Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

6 July 1979

Dear Byan,

UN Secretary-General's Call on the Prime Minister: 12 July

I enclose a steering brief, and briefs on Rhodesia and the Middle East, for the Prime Minister's use when Dr Waldheim calls on her at 1700 hours for an hour on 12 July. A brief on Indo-China will follow as soon as consultations on policy, at present under way among Ministers, are complete.

As you know, Dr Waldheim will be seeing the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary before he calls on Mrs Thatcher.

Those accompanying Dr Waldheim on his visit to London include two Under-Secretaries-General (Mr Brian Urquhart, British, and Mr Buffum, American) and Mr Rohan, Director of the Secretary-General's executive office, the equivalent of Private Secretary. All of these, together with Mr Popovic who heads the UN Information Centre in London, will attend Dr Waldheim's discussions with Lord Carrington. We recommend the same for the Prime Minister, although Mr Popovic could be dropped if numbers were important. If you needed to cut the party down still further, we think you would have to exclude both Mr Urquhart and Mr Buffum, rather than attempting to choose between them. But both have come to London from elsewhere especially for the purpose of attending Dr Waldheim's talks with British Ministers. Perhaps you would let me know by telephone what you decide so that we can let the UN Information Centre know, since they are responsible for the visit arrangements.

You may wish to include Sir Anthony Parsons. It would be useful for him to attend if the Prime Minister agrees.

Yours ever,

Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

VISIT BY UNITED NATIONS' SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 1: STEERING BRIEF

DR WALDHEIM'S VISIT

1. Dr Waldheim is to call on Mrs Thatcher for an hour from 1700 hours on 12 July following a call on Lord Carrington. Personality notes on Dr Waldheim and his party are attached, together with essential facts on the UN.

2. Dr Waldheim - who is conscious of his status - would have liked this to have been an official visit [with hospitality from the Prime Minister and possibly some kind of contact with HM The Queen] but accepted a deferment, making this a working visit. He arrives in London on 11 July and leaves on the morning of 13 July. He has no public engagements in London, but is likely to give interviews to the press and media. Dr and Mrs Waldheim will be the guests of Lord and Lady Carrington to a private supper on the evening of 12 July.

3. Dr Waldheim comes to London from a week in Geneva for organisational meetings and the opening of the summer session of the Economic and Social Council, followed by visits to Hungary and Romania. After leaving London he will pay a one-day visit to Madrid followed by an official visit to Angola and the opening of the OAU 16th Assembly in Liberia. He will then return to Geneva for the Conference on Indo-China Refugees.

AGENDA

4. There is no formal agenda for the meeting. Indo-China refugees, Rhodesia and the Middle East are automatic subjects. Dr Waldheim will also be interested in the Prime Minister's views on the Tokyo Summit and likely follow-up, particularly on the energy question. (Two years ago, Dr Waldheim submitted proposals to the General Assembly for some kind of UN energy body; he persists despite a general lack of enthusiasm among governments.) Briefs are attached on Rhodesia and the Middle East. A brief on Indo-China refugees will follow in the light of Ministerial decisions.

UK OBJECTIVES

5 a) To form a good working relationship with the UN Secretary-General;

b) On Indo-China refugees, to enlist Dr Waldheim's aid in taking steps which might serve to obtain more resettlement places, and which might put pressure on Vietnam to change the repressive policies which cause the exodus;

c) On Rhodesia, to re-assure Dr Waldheim that the Government are making a serious attempt to win the widest possible international acceptance of the basis on which Rhodesia is brought to legal independence;

d) If the Middle East is raised, to urge Dr Waldheim - notwithstanding his own misgivings about Camp David - to use his influence to encourage constructive attitudes in the UN on the Middle East.

DR WALDHEIM'S PROBABLE OBJECTIVES

6 a) To exchange views on the international situation; to hear at first hand about the Tokyo Conference;

b) On Indo-China refugees, to receive a significant offer of resettlement places and financial assistance; to know HMG's likely stand at the Geneva Conference;

c) On Rhodesia, to argue the dangers of major confrontation over Rhodesia in the UN, and to dissuade UK from lifting sanctions without the concurrence of the Security Council.

RESUME OF BRIEFS

Rhodesia (Brief No 2)

7 An opportunity to explain policies including our view of the election, and to re-assure Dr Waldheim about the sincerity of our intentions. He may be concerned about a confrontation at the UN if the UK does not renew sanctions in November and is accused by other UN members of breaking its obligations under the Charter.

Middle East (Brief No 3)

8 The Security Council will shortly be considering whether UN forces should be used to supervise implementation of the peace treaty, Israeli settlements and the question of Palestine. We want the UN to take a constructive stand which will keep up pressure on Israel to review unacceptable policies, but to avoid extreme and unhelpful resolutions.

Refugees (Brief No 4)

9 To follow

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
5 July 1979

WALDHEIM, KURT (DR)

Secretary-General of the United Nations

Austrian. Born 1918. University of Vienna (Doctor of Jurisprudence).

Austrian Diplomatic Service 1945-64. Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs 1968-70. Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations 1971-72. Elected Secretary-General of the United Nations 1972 and re-elected in 1976 (second term expires 1981).

Dr Waldheim is a painstaking and cautious man who sees his role primarily as a conciliator. He is touchy about the authority and prestige of the UN and appreciates recognition of his unique position in world politics. He has sought, with some success, to promote the wider involvement of the UN in issues of international peace and security as well as economic and social development.

Although he was aware when first elected that the UK had reservations about his candidature, he trusts and likes Britain and his relations with the UK Mission have been consistently good and helpful.

Married, two children (one son living in London). Interests - horses and the UN.

URQUHART, BRIAN EDWARD

Under Secretary-General, Special Political Affairs

British. Born 1919. Educated Christ Church, Oxford University.

Almost certainly the longest serving UN official. Has made his career in the UN which he joined in 1945. Personal Assistant to the first Secretary General from 1946-49. Posts included special missions to the Congo where he served as UN representative, Katanga, from 1961-2. Author of an outstanding biography of Hammarskjold published in 1972.

One of the outstanding international civil servants of his generation. Straight, trustworthy and modest. He remains devoted to UN ideals. His political sense is thorougly realistic. Has never allowed close relations with successive UK Permanent Representatives to influence his impartiality.

The office of Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs covers UN peacekeeping forces and missions and special political missions, reporting to the Secretary-General.

BUFFUM, WILLIAM BURNSIDE

Under Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs

American. Born 1912. Educated Oneonta State Teachers' College, University of Pittsburgh, Oxford and Harvard Universities.

US Army 1943-46. US Foreign Service 1949-75 (including Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN 1967-70).

A shrewd, able and well disposed official who avoids the limelight.

ROHAN, ALBERT

Deputy Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General and Director of his Executive Office.

On secondment from the Austrian Diplomatic Service.

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

ESSENTIAL FACTS: UNITED NATIONS

1. 151 member states.

2. UN regular budget for 1978 and 1979 about $986 million. UK assessed contribution 4.5 %; £9 million in 1978. Additional UK contribution to UN funds and agencies in 1978 £72 million.

3. Under the UN Charter, the principal organs are:-

a) The General Assembly, comprising all UN members and meeting in regular session from September to December each year. Emergency or special sessions may also be held.

b) The Security Council. 15 members. Primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (UK has permanent membership under the Charter).

c) The Economic and Social Council. 54 members. Concerned with economic, social, cultural, health, and related matters and human rights. (UK has consistently secured re-election).

d) The Trusteeship Council. 5 members. Concerned with trust territories of which only the US trust territory of the Pacific remains (UK is a member under the Charter).

e) The International Court of Justice. The principal judicial organ.

f) The Secretariat.

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4. Under provision for a Secretariat, the Charter provides for a Secretary-General (to be appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council) and such staff as the organisation may require. Headquarters staff now number about 5,700, worldwide UN staff about 18,300.

5. There are in addition a number of intergovernmental agencies related to the UN by special agreements. They include the International Labour Organisation, The Food and Agriculture Organisation, The World Health Organisation and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. The Interngovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation is the only specialised agency based in London.

6. The UN is represented in London by the UN Information Centre headed by Mr Michael Popovic (British).

VISIT BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 2 : RHODESIA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. We wish to work with other members of the international community. The Government's aim is to bring Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international acceptance.

2. We do not accept the views of those who seek to ignore the results of an election in which for the first time the entire adult population of Rhodesia were able to vote. Bishop Muzorewa has shown that he enjoys extensive popular support.

3. We are engaged in consultations with Commonwealth and other African leaders and with Bishop Muzorewa. There is a feeling that a solution will have to stem from the UK, as the legal authority. We intend to carry out our constitutional responsibility.

UN Role

4. The United Kingdom will have full regard to its obligations under Security Council resolutions. But it is our constitutional responsibility to decide the proper basis for independence.

Sanctions

5. Our objective is to bring Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international acceptance. The lifting of sanctions would follow naturally from this. If we cannot do so, a difficult situation will be created: there is unlikely to be a majority in Parliament for the continuance of sanctions in November.

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

Brief No : RHODESIA

BACKGROUND

1. Dr Waldheim will be concerned about the situation later in the year in the Security Council and General Assembly over Rhodesia, if the United Kingdom grants legal independence and lifts sanctions while other UN members adhere to the position laid down in previous Security Council Resolutions.

UK's International Obligations

2. If legal independence were granted to Rhodesia by an Act of Parliament this year, we would argue that the Chapter VII basis for the imposition of sanctions, which stemmed from the threat to the peace arising from the continuance of the illegal regime, had fallen away. The reaction in the Security Council would depend on how far we had managed to obtain the acquiescence of the Front Line States; if they were prepared to go along with us we should have little trouble from representatives of Third World countries. But if we were going against their wishes, we could expect fairly solid opposition from all but our fellow Western members of the Council. Our position would be defensible in international law, but would be challenged strongly at the United Nations by countries taking a different view.

3. If we failed to find a satisfactory basis for granting Rhodesia legal independence in the next few months and Parliament does not renew Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (which would lapse on 16 November) we should be in a more difficult situation. The consequential falling away of our sanctions controls would put us unarguably in breach of our treaty obligations under the UN Charter; and this would be particularly embarrassing to us as a Permanent Member of the Security Council. (There is a limited precedent in that the US Administration legalised the import of chrome from Rhodesia for a period in breach of sanctions, but this is not comparable to the lifting of all sanctions controls.) But by November it is possible that the US Congress will have forced the US Administration to lift sanctions

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and we and the Americans may thus find ourselves in similar positions.

Security Council

A 4. The UK (and US) have abstained on two Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia this year. Resolution 445, adopted on 8 March, declared that the elections to be held in Rhodesia in April were null and void and urged all States to refrain from sending observers to them. In his explanation of vote, the UK Representative said that we could not accept language which sought to circumscribe the functioning of our Parliamentary democracy, and that the British Parliament could not be fettered in any way as to how it might decide to inform itself about the situation in Rhodesia.

B 5. Resolution 448, adopted on 30 April, condemned the Rhodesian elections as being "aimed at retaining and extending a racist minority rule and at preventing the accession of Zimbabwe to independence and genuine majority rule" and reaffirmed that their results were null and void. It called on all States not to accord recognition to any organ established as a result of the Rhodesian elections. In explaining the UK's abstention, the UK Representative repeated that the British Government had to preserve Parliament's freedom of action over Rhodesia and said that the UK did not regard the Resolution's recommendations as binding.

6. Resolution 445 requested the UN Sanctions Committee to report on measures for strengthening and widening sanctions against Rhodesia. This report was completed at the beginning of May and is due to be considered by the Security Council. However no arrangements have yet been made for a debate. Having pushed two Resolutions through the Security Council condemning the internal settlement, the African group at the United Nations may prefer to wait for the UK (or US) to take specific action over Rhodesia before they initiate a further debate. Their tactics may be discussed at the OAU Summit in Monrovia (16 - 19 July).

/UN General Assembly

UN General Assembly

7. Rhodesia is certain to be considered in the forthcoming Session of the UN General Assembly. In 1978, as in previous years, the General Assembly adopted two Resolutions on Rhodesia, dealing with political issues and sanctions respectively. The United Kingdom abstained on both Resolutions. Having joined in a consensus on the "political" Resolution in 1977, the UK could not support it in 1978 : the Resolution repeated provisions in Security Council Resolution 423 (1978) which precluded any recognition of an internal settlement and contained unacceptable references to "the leadership of the Patriotic Front" of the people of Zimbabwe, and condemnation of Western countries. The sanctions Resolution inter alia condemned the supply of petroleum to Rhodesia by oil companies of the UK and other countries, and deplored "the complicity of successive UK Governments in the violation of UN sanctions by British oil companies".

Possible UN Role in a Rhodesian Settlement

8. Dr Waldheim may be interested to know whether a UN role has been one of the questions discussed in the United Kingdom's consultations with African Governments and the Patriotic Front. The Anglo-American proposals of 1977 envisaged a UN presence, including a UN Force, during a transitional period in Rhodesia. On the basis of these proposals, the UN Security Council authorised the Secretary General to appoint a representative (General Prem Chand) to work with Lord Carver.

Rhodesia Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
5 July 1979

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL

Annex E

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/445 (1979)
8 March 1979

RESOLUTION 445 (1979)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2122nd meeting on 8 March 1979

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular resolutions 253 (1968), 403 (1977), 411 (1977), 423 (1978), 424 (1978) and 437 (1978),

Taking note of the statement of the African Group contained in document S/13084,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Angola and Zambia,

Having also heard the statement of the representative of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe,

Gravely concerned over the indiscriminate military operations by the illegal régime and the extension of its premeditated and provocative acts of aggression not only against neighbouring independent countries, but also against non-contiguous States, resulting in wanton killings of refugees and civilian populations,

Indignant at the continued executions by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia of persons sentenced under repressive laws,

Reaffirming that the existence of the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and the continuance of its acts of aggression against neighbouring independent States constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of such rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,

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Gravely concerned over the moves within certain States to send missions to observe the so-called elections in April 1979 organized by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of according it some legitimacy and thereby eventually lifting sanctions,

Reaffirming Security Council resolution 423 (1978), particularly its provisions declaring as illegal and unacceptable any internal settlement under the auspices of the illegal régime and calling upon all States not to accord any recognition to such a settlement,

Bearing in mind the responsibility of every Member State to adhere scrupulously to Security Council resolutions and decisions, and their responsibility to ensure that institutions and citizens under their jurisdiction observe the same,

1. Strongly condemns the recent armed invasions perpetrated by the illegal racist minority régime in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia against the People's Republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of Zambia, which constitute a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these countries;

2. Commends the People's Republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of Zambia and other front-line States for their support of the people of Zimbabwe in their just and legitimate struggle for the attainment of freedom and independence and for their scrupulous restraint in the face of serious provocations by the Southern Rhodesian rebels;

3. Requests all States to give immediate and substantial material assistance to enable the Governments of the front-line States to strengthen their defence capability in order to safeguard effectively their sovereignty and territorial integrity;

4. Requests the Administering Power to take all necessary measures to prevent further illegal executions in Southern Rhodesia;

5. Condemns all attempts and manoeuvres by the illegal régime, including its so-called elections of April 1979, aimed at retaining and extending a racist minority rule and at preventing the accession of Zimbabwe to independence and genuine majority rule;

6. Declares any elections held under the auspices of the illegal racist régime and the results thereof null and void and that no recognition will be accorded either by the United Nations or any Member State to any representatives or organ established by that process;

7. Urges all States to refrain from sending observers to these elections and to take appropriate action to discourage organizations and institutions within their respective areas of jurisdiction from doing so;

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8. Requests the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia to meet immediately to consider measures for strengthening and widening the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and to submit its proposals not later than 23 March 1979;

9. Decides to meet, not later than 27 March 1979, to consider the report envisaged in paragraph 8.

Mr Hurr
Rhodesia Rep

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/448 (1979)
30 April 1979

RESOLUTION 448 (1979)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2143rd meeting on 30 April 1979

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular resolutions 253 (1968), 403 (1977), 411 (1977), 423 (1978), 437 (1978) and 445 (1979) reaffirming the illegality of the Smith régime,

Having heard the statement of the Chairman of the African Group,

Having also heard the statement of the representative of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe,

Reaffirming Security Council resolution 445 (1979), particularly its provision declaring any elections held under the auspices of the illegal racist régime and the results thereof null and void and that no recognition will be accorded either by the United Nations or any Member State to any representative or organ established by that process,

Gravely concerned that the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia proceeded with the holding of sham elections in the territory in utter defiance of the United Nations,

Convinced that these so-called elections did not constitute a genuine exercise of the right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and national independence and were designed to perpetuate white racist minority rule,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of such rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the responsibility of every Member State to adhere scrupulously to Security Council resolutions and decisions, and their responsibility to ensure that institutions and citizens under their jurisdiction observe the same,

1. Strongly condemns all attempts and manoeuvres by the illegal régime, including the so-called elections of April 1979 aimed at retaining and extending a racist minority rule and at preventing the accession of Zimbabwe to independence and genuine majority rule;

2. Reaffirms the so-called elections, held under the auspices of the illegal racist régime, and the results thereof, as null and void;

3. Reiterates its call to all States not to accord recognition to any representative of or organ established by that process and to observe strictly the mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

MIDDLE EAST

Points to Make

1 Israel's behaviour over settlements and South Lebanon threatens the autonomy negotiations.

2 Need for UN to take up firm but not extreme positions on these issues. Strongly-worded resolutions to which the Nine and the US can subscribe will have more effect on Israeli opinion than resolutions calling for sanctions which will inevitably be vetoed.

3 If no progress in autonomy negotiations, may need to consider fresh UN resolution on nature of a comprehensive settlement, giving more weight to Palestinian rights.

4 Hope also that Secretary-General will be prepared to revive his proposal for a conference of all the parties under UN auspices, if necessary.

5 Britain will support use of UN forces to supervise Israel's withdrawal from Sinai.

Background

1. Dr Waldheim has taken a generally negative view of Camp David and the Egypt/Israel peace treaty. He has expressed doubts about their compatibility with UN decisions and their ability to lead on to wider peace. He favours multilateral negotiations but has not so far produced new proposals or renewed the call he made after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 for a conference under UN auspices. It is difficult to see how such a conference could be convened at present. But if the autonomy negotiations break down or falter, there could be a scope for a multilateral initiative in which the Secretary-General could well have a role.

2. If the autonomy negotiations flag, there may be a call for a new Security Council resolution spelling out the requirements for a comprehensive settlement. This might endorse 242 but be more explicit about the need for a settlement to satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. It would be hard to negotiate a text acceptable to all sides; and there would be a risk that Israel might withdraw her acceptance of 242. But it could restore Arab faith in Western intentions. The idea should be kept in reserve.

3. The peace treaty itself has not so far been specifically discussed at the UN. However it calls for supervision of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai by the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), which would need to be redeployed for this purpose. The Arabs have called on the Secretary-General not to allow UN involvement in the treaty, and the Russians have said they will oppose use of UNEF, whose mandate is due for renewal on 24 July (when the UK has the Security Council Presidency).

Use of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) has been suggested as an alternative. This might be acceptable to the Russians. The Secretary-General has so far said he cannot use either force without the authority of the Security Council. It is not clear whether he himself favours use of UN forces.

4. Several sessions of the US/Egypt/Israel autonomy negotiations have now been held. While the fundamental disagreements have not yet been tackled and the procpects of success remain poor, the atmosphere has been reasonably constructive so far. The US chief negotiator, Mr Robert Strauss, is paying his first visit to the area in early July and Mr Begin and President Sadat are to meet again on 10 July.

5. Israeli settlements will be discussed in the Security Council in mid-July when an Investigating Commission set up in March reports back. Its report is bound to be severely critical of Israel. A strongly-worded resolution could probably be accepted by all Security Council members, but the Arabs may go further and demand sanctions against Israel. Neither we nor the Americans could accept this. There could also be a call for sanctions if and when the question of Palestine is brought back to the Security Council in the year.