALISATION AND A ONE PARTY STATE AND TO THE SECURITY SITUATION). THERE WAS A NEED FOR REASSURANCE. AND, WHILE WE AS FRIENDS OF ZIMBABWE WOULD DO WHAT WE COULD, THIS REASSURANCE COULD ONLY COME FROM MUGABE HIMSELF. IN THAT CONTEXT, HIS MEETING WITH BUSINESSMEN LAST WEEK HAD BEEN USEFUL.

3. MUGABE TOOK THIS WELL. HE APPEARED IN PARTICULAR TO ACKNOWLEDGE A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE WITH "THE WHITE MAN IN THE STREET" WHO DID NOT HAVE THE ACCESS TO MINISTERS ENJOYED BY LEADERS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, AND HE DID NOT DEMUR WHEN LORD CARRINGTON POINTED TO THE UNHELPFUL IMPACT OF CERTAIN MINISTERIAL SPEECHES.

4. CHIDZERO, DURING A BRIEF TETE A TETE WITH LORD CARRINGTON, WELCOMED THE FACT THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO MUGABE AS HE DID. AND MUGABE SUBSEQUENTLY (OVER LUNCH ON 26 FEBRUARY) TOLD LORD CARRINGTON THAT HE WOULD ARRANGE ANOTHER MEETING WITH WHITE LEADERS.

5. IN BRIEFING ON INTERNAL SECURITY, MUGABE SOUGHT TO DISPEL ANY IDEA OF CRISIS. THERE WAS A PROBLEM, THE POLICE WERE INVESTIGATING, AND THE MATTER WOULD COME TO COURT IF THE EVIDENCE WAS SUCH AS TO JUSTIFY PROSECUTIONS. MUGABE IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED THAT THIS

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WOULD PROVE TO BE THE CASE AS FAR AN NKOMO WAS CONCERNED, BUT WAS CAREFUL TO LEAVE HIS OPTIONS OPEN. (IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH LORD CARRINGTON OVER LUNCH, MUGABE ADDED THAT NKOMO WOULD BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL IF THAT WAS THE WAY THE EVIDENCE POINTED. HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE SERIOUS DIFFICULTY OVER THE REACTIONS AND THOUGHT THAT THE ARMY WOULD HOLD.) MEMBERS OF ZAPU WHO WERE NOT IMPLICATED WOULD NOT BE PENALISED, AND HE HOPED THAT ZAPU WOULD AGREE THAT THOSE OF ITS MEMBERS WHO WISHED TO ACCEPT POSTS IN THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DO SO, BUT SUCH PEOPLE WOULD NOW HAVE TO HOLD OFFICE AS HIS (MUGABE'S) APPOINTEES, NOT AS ZAPU PARTY NOMINEES.

6. FOR THE REST, MUGABE'S MAIN PREOCCUPATION WAS WITH LAND RESETTLEMENT. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO RESETTLE SOME 160000 FAMILIES OVER THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS (A FIGURE WHICH CHIDZERO LATER IMPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT UNREALISTIC). THIS WOULD REQUIRE MUCH MORE MONEY. WHAT WE HAD OFFERED WOULD SOON BE EXHAUSTED. SECTION 16 OF THE CONSTITUTION WAS ALSO LIKELY TO CAUSE DIFFICULTY. LORD CARRINGTON MADE CLEAR THE LIMITS TO OUR ABILITY TO HELP FINANCIALLY, AND RECALLED THAT SECTION 16 HAD BEEN NECESSARY PRECISELY BECAUSE OF FEARS THAT LAND WOULD BE COMPULSORILY ACQUIRED FOR RESETTLEMENT. MUGABE ALSO COMPLAINED, WITHOUT PRESSING THE POINTS THAT OUR PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING LAND RESETTLEMENT PROJECTS WERE TOO CUMBERSOME AND TOO CONSERVATIVE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

7. MANGWENDE BEGAN WITH A PREDICTABLE ATTACK ON SOUTH AFRICAN ATTEMPTS TO DESTABILISE ZIMBABWE. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED WHAT WE HAD DONE BOTH DIRECTLY AND THROUGH THE AMERICANS TO EXPLAIN TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT A STABLE ZIMBABWE UNDER MUGABE WAS BETTER FOR THEM THAN ANY CONCEIVABLE ALTERNATIVE. HE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE POINTS SUGGESTED BY CROCKER (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 165 TO FCO) AND REPEATED THEM TO MUGABE. MUGABE NOTED WITH APPROVAL THE ACTION TAKEN WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS, BUT EXPRESSED HIS DISLIKE FOR BILATERAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS ON INVESTMENT PROTECTION: THE LAW AND CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE SHOULD BE ENOUGH, AND THERE COULD IF NECESSARY BE AGREEMENTS WITH PARTICULAR ENTERPRISES.

8. DISCUSSIONS OF NAMIBIA WITH MANGWENDE FAILED EITHER TO REMOVE OR TO CLARIFY HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE VOTING FORMULA PROPOSED BY THE CONTACT GROUP. IT WAS AGREED THAT OFFICIALS SHOULD PURSUE. LORD CARRINGTON EMPHASISED TO MANGWENDE AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO MUGABE THE DANGERS OF EAST/WEST POLARISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE ABSENCE OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. MUGABE READILY AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE DISASTEROUS.

BILATERALS.

9. MANGWENDE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE WAS GENERALLY EXTREMELY HAPPY WITH RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN: THERE WAS GENUINE FRIENDSHIP, BMATT IN PARTICULAR HAD DONE A WONDERFUL JOB AND FRANK MILL'S

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HELP IN SETTING UP THE MFA HAD ALSO BEEN MUCH APPRECIATED. WHETHER OR NOT MANGWENDE HIMSELF SINCERELY SUBSCRIBES TO THESE SENTIMENTS, THEY ACCURATELY REFLECT THE WAY WHICH THE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT HANDLED THE VISIT. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT ZIMBABWE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS US FOR MORE AID (ESPECIALLY FOR RESETTLEMENT), BUT IT WAS CLEAR ALSO THAT WE ARE RECOGNISED TO HAVE MADE A MAJOR EFFORT.

10. LORD CARRINGTON WAS ABLE TO EMPHASISE OUR INTEREST IN THE EARLY SIGNATURE OF THE DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENT AND THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO AN AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT PROTECTION. THE FORMER WAS SIGNED ON 26 FEBRUARY. THE LATTER WILL BE DIFFICULT, GIVEN MUGABE'S ATTITUDE. CHIDZERO HAD CLEARLY HOISTED IN THE NEED FOR SOMETHING TO BOOST INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, BUT IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD FIND AN AGREEMENT CONFINED TO NEW INVESTMENT MUCH EASIER TO SELL TO THE ZIMBABWE CABINET AND THAT THE GERMANS MIGHT ACCEPT THIS (AND THUS ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT).

11. LORD CARRINGTON RAISED MAJOR TRADE PROJECTS WITH CHIDZERO AND MADE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO :

- (I) THE EARTH SATELLITE STATION.
- (II) THE SUGAR ENTHANOL PROJECT AND
- (III) RAILWAY ELECTRIFICATION.

HE WAS TOLD THAT FINANCING WOULD BE THE KEY TO (I), THAT A DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN SOON ON (II) (BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD YET TO DECIDE HOW FAR IF AT ALL IT WANTED TO BE INVOLVED) AND THAT (III) WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE RAILWAY AUTHORITIES BUT HAD NOT YET BEEN SUBMITTED TO GOVERNMENT.

12. LORD CARRINGTON PRESSED FOR AN EARLY DECISION ON OUR REQUEST TO HAVE THE DEVELOPMENT DIVISION MOVED TO SALISBURY.

FCO PASS SAVING BONN, PARIS, OTTAWA AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

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