



UN

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 May 1981

Dear Michael,

Visit of the UN Secretary General

I attach two sets of the briefs for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Waldheim at 1545 on 12 May.

The Prime Minister may wish to concentrate on Afghanistan and Cambodia. Mr Waldheim's present travels have taken him to Washington, Moscow, Belgrade, Lisbon and Geneva. The main purpose of his call on the Prime Minister is to discuss his visit to the Soviet Union. He may also wish to take the opportunity to sound out the Prime Minister's attitude to his seeking a third term.

The Prime Minister last met Mr Waldheim on 28 February in New York. She also corresponded with him in January on the succession to Brian Urquhart. We do not think the Prime Minister need revert to the subject on this occasion, as Waldheim will not have anything further to say (and Urquhart has not indicated that he is about to retire).

Yours ever
Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St



VISIT BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 MAY 1981

POINTS TO MAKE

Afghanistan

1. We attach great importance to the basic principles of the 20 November UNGA Resolution:

- (a) immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops;
- (b) right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government, and to return to their traditional neutral and non-aligned status;
- (c) creation of the necessary conditions to enable the Afghan refugees to return in safety and honour.

2. Have the Russians shown any flexibility? Must maintain pressure on them to move towards a political settlement in accordance with the UNGA Resolution.

3. No future in a dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which would merely give status to the Karmal Regime. Pakistan has maintained its insistence that any talks should involve Iran, and also be held under the auspices of the UN. These conditions are important. Pressure should not be put on Pakistan to deviate from them.

4. How does Waldheim see UN actively continuing after departure of his present special representative?

/Cambodia

Cambodia

5. Hope Essaafi's mission was useful. Glad Cambodian conference is to go ahead in accordance with UNGA resolution.

6. Too early to hope for breakthrough and Vietnamese still seem to believe they can win total victory. But necessary for ASEAN to maintain diplomatic momentum, and demonstrate to Vietnam that the world will not accept occupation of Cambodia as fait accompli.

7. Vietnam and friends might attend in the event (they eventually turned up for 1979 Geneva Refugees Conference). If they do stay away they will be seen to flout wishes of overwhelming majority of UN and non-aligned member states. Preparations should leave options open.

Lebanon

8. Very concerned and have kept in touch with those principally involved to urge restraint.

9. Guardedly optimistic about the negotiations in Beirut. But the new Israeli/Syrian angle is potentially dangerous. US best placed to mediate.

10. Difficult to see role for the UN given Arab opposition. But prepared to help if necessary.

South Lebanon

11. We remain concerned at the continuing cycle of violence in South Lebanon which is of particular concern coinciding as it does with the troubles in the North.

/Cyprus

Cyprus

12. Congratulations on keeping talks going on regular basis. Impressed by energy and ingenuity of UN representative in Cyprus (Gobbi). July/October may provide opportunity for progress. Elections in Cyprus will be over: 'window' before UN General Assembly debate and Greek elections.

13. Talks seem likely to lose credibility if no major new initiative in July. UN intentions? What sort of proposals might UN present: overall solution or interim?

14. Might be best to suggest range, or limits, within which parties should negotiate details. Need to persuade Turks to make a realistic offer on territory.

15. To succeed, any proposals will need all-out backing from New York: parties will not give ground easily, although Turkmen has taken reasonably encouraging line in recent conversations.

16. UN likely to need outside help. We will do what we can.

Namibia

17. Pik Botha visits Washington 14 May. Haig will try to discover what South Africa require to make final commitment to implementation. Senior officials of the Five will then meet in Washington in late May to flesh out the proposals outlined in the Rome communiqué.

Iran/Iraq War: Mr Olaf Palme's Mission as UN Secretary-General's Special Representative

18. Fully support the efforts of Olaf Palme.

/Mexico Summit



Mexico Summit and Global Negotiations (if raised)

19. We hope for informality and flexibility at Mexico, and that the absence of elaborate preliminaries will make for a free and constructive exchange of views. Any link with the Global Negotiations should be very informal.

Elections for Secretary-General (if raised)

20. What are Waldheim's own wishes? We should be glad if he carried on.

The Succession to Mr Urquhart

21. Glad to know that Waldheim will look to us to provide Urquhart's successor.

Miss Joan Anstee

22. Hope Secretary-General will support Miss Anstee for post of Executive Director, World Food Programme. She deserves the promotion.



VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 MAY 1981

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Afghanistan

1. Visit of Waldheim's representative, Peres de Cuellar to Islamabad and Kabul in week of 13 April was exploratory. He has reported (optimistically in our view) that he is satisfied that he has 'started the negotiating process'. He has listed the following 'positive points':

- (a) He was warmly received in Kabul as well as Islamabad:
- (b) Both sides were interested in finding a political solution:
- (c) Both sides were prepared to accept an active role for the UN:
- (d) Both considered his visit as the first step in a continuing process.

2. The visit did not however suggest that the Karmal regime (or the Russians) were prepared to make new concessions. de Cuellar avoided the earlier areas of disagreement. Karmal may be trying to use the initiative to set up bilateral talks of the sort which Pakistan has already rejected. de Cuellar has not yet talked to the Iranians; there is no sign that they are willing to take part in negotiations. Hitherto they have insisted that the Resistance should be represented in any discussion of Afghanistan.

3. The Russians have so far shown no willingness to make concessions over Afghanistan. Brezhnev's proposal at the

/ Party



Party Congress (23 February) that the international aspects of the Afghan situation should be discussed in the context of security in the Persian Gulf is an attempt to distract attention from the need for a political solution, and to establish a Soviet droit de regard in the Gulf area.

4. de Cuellar will apparently be leaving the UN to return to the Peruvian Foreign Ministry at the end of May.

Cambodia

5. Mr Waldheim has until recently resisted efforts by ASEAN to get him to summon the Conference called for by the General Assembly.

6. However, following a further demonstration of the broad support enjoyed by ASEAN when Cambodia was discussed at the New Delhi Non-aligned meeting, Waldheim sent Essaafi (a Tunisian Under Secretary-General), to make a tour of the region as his Special Representative. In the light (presumably) of Essaafi's report (which should have confirmed both Vietnamese intransigence and ASEAN insistence on a Conference) Waldheim informed ASEAN on 22 April in New York that he was now prepared to call a Conference, and asked for their suggestions on place, time, agenda and attendance.

7. ASEAN Foreign Ministers are expected to decide to ask for the Conference to be convened in Vienna in July when they meet in Jakarta on 8-9 May. They may also decide who they want to be invited, but are likely to need more time to consider the formulation of the agenda and what results to aim for.

8. (NOT FOR USE) Waldheim expects Vietnam and the Soviet Union to stick to their declared intention to boycott any such Conference, and fears it is doomed to failure. He has

/been



been encouraged in this pessimism by doubts expressed to him privately by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, who remains nevertheless committed to the ASEAN proposition that, having secured a massive UNGA vote in favour of an early Conference, they cannot just drop it in the face of Vietnamese intransigence. The Secretary-General has also evidently formed the impression that the Ten have their own doubts. He may have derived this from the cautious reception given by the Ten to ASEAN's rather hectic and uncoordinated lobbying for pressure from their friends on the Secretary-General. But these reservations were more tactical than substantive; the Ten's policy remains to support ASEAN's efforts to get UNGA Resolution 35/6 implemented. There may well be an early joint EC statement to confirm this and (incidentally) correct any misunderstanding.

9. ASEAN's case (which we accept) for going ahead with a Conference attended by a wide range of non-aligned and Western countries is that it would serve to

- a) keep the diplomatic initiative in ASEAN hands;
- b) demonstrate Vietnamese isolation;
- c) remind world opinion of the growing Soviet role in SE Asia;
- d) encourage the Cambodian resistance groups to combine their efforts behind some kind of broad resistance front.

If skilfully handled it could also pave the way for further action at the UN which would step up the pressure on Vietnam, eg by starting to work out a full transition plan for restoring an independent and autonomous Cambodia. The rival Vietnamese proposal for a regional Conference is no more than a manoeuvre designed to entangle ASEAN in a process whose object would be to confirm the status quo in Cambodia.

/ 10.



10. On the ground in Cambodia the stalemate continues. The Vietnamese appear to have decided to settle for a mainly defensive role during the current dry season, concentrating on 'protecting' the main populated areas and lines of communication. But there is no sign as yet that they feel under the kind of pressure that might force concessions over Cambodia.

Lebanon

11. The fighting has mostly died away including, since the Israeli attack on the Syrian helicopters on 28 April, that on the Sannin ridge in Central Lebanon. The negotiations in Beirut are continuing with Khaddam making a further visit from there 3-5 May and planning another from 9-10 May.

12. The most pressing problem is the Israeli/Syrian dimension. The Israelis had told the Americans that they would attack Syrian SAM sites in the Beq'a'a unless these were removed by midnight on 4 May. They have now extended this deadline indefinitely to allow the US to mediate with the Syrians. Mr Phillip Habib (an American of Lebanese origin and former State Department Under-Secretary) left for Israel, Lebanon and Syria on 7 May. He is likely to ask the Syrians for an immediate freeze on activities in the Baq'a'a and Sannin, a withdrawal from Sannin (this is one of the subjects being negotiated in Beirut the most likely solution being the takeover of positions there by the Lebanese army), and a withdrawal of Syrian SAM missiles from the Baq'a'a. The Syrians will not easily agree on the latter point. If they do they will have to save face and are likely to press the US for Israeli undertakings not to intervene in Central Lebanon. These will not be easy for the

/Americans



Americans to get.

13. We do not believe either the Syrians or the Israelis want further escalation. But pride is now engaged on both sides. If the Israelis engage the SAM missiles we believe that the Syrians would be bound to react. The signs are that this would unite the Arabs behind them.

14. We have spoken to both the Israelis and Syrians urging restraint in the wake of the Israeli attack on Syrian helicopters. We have also kept in touch with the Kuwaitis (whose proposal for a round table conference remains on the table) and to the Russians (who said most of the right things but avoided saying they were urging restraint on the Syrians). The Saudis have told the Americans privately that they have sent an emissary to Beirut.

15. The French continue to speak of action in the UN. But no initiative has been taken following the abortive Security Council discussion before Easter. The Arabs and Lebanese continue to insist this is an Arab not international problem.

South Lebanon

16. The two weeks up to 4 May saw greatly increased fighting in the South with frequent Israeli air raids on Palestinian positions and Palestinian rocket attacks on Northern Israel. The Israelis told the UN that if the PLO did not cease firing rockets into Israel the Israelis would be compelled to take drastic measures. Urquhart sent a restraining message to Arafat while telling the Israelis that in his view PLO rocketing must be regarded as a response to Israeli raids. All

/was quiet



was quiet on 5 May but the IDF have been building up their capacity to mount ground attacks into South Lebanon and are now capable of mounting incursions of up to brigade strength at very short notice.

Cyprus

17. UN has done well to re-establish intercommunal talks on regular basis. Gobbi energetic and imaginative. Atmosphere reasonable, but both sides inflexible. UN has tried without success idea of interim arrangement, whereby Greeks trade reopening of Nicosia airport (and thereby partial lifting of economic embargo on Turks) for Varosha (Greek Famagusta, held by Turks).

18. Talks now formally going slow because of elections in both communities (May/June). UN considering ideas for more comprehensive package. (Any final solution would have to involve loose regional federation, with Greeks conceding on constitution, Turks on territory).

19. Possible 'window of opportunity' in summer: elections out of way, talks proceeding on regular basis, Turkish military government with freer hand than predecessors. Ankara and Athens both claim to favour determined effort then. Turkmen told Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 5 May that he hoped for more substantial negotiations after elections, and thought the Turkish Cypriots would be able to make some territorial adjustments in return for real constitutional concessions. 'Window' will not last long. Greek Cypriots will want traditional propaganda feast at UNGA unless talks make progress. Papandreou advance in Greek elections could strengthen Greek

/Cypriots hardliners;



Cypriots hardliners; possible Turkish steps to democracy in 1982. Real threat of talks breaking down if no initiative launched.

20. [Not for disclosure] Waldheim's representative in Nicosia working on detailed proposals, but Secretariat uncertain about way forward. Americans favour active support of UN in partnership with UK, if possible, France and Germany. But not yet clear whether US are prepared to push the Turks sufficiently for concessions, or merely want a public relations plus with Greek Lobby at home. Possibilities for joint 'push' under discussion in knowledge that UN unlikely to overcome intransigence of parties without help from major Western powers.

Namibia

21. On 30 April, after a 10 day debate in the Security Council, UK, France and US vetoed 4 draft resolutions, tabled by the Africa Group, which sought to impose comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa (including an oil and new arms embargo). This was the first time the Security Council had voted on (and UK had vetoed) sanctions against South Africa since November 1977. The Africa Group intend to reintroduce the vetoed resolutions in the General Assembly under the 'Uniting for Peace' procedure, though the latest indications are that this move will be postponed until after the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit in Nairobi in June.

22. The Foreign Ministers of the Five met in Rome to discuss Namibia, 3 May. They issued a joint communique, which instructs senior officials to meet to develop proposals, including constitutional arrangements, to increase the confidence of the parties by strengthening the UN Plan and enhance the prospects

/of achieving



of achieving a settlement. The officials will meet in Washington in late May.

23. [NOT TO BE REVEALED] South Africa has long been concerned at the apparent partiality of the UN. In particular South Africa has condemned the General Assembly, which recognises SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. In the past, the Five have argued that the Security Council, which endorsed the UN Plan and would supervise the elections in Namibia, has remained impartial. However, the refusal of the Security Council to hear the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (whilst allowing SWAPO to speak) in the recent Debate (21-30 April) has undermined this argument. As the US to some extent shares South Africa's view of the UN, the next steps in the negotiations will probably be kept away from New York. The Five intend to develop proposals, on which they hope to secure the agreement of the Front Line States, the Namibian Internal Parties and South Africa, before submitting them to the Security Council for endorsement. The UN Secretariat will not therefore be as closely involved as they have been in the past in the actual process of negotiation. The indications are that Waldheim himself recognises this.

Iran/Iraq War: Mr Olaf Palme's Mission as UN Secretary-General's Special Representative

24. Palme was appointed by Waldheim last October. He has paid two visits to the area and appears to have been well received by both sides.

25. He has concentrated much of his efforts so far in obtaining the agreement of the belligerents to a temporary

/ceasefire



ceasefire to allow ships trapped in the Shatt Al Arab waterway to be evacuated. He has obtained agreement in principle but major difficulty still to be resolved is the costs of the operation. Iran insists on sharing costs. Iraq wants to pay for everything, thus tacitly forcing recognition of their responsibility for the waterway.

26. Palme is preparing for his third visit later this month. It will come in the wake of recent visits by the Non-Aligned Movement and the Good Office Committee of the Islamic Conference. Their attempts at mediation have not so far produced any breakthrough. This time round, Palme will be seeking again to establish a basis for a negotiated settlement of the dispute. As the key issue is sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab, on which neither side appears ready to compromise, he is pursuing the idea of shared sovereignty.

27. [Not to be disclosed] Palme is spending the afternoon of 12 May with us. At his request, the MOD gave him a briefing on 12 December 1980 on the military situation in the Iran/Iraq war. He is coming for a further briefing and will be calling on Mr Hurd. We also hope to give him such information as we have on precedents for shared sovereignty.

Mexico Summit and Global Negotiations (If raised)

28. There is no need to raise this subject but Waldheim may do so. We believe that it was he who prompted Chancellor Kreisky and President Lopez Portillo to launch the Mexico Summit. Arrangements for the meeting, (structure of discussion, agenda etc) will be discussed by Foreign Ministers on 1/2 August. Meanwhile

/Special Envoys



Special Envoys of Austria and Mexico will visit London soon for talks with officials.

29. Conditions for US attendance (postponement until the Autumn and exclusion of Cuba) have been met by cosponsors. But President Reagan, who has not formally committed himself, may yet decline in the (unlikely) event that President Brezhnev decides to participate. There will be no observers, although it was earlier proposed that Waldheim himself would assist in that capacity.

30. The Americans have made it clear that they are not prepared to contribute to further discussion of the Global Negotiations until after the Mexico Summit (22/23 October). Meetings on 5/6 May called by President of the General Assembly, Baron von Wechmar, proved inconclusive. Final decision by Wechmar not expected until June, but further preparations without the Americans now seem increasingly unlikely. The developing countries have said in the past that they would not proceed without the United States and the feeling of Community Member States is against continuing without US participation. If the Global Negotiations take place, substantive discussions would not begin before early 1982.

Elections for Secretary-General (If raised)

31. Mr Waldheim's second term expires on 31 December. The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The election is likely to take place in December. Waldheim has not yet announced

/his candidacy



his candidacy for a third term of office but he is likely to stand, unless strongly challenged and unsure of support from major powers.

32. There are a number of other candidates in the wings but none have overwhelming support. The likelihood is that most UN members would acquiesce in a further term for Waldheim. The attitude of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council is crucial; the Russians and Americans are likely to prefer a further term for Waldheim rather than risking a change. This is also our view, despite Waldheim's mediocre record, particularly his poor management of the Secretariat.

The Succession to Mr Urquhart

33. Urquhart's post as Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs is uniquely important in the UN. Strong British interest that his post should be retained for the UK when Urquhart retires, possibly 1983. In an exchange of letters with Waldheim in January 1981, Prime Minister made clear our wish to provide Urquhart's successor. The response was positive.

Miss Joan Anstee

34. Miss Anstee is an Assistant Secretary-General at UN HQ in New York. She is not happy in her present job, and in any case deserves promotion to Under Secretary-General. We do not want her to be promoted at UN HQ, as this would make it more difficult to replace Brian Urquhart with a UK national when he eventually retires. She is not suitable for that post.

35. The Executive Director of the World Food Programme is appointed jointly by Waldheim and the Director-General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. The last incumbent, Mr Vogel,

/died on 30 April



died on 30 April after a long illness.

36. Sir A Parsons spoke to the Secretary-General on Miss Anstee's behalf on 17 March, when it seemed clear that Vogel could not resume his duties. Waldheim reacted positively. A push by Ministers now could do the trick.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE SW1

8 May 1981