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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
ROME.

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Foreign Office	

Sir Michael Palliser  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON S W 1.

WED for draft reply pl.

cc. PS  
 PWS  
 Sir A Duff  
 Sir R Hibbert  
 Mr Rutler  
 Mr Facknell  
 Mr Howarth  
 EID (E)  
 FID  
 Det D.  
 RAN?  
 22/i

Dear Michael,

ITALIAN EXCLUSION FROM QUADRIPARTITE AND OTHER SMALL GROUPS

1. I have been giving some further thought to the question of Italian exclusion from the Guadeloupe meeting and other similar meetings in order to try to formulate suggestions for propitiating the Italians or helping them to minimise any damage that could be done by their continued exclusion.
2. An important point to remember is that this is not simply a question of amour propre - although this naturally comes into it and it is after all a legitimate element in any country's attitude in international affairs. For the Italians it has been an object ever since Cavour to be regarded as one of the Great Powers. This is why Cavour sent troops to the Crimean war and why Italy was present in the Far East and in Africa in the period between Italian unification and the 1914 war. This traditional attitude, which since 1945 has acquired the more respectable overtones of ensuring that Italy plays a full part in the councils of the Western alliance, would be prominent in the minds of our real friends in this country i.e. liberal-minded democrats. To their right and to their left there are many people in this country who would advocate an Italian foreign policy which would be very different and much less respectable or comfortable from our point of view. Therefore we have to take Italian resentment seriously even if we may sometimes be a good deal irritated at the way in which it is expressed.
3. Over the last year or two Italian sensitivity on this score has not been manifested except recently over certain tripartite meetings on defence procurement questions, and most recently of all over the quadripartite meeting at Guadeloupe. I think that the reason  
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for this absence of sensitivity is that we and others concerned have been very careful and ingenious in the arrangements which were presumably made both in London and in Bonn for quadripartite Summit meetings to take place in the course of the 7-Power economic Summits. Unfortunately in the light of Guadeloupe the Italians will be once more exceptionally sensitive on the subject when the Tokyo economic Summit takes place. As regards restricted meetings on defence procurement questions, I have already had some correspondence with Tony Duff about the occasions when the Italians have resented their exclusion from certain meetings. Duff has replied to the effect that in future those concerned in London will try to take account of Italian sensitivities while at the same time not allowing them to inhibit us from doing what we think is practically necessary and sensible. There was one other restricted group which was active earlier last year when there was intensive four and five power consultation about the Horn of Africa. This was at one stage not very well handled from the point of view of the Italians since they were sometimes included and sometimes not, but in the upshot they seem to have been propitiated by the Americans, who kept them fully informed on the subject without actually roping them into all the quadripartite consultations.

4. The first question really is whether to give way to the Italians on any of these groups. That is to say would we be justified in allowing them to join or would that simply open the door to others such as the Canadians etc.? The second question is how best to avoid embarrassing the Italians if further quadripartite meetings do take place without them.

5. I do not think it would make sense to contemplate actually including Italy as the fifth participant in a Summit meeting such as Guadeloupe. Nor do I think that Andreotti would have expected to be included (you will notice that in the representations that they made to us they at no time actually solicited an invitation to Guadeloupe). He himself has taken a notably relaxed and understanding view. But of course he would greatly deplore it if another such meeting were to take place soon (unless under cover of some larger meeting).

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6. As regards other occasions for restrictive groups, this is, it seems to me, simply a question of bearing in mind the Italian sensitivity and including them whenever their interest or expected contribution seems to warrant it. This I think would certainly apply to any future consultation on the Horn of Africa where I should have thought that the Italians were at least as well informed as we are.

7. As to the question of embarrassment, we seem to have successfully avoided embarrassing the Italians at London and Bonn so perhaps we shall succeed in doing the same at Tokyo. The only new point that occurs to me is that at Tokyo you might try to arrange for several other social encounters à quatre at which one or other of the Big Four could be absent and their place taken by Italy or Canada. It seems to me that some such device would at least serve to avoid pinpointing the hurtful quadripartitism for which Italian diplomats and diplomatic correspondents are always on the look out.

8. Finally, I suggest that we should bear in mind that our other three partners in quadripartitism are sometimes more successful than we are in propitiating the Italians. For example, the Americans informed the Italians 48 hours before the announcement of Guadeloupe even though, as I understand it, it was agreed between the four of us that nobody should be told anything in advance. And now I see that they are making a considerable fuss of Zaccagnini in Washington, no doubt partly in order to offset any damage to US/Italian relations which may have resulted from the Guadeloupe affair. The French too, although they have behaved with their habitual arrogance both over Guadeloupe and over the EMS etc., have also been quite active in telephone calls between Giscard and Andreotti and in sending Wahl on a special expedition to Rome to inform the Italians about the Guadeloupe conversations. The Germans have probably not done anything much except I think a telephone call between Schmidt and Andreotti, but then the Germans are not regarded by the Italians as models of courtesy. For our part the Prime Minister has written a nice letter to Andreotti and that is perfectly all right

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so far as this occasion is concerned. However, I think we must be careful that on any future occasion we are not thought by the Italians to be less understanding of their interests and sensibilities than the others are. If for example on some future occasion the Americans were to suggest inviting the Italians it would seem to me unnecessary and very undesirable for us to oppose this.

*Yours ever*  
*A H Campbell*  
(A H Campbell)

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cc. Peter Jay Esq. Washington  
Sir Nicholas Henderson GCMG, Paris  
Sir Oliver Wright GCVO KCMG DSC, Bonn.

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